33. 社會援助中的社會排斥:一個批判性的分析

Social Assistance with Social Exclusion: A critical review

     社會援助中的社會排斥:一個批判性的分析

歐陽達初AU YEUNG Tat-chor

關注綜援檢討聯盟Concerning CSSA Review Alliance

前言

近年香港關於福利的激烈討論,莫過於針對「福利依賴」(welfare dependency)及如何讓福利接受者自力更生,這成為社會保障及社會服務最重要的課題。而1999年可說是香港社會保障發展的轉捩點,它開啟了近10年政府針對社會援助,即綜合社會保障援助(下稱綜援CSSA),2次的福利改革。這2場福利改革,究竟是改善了接受福利者於於貧窮的境況,還是維持甚至加劇了他們面對的社會排斥(social exclusion)呢?

本文將聚焦於領取社會救濟中,一些有工作能力/健全的群體(able-bodied),包括失業、低收入及單親人士,以及新來港(來港不足7年)人士,因為他們是媒體、社會政策辯論的核心,是最具爭議性的福利接受群體。我們將探討他們現時的援助金額水平、福利改革的內容及效果,以至對福利接受者造成的污名化現象。我們認為政府推動的福利改革類近於英美的新自由主義(neo-liberalism)浪潮:要減少福利開支、援助個案,推動有工作能力的人士重返勞動市場,崇尚市場價值而政府儘量減少對市場的干預。我們將借助政府的統計數字,以及作為倡議團體(advocacy group)的經驗,批判地檢視現時香港的社會援助,其政策層面(policy level)的問題,最後我們嘗試提出一些改革的方向,期望可以透過社會保障改善貧窮人士的生活,減少社會不平等。

  1. 1.          接受者背景簡介

目前,香港約有488800人領取綜援[1],其29萬宗個案包括:長者、健康欠佳、傷殘共約70%,而失業、低收入、單親則佔約30%。綜觀而言,08年的綜援個案較98年的綜援個案上升約25%,其中平均每年增幅最高的為低收入個案(8.1%)[2],而單親、失業個案亦有輕微的上升,可說是近年綜援個案的增幅,主要來自健全人士個案。如表一顯示,從數字上亦可見到整體綜援個案,特別是失業綜援個案,其實與香港經濟表現(失業率)有密切的關係,如1998年是失業高峰的第一波,第二個高峰就是在2001年911事件至2003年香港經歷沙士期間,二者皆到了前所未有的高峰。03年後,綜援失業個案與失業率有同步下降的趨勢。因此,從宏觀上看社會援助的個案數,與經濟狀況(失業率)有較明顯的關聯。以下將簡介失業、單親、及低收入3組群體的背景,嘗試帶出他們個案的增幅反映著3個社會結構的變遷:長期失業、在職貧窮、家庭結構轉變。

表一

1.1    失業個案

從表二可見,香港失業綜援的個案,大部份屬中高年人士,年齡中位數為49歲,超過60%為男性,領取綜援年期的中位數為5.1年,而66.6%的受助人已領取綜援超過三年。不過,根據表二所示,失業個案最多集中於5年或以上,及1年或以下;這反映失業後1年內能否就業,將影響到他們會否變成長期失業個案。根據我們的經驗,這批失業人士包括因經濟衰退而出現的周期性失業人士,如去年金融海嘯後對外圍經濟敏感的行業,如進出口、物流、船務、中港貿易等;亦包括因經濟轉型(去工業化、服務業的興起)及就業市場二元化之下,製造出來的一批邊緣勞工(黃洪、李劍明,2000),他們經歷著開工不足、零散化、彈性化的就業狀態,包括建築工人、飲食職業的工人;當然,他們的一些特質亦可能令他們處於勞動市場中脆弱的位置,包括年紀、技能、學歷等問題。最後,失業綜援亦包括一批結構性地被主流市場排斥的失業人士,如更生人士、吸毒者、有酒癮賭癮者等。他們都屬於長期失業人士,並且一般性的就業服務難以協助他們就業,以至脫離綜援。

失業綜援在香港的認受性(legitimacy)很低,最常見的攻擊為「沒有期限、過於慷慨的福利造成福利依賴」。以此觀點解釋失業綜援領取年期中位數的上升,忽視了就業市場及經濟結構帶來的問題,甚至將問題歸咎於受害人身上(blaming the victims)。其實香港去工業化的速度相當驚人,特別是在90年代開始金融地產主導的虛擬經濟開始膨漲,但那時香港的經濟泡沫尚可以承載一批要面對轉行的工人。但自2000年起,特區政府已宣布香港要進入知識經濟的年代,但從經濟發展的軌跡看,金融服務(如銀行、資產管理)、資訊科技等新興行業,以至零售、個人服務業等,都難以吸納這批數以十萬的中年失業工人,加之以2001年911事件帶來的經濟不景,以至2003年沙士出現的急速經濟收縮,令失業率及失業綜援大幅上升,及至06、07年才出現明顯跌幅。

另外,許多市民常將失業綜援家庭與低收入家庭所得進行比較,並且得出「領綜援不需工作,其收入更勝工作家庭」的結論。這或許是事實(詳論見本文第3部份),不過卻應令我們反思造成這現象的真正原因,在於近10年香港基層工人的實質工資出現下跌的狀況。

表二

表三

1.2    低收入個案

根據社署的數字,低收入綜援人士的工資中位數為$4800,低於全港就業收入中位數的一半[3]($5250),而工時中位數為195小時,即時薪約$25。從他們的工作種類(表四)可見,他們較集中於清潔、雜工,以及分散於各行各業的底層。接近80%的低收入個案領取超過3年,而他們的年齡中位數明顯地低於失業個案,男性及女性分別為43及44歲。

正如前文所說,這批低收入個案屬近年新增的,而年增長率是最高,可說是社會援助對象中的「新貧」(new poor)。隨著工作福利的加強,即有更多失業者、家庭照顧者進入就業市場,但這批邊緣勞工的待遇卻得不到保障,如最低工資、標準工時、收入補貼等收入保障制度,我們預計將會有更多「失業」、「單親」個案轉變成「低收入」綜援個案。

表四

1.3    單親

近年香港的離婚數字不斷攀升,而單親綜援個案中,約65%為離婚或分居,17%為喪偶;83%為女性,超過60%為40歲以上。值得注意的是,香港的單親綜援個案大部份都是已婚的中年女性,這與美國備受注目的年輕未婚黑人母親有所不同。下文將由此引申出美國或其他國家針對單親家長的強制就業計劃,是否能直接套用於本地的單親婦女身上。

表五.

  1. 2.          資格 – 制度所排斥的人士

綜援作為一種高度選擇性(selective)的社會援助制度,它不單是香港唯一且最後的安全網,更要求健全領取者要符合3種資格:

  1. 居港年期:需居港7年或以上的永久居民,而申請前一年不能離港超過56日
  2. 經濟審查:入息審查及資產審查,前者即收入不能超過家庭認可的綜援金,而後者則約為5至7個月的綜援金。
  3. 參加自力更生計劃:積極求職及強制參與社區工作

上述的資格要求,其實有意無意地排斥了以下有經濟困難人士:

一. 新來港人士。這裡主要指因與家人團聚而來申請港定居的內地移民,多是丈夫在香港替妻子及子女申請來港。不過,部份新來港婦女與本地丈夫因著長期分隔兩地、出現婚外情甚至受到本地夫家的欺壓、家暴而無奈地要離婚。這批單親家長在現行的綜援制度下並不符合資格,除非她們能找到不少於約$1800的工作,否則她們很可能要與子女共用綜援金,即如3人共用2人的綜援金,這對新來港家庭構成極大的經濟壓力。雖然有論者支持有關做法,指出這關乎公民身份與福利權的賦予,不少國家都不容許新移民享用某些福利。不過,新來港婦女在香港的情況其實有點特殊,因為她們大部份來自中港婚姻,這隨著香港回歸後兩地互通日益頻繁更有升無跌。故此,她們多是與本地人建立婚姻關係後才來港團聚,並非純粹的移民家庭。更重要的是這批新來港家庭多育有子女,這一方面補足了本地夫婦生育率下降帶來的人口老化,但同時亦令她們墮進貧窮網中,因為母親的生活費亦會無可選擇地從孩子的綜援金中分享。我們認為這對她們以至香港未來的人力發展都沒有好處,更違反了聯合國經社文公約的社會權利規定。

二. 跨境工人/回流人士。這指一直在中港兩地往返的工人,以及回到內地定居的香港永久居民。前者在工廠北移、CEPA的出現後愈益增加,兩地不論在商業、婚姻、物流、娛樂等都有更多的接觸;後者多為長者,或因內地物價指數較低、親屬關係較強而回到內地,但之後因種種原因卻未能適應內地生活,欲回港生活卻陷入貧困境地。這制度基本上無任何政策理性(policy rationality)可言,只能說是但求減低個案數字,卻令不少此類家庭陷入絕境。

三. 低收入人士。這指收入僅高於綜援水平的低收入家庭,他們固然被排拒於綜援的支援系統之外,但值得檢討的是他們的收入只需略低於綜援水平,便即符合資格,並可享有豁免計算入息(disregarded earnings),令整體家庭收入較先前低收入更好,如下例:

4人家庭綜援金:約8000元;如他們找到一份收入$8500的工作,綜援就被取消;但如他們找到一份$6000元的工作,綜援金就會補貼他們$4500,而最後整個家庭收入變成$10500。這造成經常被人詬病的「綜援收入更勝工作」,亦在某程度上令僱主沒有加薪的壓力,因為工人不要求之餘更擔心加薪可能令他們被取消綜援的資格。

這種情況亦說明了為何綜援人士不易脫離綜援,主要原因在於現時領取綜援屬「一刀切」的模式,而綜援以外香港基本上沒有任何低收入家庭補貼的制度,因此他們面對著「All or Nothing」的狀態。再者,香港的次等勞動市場並不有利於工人得到穩定的生計,如他們能成功就業資格就被取消,紀錄即被刪除,一旦幾個月後被解僱,則又要再重新經歷一個多月的審查期。這種制度安排減弱了讓接受者「反彈」的效果。

總的來說,從資格上來看,綜援作為香港剩餘福利模式(residual model)的代表,社會上缺乏其他形式、層次的安全網,造成只有領取綜援才能令貧窮家庭得到最多保障:收入、租金、公立醫療費用、書簿費等。一旦欠缺綜援資格,則得不到任何制度化的安全感。這既令社會保障變得高度排斥性,亦令接受者與非接受者產生極大的社會分化。

  1. 3.          金額水平與脫貧的可能

3.1 綜援金與貧窮線

香港並沒有官方的貧窮線,不少官員曾表示綜援水平就已取代了貧窮線的意義。但若採用最常見的貧窮線指標,即住戶收入中位數的一半,可見到綜援家庭的援助水平,與貧窮線比較仍有差距:

綜援家庭水平例子[4] 貧窮線(住戶入息中位數一半)[5] 差距 收入超過貧窮線的可能
2人健全單親家庭(公屋戶)生活費1990+1820租金1500

補助金255

學童膳食津貼220

約$57852人住戶:$7000-17.4%工作收入達$1800或以上扣綜援金:$550總收入:5285+1800

=$70853人健全單親家庭(公屋戶)生活費1795+1639+1639租金1500

補助金255

學童膳食津貼220+220

約$72683人住戶:$9750-25.5%工作收入達$4200或以上扣:$1700總收入:$5568+4200

=$97684人健全雙親失業家庭(公屋戶)生活費1590+1315+1455+1455租金 1800

學童膳食津貼220+220

約$80554人住戶:$11500-30.0%1人工作無法高於貧窮線$8000扣:$5500

總收入:2555+8000

=$10555

如工作收入超過$8055,就被取消綜援資格

表六

從表六的例子可見,綜援水平比較貧窮線的差距,住戶人數愈多,則差距愈大。當然,如綜援家庭有工作收入,這雖然會在綜援扣除部份金額,但整理家庭收入仍會上升,甚至高於貧窮線,這是現時綜援戶唯一可以改善收入甚至超越貧窮線的方法。不過,當住戶人數達到4人時,如只得一位家庭成員工作,在制度上它的收入是沒有可能超過貧窮線。這反映了綜援家庭目前只有鼓勵更多家庭成員覓得低薪工作,符合資格領取綜援金補貼生活,才有機會脫離貧窮。

3.2   基本生活需要

綜援金主要由3部份構成:標準金、特別津貼、補助金,下文將檢討3種金額對健全家庭來說是否足夠,以及所反映的政策漏洞(policy gap)。

標準金

政府在1996年其實針對綜援金進行了一項「基本生活需要調查」,然後將綜援標準金全面提升。撇開政治因素,當時此舉的確令綜援人士的生活得以改善,亦代表著政府將綜援金水平更新自更貼近香港社會的轉變。不過,這研究距今已有13年,亦代表著綜援金的構成(基本需要)很可能已落後於社會的發展。根據香港社會服務聯會的「基本生活需要調查」研究顯示(社聯,2005),現時健全綜援家庭中,單身健全失業成人的金額較基本生活需要為低。

特別津貼

現時綜援除標準金外,最大份額的為租金津貼。一般來說,居於公共房屋中的綜援戶,其租金津貼是足夠支付實際開支的。不過,現時綜援戶中約有44000戶要租住私營房屋,其中一半家庭的租金津貼並不足以支付其開支。

而學童的一些新興學習開支,亦無納入綜援金的計算之內,例如學童的電腦上網費用等,這對他們來說是融入社會的一個途徑,但由於綜援金並無計算在內,故他們唯有使用標準金(本應用作衣食行)支付。

補助金

目前除單親補助金外,健全家庭並無資格領取任何補助金,而單親補助金為每月$255。

總的來說,香港的綜援水平是過高還是過低,是否足夠讓貧窮家庭維持基本生活,這是一個政治性的問題,因為這視乎我們用什麼尺去量度,而官方最常見的論點就是綜援水平比一般低收入家庭還要好,因此難以再提升綜援金額。不過,我們認為這種參考標準將帶來「競低」(race to bottom)的效果。相反,我們認為政府應以「基本需要」或比較國際慣用的貧窮線,以作為釐訂綜援水平的參考點,如上文所示,當我們用貧窮線作比較,則健全綜援戶的金額水平與貧窮線尚有一段距離,顯示香港的社會援助水平仍處於一個發展中的階段。不過,亦有關心綜援人士的福利改革者提出,最佳的脫貧方案並非增加綜援金,而是推動綜援人士進入勞動市場,以避免因增加綜援金而帶來的福利依賴效應。下文將探討這種工作福利(workfare)在香港實施的效果,是否可以符合官方所講,有助綜援人士融入社會。

4        兩次福利改革

1999年政府推出自力更生計劃,為工作福利的實施展開序幕,因為健全失業者必須求職(全職工作)以及社區工作。最常見的社區工作,包括強制受助人到指定的地方,如沙灘、郊野公園進行清潔、防蚊,並且會由社會福利署社會保障部派員直接監督。這種強制勞動的形式近乎「社會服務令」,即一種懲罰性措施,不但未能如政府所想,可以擴闊受助人社交圈子,更令他們的自尊心受損。另外,2003年政府首次推出「深入就業援助計劃」(Intensive Employment Assistance Programme),這有別於之前的自力更生計劃只扮演監察(monitoring)的角色,而主動請社會福利機構,由社工協助受助人安排培訓、職業轉介等就業服務。這開展了工作福利中,政府嘗試介入就業市場的供應面,即處理失業者的技術、態度等面向。

其次,政府在2005年推出欣曉計劃,主要針對健全的單親家長及家庭照顧者,這可說是福利改革的第二波。它要求受助人從事兼職工人,每月最少32小時。形式上它參考深入就業援助計劃,亦是提供就業服務作支援,但如不參與者將被每月罰款$200。

根據政府的數據顯示,此類的就業服務計劃成效一般,大約30%的參與者在參與計劃後能成功求職。不過,我們亦懷疑這與香港經濟表現有較直接的關係,因為05-07年香港經濟出現復甦,而此類計劃亦易出現泡沫效應(creaming effect),亦即能成功求職者本身具有一定的能力,即使沒有就業計劃,她們都可以成功求職。

根據關注綜援檢討聯盟及天主正義和平委員會的研究顯示,這些就業計劃具有「工作優先」(work first)的方向,即體現政府「low paid is better than no pay」的精神。就業服務的資源是與其成功就業率掛勾的,因此有機會出現推動綜援人士就業,而剝削她們的選擇機會,亦會忽視了「體面工作」(decent work)的精神。在缺乏政府宏觀介入就業市場的前提下,如沒有最低工資、低度監管的就業市場、沒有刺激就業市場的需求面等,這種棒子(stick)多於胡蘿蔔(carrot)的政策,只會減低邊緣勞工的議價能力,令原本已飽和的就業市場更出現擠壓(over-crowed)的狀態。再者,由於這些壞工作(bad jobs)的時間為黃昏至晚上或於公眾假期,都影響著受助人照顧家庭,並不對家庭友善,破壞了工作生活的平衡(work-life balance)。真正影響單親家長就業動機的因素,其實是工資水平、工作時間、能否照顧家庭等,而並不是出於個人對工作的厭惡或懶惰。同時,我們亦發現單親家長參與欣曉計劃,即投入勞動市場後,不見得與社會的接觸增加,反而參與社區活動、與親友見面的時間大幅減少。最明顯的就是她們大部份在職前都積極參與社區中心的義務工作,但在職後因為難以兼顧工作、照顧家庭與社會參與,故唯有放棄後者。因此,她們雖然進入了勞動市場,但不代表她們已脫離貧窮,只將她們置於另一個被排斥和被剝削的處境,使她們受到政府、僱主的雙重壓迫。(見表七)

  融入社會 社會排斥
參與勞動市場 高學歷、高收入,工作穩定的人士 低收入綜援人士、非綜援的在職貧窮人士(例如:清潔、保安)、參與欣曉計劃的單親家長(成功就業)
非參與勞動市場 有經濟能力的退休人士、家庭照顧者 失業綜援人士、貧窮長者、殘障人士、參與欣曉計劃的單親家長(尚在求職)

表七Gerrit van Kooten(1999)提出的「融入社會vs社會排斥」與「參與勞動市場Vs非參與勞動市場」

其實已有論者(Yu,2008)指出此類工作福利計劃,不是純粹的就業計劃、協助綜援人士求職,而是政府透過改革社會援助而減低個案數字,但更重要的是推廣一種「市場至上」的價值,即參與有薪工作才是公民必須的責任,排斥其他社會參與的形式、生產活動,如無酬的家務勞動、社區勞動等。

歐美關於工作福利的討論在社會政策及社會保障範疇內持續不減,但矛頭離不開福利帶來對工作意欲的負面影響。早有論者(梁麗清,1999)指出香港的接受福利者,並非如支對者所想,經理性計算綜援金及工資後,才選擇接受福利。他們大都不了解福利水平,只是到了積蓄差不多用光仍找不到生計,才決定領取綜援。當然,香港沒有失業保險,只有不需供款的社會(失業)救濟,但卻扮演著失業保險的一些角色,即有許多工作條件的要求。根據上文分析,這些措施對綜援人士脫離綜援影響有限,更重要的影響是經濟表現及就業市場的空缺、薪金水平。不過,福利改革並非簡單的一連串強制性就業措施,而是它施加在受助人身上的壓力令她們失去自主性(autonomy),減少她們對生活的選擇性,更重要的是它加強了香港人對「自力更生」、「福利依賴」的迷思,多年來已累積成對綜援人士的一種嚴重污名化(stigmatization)及歧視,甚至引發一些道德恐慌(moral panic)。

5        總結及建議:社會援助與社會排斥

本文嘗試從3個範疇分析社會援助的效果:金額水平、資格、工作福利內容。根據本文的分析,領取綜援的家庭仍經歷著貧窮與社會排斥,因為他們仍處於物質性的匱乏,缺乏資源、時間參與社會活動,如學童的學習發展活動、成人就業、參與社交活動的權利,這令他們都面對社會排斥的狀況;同時,綜援在制度上排斥了許多未符合永久居民身份的香港公民,以及其體現的剩餘福利模式、有限的安全網,都令不少被排除在綜援以外的新來港人士得不到任何保障。就工作福利改革的內容,本文透過分析欣曉計劃的經驗,對強制性就業計劃的效果及其推崇的市場至上價值,提出嚴重的質疑,指出香港模式的工作福利並不是從受助人發展的角度出發,並將求職的最重要責任放在失業者個人身上。當然,現行社會援助的制定過程非常不透明,更顯示了制度的不民主,綜援使用者難以參與改變,這亦反映了綜援人士在政治上面對的排斥。

根據我們數年來參與福利運動的經驗及反思,對現時的綜援政策,以至香港的社會保障有以下的建議:

一.    重新釐訂綜援水平

根據不同的指標,目前的綜援水平與「基本生活」仍有一段距離,而政府其實可參考1996年的做法,主動進行基本生活需要調查,以改善綜援人士的生活水平,將一些新增的生活開支納入綜援金的計算在內,特別是健全人士的生活費(包括就業開支)、學童的學習開支等。

二.    檢討現時工作福利的內容

從上述的分析可見,目前主導整個綜援政策的哲學,就是「從受助到自強」,因此對政府來說要解決貧窮,並不是依靠綜援制度。不過,我們認為綜援作為社會保障的一環,它需肩負起保障市民基本生活的責任,即使他們會繼續求職。針對協助失業綜援人士就業,政府應參考歐洲國家流行的積極就業市場政策(Active Labour Market Policy),投放更多資源進行人力發展改善生產力,以及從勞工市場的需求面入手,以確保就業市場有更多職位可吸納到這批中年失業的綜援人士,並保證工作可獲得合理的薪金(如實施最低工資政策等以及持續穩定的職位,正如愛爾蘭就為解決就業貧窮訂下了3個目標:「工有其酬」(make work pay)、「工有其所」(make work possible)及「工有其技」(make work skilled)。

融入社會並不只參與有薪工作一氣路,政府亦應承認單親家長(女性)的義務工作和家務勞動作為社會參與的一部份,並讓她們可以選擇從事有薪工作、義務工作或照顧家庭。面對就業時要有選擇,不應採用懲罰性的措施強制。反之,應採用多種誘因,協助她們就業,例如提升豁免計算入息,使工作賺取的入息可改善她們的家庭生活,並增強綜援的「跳板能力」,減低被排斥的機會。

三.    放寬資格

從公民權利的角度出發,綜援制度暫時排斥了許多群體,令不同的邊緣社群即使面對經濟困難,亦難以得到領取資格。當然,這牽涉到香港的人口政策、移民政策以及中港關係,但從人權的觴度,每個社會成員都應享有被保障的權利,既然他們的經濟狀況惡劣,而香港又無其他適合的社會保障支援,實應該接納他們,以增強社會的凝聚(social solidarity),減少族群之間的衝突。

四.    設立多層次的保障制度

香港作為一個全球城市,經歷著全球化、去工業化、資訊年代及風險社會的挑戰,各種社會危機可以迅雷不及掩耳地降臨,並對人民的生計作出不同的破壞:結業、裁員失業、減薪、增加工時,這更加顯示出以個體「獨立」地對抗全球性及本土性風險的脆弱性。為此,我們需要更好的福利制度,將這些社會風險集體承擔,防止它們不平等地分配到最弱勢、邊緣的一群身上。況且在生命的歷程中,今天的中產可以「下流」成明天的無產者甚至負資產,政府更應該強化多層的社會安全網,改善千瘡百孔的綜援政策,設立如失業保險、失業救濟,更具普及性(universal)的低收入補貼制度、最低工資、標準工時等。單靠傳統的社會保障亦可能難以回應一些新增的風險,如就業的彈性零散化等。

故我們需從宏觀的社會政策著手,包括房屋、教育、醫療、勞工政策,配合社會保障,除了能在物質層次上減少社會不少等、縮小貧富差距外,更應在製定的過程中,容許不同的持分者可參與其中,體現參與式民主的精神,真正邁向社會公義。

參考書目

梁麗清(1999),「依賴文化」,收錄於李健正、趙維生、梁麗清、陳錦華編,《新社會政策》,香港:中文大學出版社,頁299-310。

黃洪(1999),「積極勞動力市場政策:香港及國際經驗」,收錄於胡春惠主編,《亞洲研究》,第29期,香港:珠海書院亞洲研究中心,頁205-220。

黃洪、李劍明(2001),《困局、排斥與出路: 香港「邊緣勞工」質性研究》,香港:樂施會。

陳錦華(2004),「社會排斥與包容:『綜援養懶人』啟示錄」,收錄於陳錦華、王志錚編,《香港社會政策評論》,香港:中文大學出版社,頁27-38。

關注綜援檢討聯盟、香港社會保障學會及樂施會(2005,《領取福利援助之單親家長的就業政策研究──美國、挪威、新西蘭、荷蘭、英國、愛爾蘭的單親狀況探討》。

關注綜援檢討聯盟、香港天主教正義和平委員會(2007),《實施欣曉計劃對單親綜援受助人的影響研究報告》。       

政府統計處(2009),《一九九八年至二○○八年綜合社會保障援助計劃的統計數字》,香港:政府統計處。

Gerrit van Kooten (1999). “Social Exclusion and the Flexibility of Labour: A theoretical exploration”, in Littlewood, Paul (ed.). Social Exclusion in Europe: Problems and paradigm.UK: Ashgate.

Abramovitz, Mimi (2006). “Welfare reform in United States: gender, race and class matter.” Critical Social Policy, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 336-364.

Yu, W.K.(2008), “The ideological orientation of the new dawn project”, in The Hong Kong Journal of Social Work, vol.42, pp.105-117


[2] 「1998至2008年綜合社會保障援助計劃的統計數字」,香港統計月刊,2009年

[3] 香港統計處(2009),綜合住戶統計調查2008年10月至12月

[4] 此例子以公屋住戶為例子,因為大部份綜援戶都居於公屋,並且租金已作最保守估計,即實際租金可能較例子更低,因此綜援水平會與貧窮線差距更大,這類作較保守的估計。

[5] 香港統計處,綜合住戶統計調查按季統計報告2009年4月至6月

32. 香港的退休保障問題及前瞻

香港的退休保障問題與前瞻

歐陽冠東 AU YEUNG Kwun-tung

爭取全民退休保障聯席 Alliance for Universal Pension

香港自上世紀六十年代已開始討論一個全面性,有配套的退休保障制度。到了九十年代中,政府已預測在2030年間香港的人口老化將會嚴重。經過多年的討論,現時香港執行供長者退休生活的制度包括:1. 由私人機構負責運作的強積金(Mandatory Provident Fund/ MPF),2. 私人儲蓄及,子女供養父母等補充;3. 政府開支及補助,包括高齡津貼(Old Age Allowance) (俗稱生果金),及綜援金 (Comprehensive Social Security Assistance)。香港政府強調上述制度為世界銀行認可的三條支柱制度為長者的退休保障。

 

本文嘗試淺談上述退休制度的漏洞,並前瞻香港未來退休保障的發展。

 

強積金不能應付退休生活

強積金是一個強制性由僱員及僱主為僱員將退休而儲蓄作退休用途的制度,並交由信託人(Trustee)營運、管理及投資,希望達致在新自由主義下的公共行政管理學上的經濟(Economy),效率(Efficiency)及成效(Effectiveness),務求減少政府承擔。政府只作為立法者,於1997年開始訂立法例,於2000年起成立強制性公積金管理局(MPFA)開始運作,並要求信託人資本充裕,財務穩健,並有豐富投資經驗[1],因此只向大財團大企業招徠為信託人,以強積金管理費及投資收入等作為收入來源。一段而言,僱員及僱主各需供款5%,而月入$5000以下的僱員則不用供款。假設僱員從25歲開始工作,月入$10,000,僱員僱主年月供強積金$1000,一年則$12,000,在工資上並沒有任何調整。該僱員在65歲退休,他合共可提取$480,000強積金。如他有20年退休生活,每月平均可有$480,000/20/12=$2000的退休金,比現時政府發放的綜援標準金額 ($2576) 還要低。

 

上述計算必受信託人及經濟學人的批評,因為假設投資回報率是0%過於保守。不過,如檢視過去十年間積金局公布的強積金的整體回報率,強積金整體並未能達致有效的回報,能否有效確保退休生活已經成疑。在2008年間,強積金在下半年整體曾錄得12.8%的「負增長」,經濟發展周期起伏不定,情況實在未可樂觀。直至2009年6月,強積金整體只是回復至2.6%的增長。其實,在某程度上,政府亦承認強積金的不足,因此在2008年的財政預算案,為低收入僱員注資$6000,而此舉勉強令了強積金回復正回報。

 

不過,強積金還存在其他根本問題的,例如衍生對沖遣散費的問題。

 

現時強積金條例規定,僱主有權在遣散僱員時,遣散費或長期服務金內可扣除強積金中僱主的供款部份;又或在強積金中僱主供款的部份扣除已支付予僱員的遣散費或長期服務金。但現時基於勞工議價能力低,僱員遇上勞資糾紛時,常因時間及職業考慮的原因,接受和解,最後僱員須接受少於法定補償的長服金或遣散費。此外,強積金亦同時強調 “僱員” 才有資格供款。非僱員的包括家庭主婦,殘疾人士,散工等工作,均不會被強積金保障的。雖然,強積金亦有推出不少所謂「優化措施」,不過對增加或保障僱員強積金資產並不見得有大幫助,例如收緊信託人的行政管理費,以 “強積金自由行” 增加信託人的競爭等,均不會解決僱員強積金資產不足的問題。

 

積金局將會在2010年進行強積金全面性的檢討。現時積金局已建議檢討的範圍,例如提前領取強積金的年齡;而信託人則建議鼓勵作自願性供款以換取稅務優惠等,但均不能確保僱員的退休保障增加。問題是,當強積金的發展並不是以有效解決2030年人口老化高峰期為前提,這注定只會是一個失敗的制度。

 

私人儲蓄的局限性

雖然世界銀行亦提倡以私人儲蓄作退休三大之柱之一;但香港是一個貧富縣殊的社會,若一個僱員扣除日常生活開支及家庭開支後,不容易留下積蓄的。現時香港的工資中位數為10600元左右[2],加上貧富懸殊等因素,基層市民難以積穀防饑的。因此,私人儲蓄退休一詞只是能在中產人士當中實現的。在香港,一般人儲蓄會投過股票、買樓等方式進行投資活動以增加私人儲蓄。不過,私人儲蓄亦會面對強積金相同的問題。2008年雷曼兄弟的迷你債券風波中,有不少受害人是長者/投資者以作退休積蓄用人士。

 

而根據政府統計署的數據顯示,現時香港大約有近120萬名六十歲或以上的長者,每月開支中位數為2500元。當中有約26萬名長者的儲蓄大約有5萬元;而資產低於1萬元的長者,更高至37萬名[3]。有團體分析現時長者的貧窮問題最為嚴重,貧窮率達32.1%,有近27萬名長者生活於低收入或貧窮家庭[4]。另外,華人社會提倡孝,子女亦有供養父母的責任。然而,香港的經濟結構轉型後,香港新一代的入息不高,覆述上述情況後,是不容易有零錢供養父母的,早前有銀行進行民意調查亦顯示子女供養父母的意欲減少,亦認為父母本身應為自己的退休負責,不應期望子女供養。

 

政府補助的問題

現時,政府主要以高齡津貼 (俗稱“生果金”) 及綜援金支援長者的基本生活需要。如65歲至70歲長者申請生果金要作資產審查;而70歲以上長者不用資產審查。現時生果金金額為$1000,如用作日常生活使用便是明顯金額不足的;但有趣的是,香港整體對「全民性」無須資產審查的生果金制度抱有正面態度。政府曾於2008年的施政報告建議在生果金上設全面性的資產審查[5],但最終因社會有太大迴響而被逼擱置。

 

至於綜援金方面,政府過去一直在深化綜援是社會最終的安全網的觀念。它是透過設有資產審查後給予長者經濟援助,現時金額約為2590元。現時綜援受助人中,有一半以上已是65歲以上的長者。然而,綜援金的問題實在不少,其中申請人如與家人同住,便必須以家庭為單位提出申請;如家庭成員不能供養該長者,該長者也可申請綜援,但需要簽署不供養証明 (俗稱“衰仔紙”)。這種逼使家庭面對長者基本問題因會涉及破壞家庭和諧及尊嚴等結果而使不少長者卻步,有需要的長者也不敢申請。

 

綜合上述三條支柱在香港的現況,香港的退休保障的制度是不完善的,最後,「經濟安全保障不足」的長者只能選擇「退而不休」,在到達退休年齡仍不斷工作,甚至以拾荒等方法維持生計。

 

出路:建立一個全民性的基礎養老金制度

爭取全民退休保障聯席認為,其實解決長者基本生活開支的問題是不難的。聯席倡議全民養老金制度,是透過現時的政府,僱主及僱員集資,以三方供款的方法隨收隨付支出養老金,供養現時香港的長者。聯席透過精算專家確認,此方法可使香港所有長者在不用資產審查下,每月可獲三千元的養老金。聯席亦透過集結民間力量,向政黨、政府、專業團體及商界游說,在香港的勞動力未減退前設立養老金,在撫養率未上升的情況下,亦可達致積穀防饑,儲備的效果,在2030年的人口高峰期仍能繼續運作。若果現時制度如上述般不作出任何改變,後果只會不堪設想。


[2] 統計處:綜合住戶統計調查報告,2009年5月29日

[4] 香港社會服務聯會2009年最新貧窮及失業數據分析」http://www.hkcss.org.hk/cm/cc/press/documents/2009poverty.doc

30. Social Security in OECD Countries: Rewards, Reforms and Economic Crisis

Background Paper
Asian Regional Roundtable on Social Security
Hong Kong
October 8-10, 2009

Introduction

This paper provides a summary of social security in the member countries of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

It is divided into
three parts: rewards, reforms and the impact of the economic crisis.
While the social security measures of OECD countries may not be immediately
applicable to many countries of Asia, it is possible to learn from their experience. It is
also important to recognize that the social security systems of OECD countries vary
considerably. The variation is a by-product of the cultural and political diversity of each
country or region.
The social security system of the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Iceland, Norway and
Sweden) is the most comprehensive among OECD countries; their programs rely heavily
on insurance principles. The least comprehensive are the Anglo American countries
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States). Their
programs tend to be more means tested.
Looked at another way, the countries of Europe (east or west) generally have more
comprehensive programs than either those of North America or Australasia, including
Korea and Japan.
The paper does not analyze why countries and regions differ.

Rather, it describes the
rewards and recent reforms in four areas: pensions, employment benefits, family benefits,
and disability/sickness benefits. It also examines briefly the impact of the economic crisis
on the benefits and reforms.

Click here: http://www.aross.asia/paper_2009/Glenn%20Drover%20_%20Social%20Security%20in%20OECD%20Countries.pdf

31. Social Security in Hong Kong: Limitations and Inadequacies as Manifested by the Negative Public Perception on Recipients

Social Security in Hong Kong:

Limitations and Inadequacies as Manifested by the Negative Public Perception on Recipients

 

 

CHUNG Kim-wah

 

Dept of Applied Social Sciences

Hong Kong Polytechnic University

 

September 2009

 

Abstract:

Some form of Social Security has been developed inHong Kongsince 1971, which was known as “Public Assistance” then recently widely recognised as “Comprehensive Social Security Assistance” (CSSA). The simple social security system retains most of its early characteristics as a temporal, transitional and minimal assistance that are “least able to help themselves”. Over the years, the basic philosophy of the system as well as the structure remains largely unaltered, yet theHong Kongsociety has changed significantly and has been changing ceaselessly. With a primitive social security system for a more complicated community, the inadequacies and limitations of social security have become obvious. In particular, when the problem of “working poor” is more apparent, the existing system could hardly meet the emerging needs. Resulting from it lacking of fund support but have to be paid out from annual government budget, the government and even the public could feel the pressure. With hints from a recent study, it was discovered thatHong Kongpeople have ascribed the system with special attributes. This is manifested in sticking a residual but not institutional status to CSSA; this was also manifested in its widespread discrimination and ungrounded bias against CSSA recipients. The paper concluded that changes and reforms have to be made on the administration and structure of the existing social security system, more proactive intervention into the labour market is also needed to cope with the changing social needs

 

Keywords: Social assistance; Social security; social change, working poor

 

 

Introduction

 

Access to social security has become a fundamental human right[1]. This right is perceived as being realized in varying degrees in different countries as “determined by their traditions, history, level of socioeconomic development and the prevailing political and social philosophies”[2]. The idea of social security is easily comprehensible and is appealing to the public. Dixon concluded that it is “the adaptability of the social security idea to local conditions and varied cultural traditions that explains its global appeal”[3]. As a formal and institutionalized system to meet human needs, social security has achieved its popularity even in countries where the governments could only command limited resources for social security.

 

According to the figure by the United States Department of Health and Human Services, the number of countries with some forms of social security programmes rose threefold from late 1940s to early 1980s. Statutory protection against employment injury and provisions for old age were of particular important as most countries with social security systems have provisions on this[4].

 

Globally speaking, there are some outstanding characteristics in the development of social security. One of these is that increasingly more different forms of social security measures has been gradually developed to cater for different needs, while the coverage of social security system has been expanding to include people facing different kinds of new risks in modern social living. Apart from the more conventional modes, such as social insurance and old age assistance schemes, other contributory and non-contributory measures were developed. Allowances of different forms, some are mean tested while some are not, were also put forward. A comprehensive network of social care and protection has also been established in many countries where their governments provide remedies for different kind of living risks.

 

 

 

 

 

Social Security in Hong Kong

 

Development

 

In Hong Kong, social security had been developed as a public commitment since 1971, when the colonial government ofHong Kongwas committed to provide financial assistance for those who were “least able to help themselves”.

 

The original form of “Public Assistance” was an assistance scheme that was transitional, temporary and minimal. The recipients have to undergone a strict mean testing process on their income and assets to establish their eligibility; amount provided was for bare subsistence and was constantly under review. Assistance in form of “Allowances” was added to the system in 1973 that were targeted only for “old age” and “the handicapped”. Since then, the social security model ofHong Konghad been largely established without significant changes from its original ideas and design.

 

The only major component added to the social security system inHong Kongwas in 1995 when the government decided to implement the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) as retirement pension. This is perceived as a late coming policy change after decades of debates and unceasing appeals for it from the grassroots.

 

The MPF is a form of contributory saving scheme to make the setting up of personal pension account as a legal requirement. The plan was in effect until late 2000 but could only be expected to have its policy effect two decades away. The adoption of a mandatory, private-run approach rather then a state run and “Central Provident Funds” as those inSingaporeis still subject to challenged after these few years of operation of the MPF.

 

During the first two decades after the Public Assistance Programme as such was established, the system, with its simple structure and minimal provision standard, was able to cope with the social changes and demand. The following reasons are what have made that possible.

 

First of all,Hong Kongentered the economic take-off stage since early 1970s, and had experienced enviable economic growth except occasional economic setbacks, but none of those setbacks, even the most severe one in 1973 when the stock market collapse to an extent that the Hang Seng Index dropped by 90%, could halt the uprising and booming economy. This upward trend was also intensified after the Mainland China started it “Open Door” policy since 1978. With an expanding market and rising living standards, employment opportunities were always on the rise, average salary level was also surging. Majority of the population was lifting up from general poverty and low living standards to continual improvement in every aspect of economic life.

 

On the other hand, population ageing of the society was just in the start with a relatively stable family system which most elderly were taken care of. But as Hong Kong was without a pension system not until 2000, elderly people applying for Public Assistance were continually on the rise and constituting a major portion of the total caseload, with all categories only of lesser significant.

 

Table 1: Public Assistance/CSSA Case Distribution 1993-2009

  1993/94 12/1997 07/2009 % changed
1993-1997 1997-2009
Low Earnings 947 4148 15882 +388.01% +282.88%
Unemployment 4866 16976 34201 +248.87% +107.47%
Single Parent 6048 15849 36962 +162.05% +133.21%
Old Age 69927 109150 152820 +56.09% +40.01%
Ill Health 10886 20438 25132 +87.75% +22.97%
Disability 7990 12801 18118 +60.21% +41.54%
Other 4143 7570 6989 +82.72% -7.70%
Total 104807 186932 292095 +78.36% +55.19%

(Sources: Annual Digest of Statistics and Annual Report of the Social Welfare Dept)

 

As indicated in Table 1, up to 1993, close to 70% of the total Public Assistance Cases were old people. Except cases in the category of “Ill-health” that summed up to more than one-tenth of the total cases, all other categories were low in proportion. Cases which were unemployed able- bodied constitutes only less than 5% of the total caseload.

 

Therefore, the system, though with a temporal, transitional, and minimal nature, was accepted by the general public. As the provision level was only barely subsistent, the financial burden on the government was also slight even if the it had to make payment continually from the annual budget.

 

Current Issues Concerning Social Security in Hong Kong

 

This situation continued up to 1997, when elderly cases still constituted more than 70% of all CSSA case number. Before Hong Kong was handover toChina, the economy was booming and the salary level was in general rising rapidly and continually with the economic bubble and the rocketing inflation, labour demand had been constantly on the rise and it was with abundant employment opportunities for those who were willing and able to work.  The concept of “helping those who are least able” to help themselves was therefore taken for granted for social welfare and for social security in particular.

 

Under such a social atmosphere, the inadequacies and limitations of the existing social security system had not been alerting. Even when some argued for a major review and revision to the policy, public support had been sparse, or at least not strong enough to arouse public attention and to urge for actions from the government.

 

However, after the Asian Financial Crisis and the economic downturn since 1997, this “conventional” idea ceases to be convincing enough to justify the existing old style and minimal social security system.

 

As shown in table 1, “Old age” is now still the most significant reasons for applying public assistance, constitutes 51% of the near 300,000 cases, although its share in the total caseloads has been gradually dropping from close to 70% in early 1990s to just slightly more then half recently. The problem of old age poverty is still alarming as more then 230,000 people aged 60 or above, which is over one-fifth of this age cohort in the population, have to depend on public assistance for their living. The reluctance to deal with population ageing, the over-optimistic idea on the stability of traditional family care value, as well as the belated development of mandatory retirement protection all account for this over-representation of old people in CSSA application.

 

However, it is still apparent that the increase rates of old age CSSA recipients are still lower then the overall increase rate from the two periods of 1993 to 1997 and from 1997 to 2009. The table clearly spelled out the fact that “low-earnings” and “unemployment” have became the two major thrusts for the upsurges of CSSA application for the two period. The overall numbers of these two groups have been remaining largely stable in the last few years, demonstrating that the problem of “joblessness” and “pays below the subsistence standard” are becoming more and more apparent in the society.  “Unemployed” and “Working Poor” seem to have become more a risk factors for poverty and for social security application.

 

Recently, social security is the major expenditure component of social welfare spending inHong Kong. Of the 33.9 billionHong Kongdollars spent under the categories of “Social Welfare” in the 2007 to 2008 financial year, 71% was on Comprehensive Social Security Assistance and Special Allowances (CSSA).

 

During the period from 2006 to 2008, although economy was said to have been recovering from its low and the number of employment opportunities are ever increasing, there are still nearly 300,000 cases receiving CSSA, involving over half a million people out of the less then seven million total population in Hong Kong[5]. This figure had been rather stable in the last two years demonstrating that quite a significant number of people here have not been benefited by the improvement in economic situations.

 

In recent years,Hong Kongsociety is becoming more and more concerned about the issue of poverty. The Poverty Commission was formed in 2005 and the government is committed to provide remedial services to cater for the needs of those trapped in poverty as well as to formulate better policy to resolve the risk of inter-generational poverty.

 

 

“Working Poor” and the Distorted Perception on Social Security

 

The growing disparities in income distribution and the ever increasing number of “working poor” is one of the most alarming issues inHong Kong.

 

Table 2: No. of “Working Poor” Family Measured by the International Poverty Line Standard

  1998 2005 (2nd Quarter)
Size of Household Half of Median Household income (HK$) No. of Household (with at least one working family member) Half of Median Household income (HK$) No. of Household (with at least one working family member)
1 3,800 6,900 3,000 2,900
2 7,500 25,800 6,500 25,500
3 9,500 44,500 8,500 52,000
4 10,000 48,500 9,800 60,600
5 11,000 30,500 10,350 22,200
6 or more 13,350 16,900 11,100 7,200
Total 9,000 173,100 7,800 170,400

(Source: Legislative Council: Committee of Poverty Eradication)

 

Though the economies has been gradually recovering and had hit the record high economic growth since 2005, low income group seems not benefited significantly as those earning HK$4,000 or below has increased by more than 30% then in 1996, and has exceeded 300,000 (9.7%) in number out of Hong Kong’s than 3.3 million total workforce[6]. According to the projection generated from census data, more than one million people out of the seven million people here are living in “working poor” families (see table 3)

 

Table 3: No. of Poverty Stricken People in HK: Measured by International Poverty Line Standard

  No. of Persons % Share of HK Total Population % of Children in Low Income Households
1991   11.2% 17.1%
2001 1,070,300 15.8% 20.7%
2003 1,122,700 16.5% 22.0%

(Source: Hong Kong Council of Social Services)

 

In principle, those low income workers, like the unemployed, could apply for Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA) or, to be exact, Low-income CSSA, as a temporal remedy for the hardship encountering them. The actual number of Low Income CSSA recipients is also remained relatively high in the last few years, reflecting that the Low-income CSSA does provide some assistance for those who apply for it. However, it is also evident that the general public has developed negative ideas on Lo-income CSSA and has sticking negative stereotypes for those who apply for assistance. This is manifested by the frequent complaints and accusation to daily phone-in radio programmes, this is also revealed through occasional cases of CSSA recipients accusing the undue pressure and prejudice they experienced in their daily living.

 

Obviously, the society is divided on policy options in tackling the problem of poverty, working poor, and the proper role of social assistance programmes. Some put forward new policy options for this pressing problem, some criticized the lack of unresponsiveness of the society to those who are desperate; while some argued that it is not financially feasible to sustain the poor through public expenditure, some argued that more restrictions and means testing criteria have to be implemented, some, including government officials, put forward ideas the lifetime drawing limit has to be imposed to those able-bodied poor. Before all these would be rationally weighted and put into the policy agenda, it is obvious that pressure on working poor is ever increasing, the antagonism on CSSA recipients is becoming more intense.

 

There are two fundamental questions to studying the issue of “Working Poor”. First of all, the definition on “working poor” is difficult enough to appeal for consensus. “Working” has long been merited as a social and personal virtues particularly in the pragmatic and achievement orientedHong Kong. “Working” has been regarded generally as the most normal and acceptable way for one to get money return so as to finance their daily spending. The citizens here are also long been recognized as hardworking, aggressive and willing to work long hours for personal and familial economic improvements. In times when working is valued not only in principle but also rewarded with livable income, all those who are able to work and are actually working are assumed to be economically independent and socially recognized as productive bodies. In this sense, working but poor had not been so appealing and is not recognized as a kind of social risk deserving public attention. Provision of financial and income transfer through the public purse is therefore less justifiable then to the “old Age persons” and “people with disabilities”, even when the concept on “working poor” has been gradually developed and becoming more widely recognizable in the community.

 

It is also argued that the government officials have been repeatedly initiating and generating momentum for discourse of this kind and have been quite successful to develop a rather negative image on people who are unemployed, especially those who live on welfare because of unemployment[7].

 

In the way, a general prejudice against “CSSA recipients” is developing gradually. This prejudice has become a general impression and conception in the public, the concept of “CSSA recipients” is particular denoted with negative connotations when it is associated with “new migrants” who come to share the economic fruits of our society, most of which are regarded as “lazy” and accustomed to “big bowl rice” in the pre economic reform period. “Working Poor” are also regarded as incapable and lack of personal assets to maintain their continual staying and living inHong Kongsociety.

 

Therefore, it is not surprising to find that people are valuing the blurred and confusingly conceived “CSSA” negatively, particularly when the unemployed or new immigrants are being discussed. This prejudice and negative social image on “welfare recipients who are capable of taking up employment” is assumingly to have exerted undue pressure and burden on the recipients themselves on one hand, and on the other hand may have undermined the appropriate utilization of CSSA on another hand.

 

Hints from a Recent Study

 

A recent study has been conducted to explore general public’s understanding on social security and in particular CSSA.[8] That study also tried to explore whether people understand or not that CSSA is a basic social safety network in Hong Kong provided for all those who are in need.

 

With a community wide survey, more than 30 case interviews and focus group discussion, it was found that people inHong Kongare holding contradictory views and sentiments to the issue of CSSA. It was found that public perception on CSSA has been seriously distorted to generate widespread biases and even discrimination against CSSA recipients.

 

In fact, most people were able to point out that CSSA system is a basic protection and human right of Hong Kong citizens, which provides effective economic supports to anybody in need, especially the disabled and elderly. In addition, a few of them could even point out that CSSA is a system which can stabilize our society through preventing crime and social unrests.

 

No Evidence of a Dependency Culture

 

However, on utilization of CSSA benefits, most of them stated that they would only apply for CSSA as a last resort when they were in need. The community ofHong Kongis still preoccupied by the idea of self reliance and tend to value personal hardworking strongly. Related to these believes and ideas come a very conservative perception on CSSA, that CSSA has been quite commonly accepted only as a last resort of assistance.

 

Most of those “working poor” people expressed that if they encountered financial difficulties, they would first try to solve that by themselves (e.g. using their personal savings, pledging their belongings or borrowing from relatives and friends).

 

It is not uncommon that some people were found to be with genuine needs for CSSA but still refuse to apply for social assistance not until no way out. The majority of the interviewed low-income workers reported they were not receiving CSSA and were unwilling to apply for one or a combination of the following reasons:

 

l   they thought they are still able to work and earn money;

l   they wanted to act as role models to children and new immigrants;

l   they thought they are not qualified to apply;

l   they did not want to disclose personal information; and

l   they had poor experiences in the past.

 

Furthermore, some refused to apply CSSA due to their poor experiences in the past. It is more alarming that most of the people who did not intent to apply for CSSA cited “do not want to dependent on the government” as the reason, indicating that a greater part of the respondents saw receiving welfare benefit as a sign of “dependence” and “reliance”. Many people were found not willing to make themselves and/or family members to be looked down by other people because of receiving social assistance. This also indicates that there is perceivable prejudice against welfare recipients held by the public.

 

 

 

 

Widespread Discrimination, Prejudice and Biases

 

With this mentality, it could reasonably understandable that people tend to be easily over-alerted by any abuse and fraud in CSSA utilization. On the other hand, able bodied welfare recipients as well as working poor people could be easily attached with negative valuations. Negative ideas on CSSA recipients have been very widespread in the community. Discrimination, misconception on CSSA and CSSA recipients are therefore found to be quite common among people particularly from the grassroots. Those negative ideas were also exaggerated by some simplified messages as spread around easily by the mass media.

 

Interviewees who have had taking up CSSA commented that most people in Hong Kong society would not show sympathy to them or try to understand their actual situations; but just think they should go to work as they were young and able. Such wrong expectation was often a great annoyance to some recipients who in fact not feasible to work.

 

Besides, CSSA recipients were always being connected with “laziness” and “burden to the society”. These serious labeling effects led the CSSA recipients always feel great pressures and have lower self-esteem. As CSSA recipients were labelled and discriminated by the public heavily, many of them chose to reduce the contacts with the others in order to hidden their identity as recipients. As a result, they often had fewer friends and poorer social connections.

 

It is found that many people who had not actually applied for CSSA tended to accept the media’s point of view. For example, many of them expressed they agreed much with the statement “CSSA is serving the lazy people”, which was often mentioned by the mass media.

 

It is also discovered that those who was born in Hong Kong or had migrated to Hong Konglong time ago often had strong belief that all “Hongkongers” should be willing to work and rely on their own. They always used this characteristic to distinguish themselves from the new immigrants. Therefore, their views towards the new immigrants would tend to be negative and disapproving; a number of them even thought that the majority of the CSSA recipients were actually the new arrivals from the mainland.[9]

 

Based on such ungrounded belief, some local people had started to blame the newly arrivals for they had not made contributions to theHong Kongsociety, but used up most of the social resources. Some of the interviewees even believed that, the current welfare policies inclined to serve new immigrants more than local people.

 

Besides verbal abuse, the new immigrants also faced greater invisible pressures from the society. Some new immigrant with CSSA-application background reported their self-esteem was lowered since they were always blamed by people; while some non-CSSA recipients claimed they were afraid to apply for CSSA though they might in need. Moreover, the Social Welfare Department introduced a residence requirement on the CSSA onJanuary 1 2004. Only residents who have been inHong Kongfor seven years are eligible to apply for the benefit.

 

The phenomenon of discrimination also existed among different groups of CSSA recipients. One of the most common conflicts was caused by the insufficient transparency of CSSA policy.

 

It is observed that the conflicts among parties in grass-root class had been more common and intense recently. For instance, people often accused the CSSA recipients since they heard from news that many people do not go to work and abuse CSSA; they blamed the new immigrants as they believed the new immigrants had taken away their job opportunities and social resources. Besides the CSSA recipients and new immigrants, other minority in the society, such as unemployed, elderly, children, disables and single parents are all thought to be the ones that took away the society’s resources.

 

As the grass-root class atHong Kongcould share very small proportion of the fruits of economic achievements of the society; they could always feel their living quality being continuously worse off. More and more people then tend to interpret their situations by what they had heard and imagined. They neglected where the problems actually come from, but only shift the responsibility to other parties that come from lower class. This makes the polarization within the grass-root class become extremely serious.

 

 

Actual Barriers in Applying CSSA

 

Adding to the negative perception of CSSA as described, which invisibly hindered the people in needed to get help from CSSA, there are actual barriers that applicants usually have to face. The administration and operation of CSSA has set up obstacles and unreasonable constraints for potential service users. Some have experienced extremely negatively in the application process and have been disgraced in the process of help seeking. Even frontline social workers also seems to have negative comments on the CSSA application process and regarded it sometimes as obstacles rather then assistance to relief the hardship of those in poverty and working poor. Some social workers reported that, during the process of CSSA application, the social welfare staffs would insult, threaten or make unreasonable requests to the applicants. These practices may have the effect of checking out some needy people, while this is also regarded as a kind of disservice acting against the original policy spirit of CSSA.

 

Similarly, though the Support for Self-reliance (SFS) Scheme was ascribed with a high sounding as well as appealing policy rationale, the operation of it had been negatively commented by both service users as well as some frontline human service professionals, including social workers and union organizers, as being harsh and extremely prejudicing, over-demanding but not assisting, hindering instead of facilitating. In effect, the SFS is sometimes, or in some cases, found to be or at least felt to be demoralizing rather than motivating self reliance.

 

 

The Pauperization of Working Poor

 

Widespread discrimination, prejudice and misconceptions were uncovered or confirmed by this study. Additionally, the empathetic and caring social atmosphere of the community is being gradually eroded by long lasting economic pragmatism in the achievement orientedHong Kong. Some other people’s less-fortunate and disadvantaged situations could easily be regarded as “personal inadequacy”, contributing to higher momentum for negative social valuation on “working poor” and CSSA recipients.

 

With the Asian financial crisis, the broken economic bubbles, and the resulting economic restructuring, the labour market situation is changing and the general public is facing up with different aspects of hardship. “Scapegoating” is always an easy tactic to justify truculent sentiments arising from the keen and harsh competition in the community; antagonism and discriminative mentality against those who are less valued, perceived as with lesser contributions to the community, and who are perceived as even taking “advantages” from the society could be also be easily flourished.

 

The changing policy discourses on CSSA and the propaganda on the valued “self-reliance” have also magnified the negative social images of the working poor as well as CSSA recipients. We observed in the general survey and our informants a general sentiment against the welfare recipients.

 

The study also confirmed that the obvious negative images developed in the general public have also been somehow internalized by the working poor themselves. This has exerted undue pressure for those in hardship and has undermined the appropriate and proper use of CSSA as a measure for one to transit their hardship and to actualize their social right to social security.

 

The downward movement of the unskilled labours to jobless people and welfare recipients illustrated how the de-industrialization processes started in 1980 had greatly changed the labour market structure, displacing and marginalizing some sectors of labours and left many of them becoming jobless. Obviously, without proper, timely and appropriate public intervention into the labour market, the situation of some groups of working people is prospected to be further deteriorating as the economic restructuring processes are still on their way.

 

Reasons for Worsening Social Situation for the Working Poor

 

There are two outstanding reasons for the worsening social situations for the working poor. Fundamental to all is the lacking of proper regulation and intervention into the labour market. In effect, the tyranny of capitalistic orientation would inevitably commodifying labour and tend to marginalize sectors of labour ceaselessly.

 

The second reason for worsening working poor issues is the inadequacies and limitations of the existing social security system inHong Kong. Adding to the complexities of this is the increasingly widespread prejudices and discrimination against social security recipients.

 

 

 

The Lack of Proper Intervention into the Labour Market

 

The lack of proper policy to intervene into the labour market tends to magnify the problem of “working poor”. The following two forces are interplaying with each other to make the situation unduly non-attended to for prolonged period:

 

Under the existing socio-economical as well as political context disfavouring unionism and collecting bargaining, employers are facing limited refrains from reducing manpower cost by reducing posts, or by making working long hours a norm of practice. Employees displaced from factory settings who compounded with relatively higher age and lower education attainment are particularly in a disadvantaged social situation.

 

The government of the HKSAR, with its “positive non-interventionism” policy stance, has an innate reluctance to extend its interventive role into the economy and the labour market on one hand, and has a predisposition that the fruit of economic growth will eventually be trickled down to benefit all those who are not “lazy” or reluctant to pick up paid employment. This in result becomes a reason for non-intervention, and this has also become a self-fulfilling prophecy to justify further indifferences to the obviously worsening social situation of the working poor.

 

In result, with economic restructuring and an obvious shift in labour market demand as well as lacking of proper intervention to cater for the changing risks in employment, the government is still reluctant to enact some more progressive and aggressive policy options, such as minimal wage, to protect basic livelihood beyond the subsistence level. Other policy intervention into the labour market are also far from adequate to make the worsening of “working poor” issue a lesser threat to labour.

 

 

The Inadequacy of the Existing Social Security System

 

In principle, those who are without a gainful employment to maintain their livelihood and those who could only earn below the socially acceptable standard could have access to the social security as a social safety net. In practice, however, social security inHong Kong, both in policy design and in practice arrangements, is with obvious limitations for this.

 

The social security system ofHong Kongis lagging behind expectation and is too limited to cope with the changing social scenario. The existing social security inHong Kongis largely in form of its original design when it was developed in early 1970s. CSSA as a form of public assistance is still the single most important component of social security ofHong Kong. Allowance system is simple and limited with only old aged and handicapped catered for. Other contributory social security measures have not been developed saved from the late coming MPF in 2000. Other forms of social insurance have not been employed here.

 

On the other hand, to face up with increasing number of so called “able bodied” beneficiaries to CSSA, the government put forward new strategies in the general concept of “promoting Self-Reliance” since 1999. However, the strategies so forth being adopted is perceived as not at all effective on one hand, and as having negative implication for its intended beneficiaries on the other hand.

 

This total reliance on the “pay as you go” social security is no longer effective to offer guarantee on continual system improvement to meet social changes and the changing needs associated with it. With more and more elderly fall into old age poverty and have to rest on CSSA as pension, could the government finance the system in the long run without detrimental effects to the fiscal health of the government? On the other hand, with more unemployed or working poor people to support, is it still adequate to offer only subsistent level assistance without considering how to develop personal capacity through welfare assistance? Would it be possible that such a remedial approach to social assistance for the new poor eventually lead to trapping more in long term poverty instead of releasing them?

 

Dichotomization of Welfare and Work – Who Benefits?

 

According to the findings of that study, it is understandably clear that social security ofHong Kongis inadequate in many aspects. On the other hand, the issue of poverty and in particular the issue of working poor is becoming burning as the economic restructuring is continuing to displace production sector workers away from the labour and manpower market, while the service sector and the financial sector are particularly “unfriendly” to certain categories of people, namely, those who are middle aged or above, those who are with education and training background incompatible with the “needs” of the business, some of which are in fact unjustifiable and discriminative in nature.

 

It seems that the dichotomization of welfare and work is the fundamental reason leading to the regretful development of negative images and discrimination on CSSA recipients, particularly those working poor people, and the gradual erosion of the original policy goal and goodwill in rendering assistance to those in economic difficulties with CSSA.

 

The Social discourse on social security/CSSA, with the “scapegoating mentality” of media, compounding with the unintended, or maybe intended, “official talking” on CSSA tend to dichotomize welfare and work further, with the tendency in dignifying work and demonizing welfare. There is a popular belief that welfare fosters a dependency culture, thus creating a self-perpetuating underclass with no incentive to work. On the other hand, it exalts self-reliance, however humble the payment one gets from his employment.

 

It is complicated by structural causes, namely demographic changes – the increase of old-aged recipients, and economic downturn in recent years, which boosted up the welfare expenditure.

 

The new right ideology and the general thrust to pragmatism, as well as the welfare reform experiences in western welfare states also provide excuses for the government to take steps cutting back welfare bill, or at least limiting the eligibility of those who are able to work.

 

Media reports, in addition, focus heavily on the behaviours (abuse and fraud) of individual welfare recipients and working poor (self-reliance) rather the structural issues—the failure of the labour market.

 

Therefore, in formulating recommendations on improving the operation of CSSA, it turns out appearing that Welfare Reform alone, or more specifically, reforming CSSA alone, could not solve the problems.

 

It is undeniable that the wide-spreading and growing misconceptions, prejudices, discrimination and even antagonisms against CSSA recipients and particularly able-bodied CSSA beneficiaries have to be dealt with properly. It is also apparent that that the operation and administration of CSSA are in many aspects pressingly in need for improvements.

 

But more fundamentally, the inadequacies of the existing social security system inHong Kong, which is basing heavily on CSSA and as a system retaining largely its original design in 1970s, have to be addressed to squarely. With changing social and economic structure, more proactive measures to intervene into the labour market will be needed. It is now no longer tolerable to let the dichotomized discussion on welfare and work skewing toward favouring “work” and bewitching “welfare” to spread further. At the same time, if the situation of those working poor is to be improved, it is also no longer preferable to let “work” and related issues surrendering to the uncensored tyranny of the “market”.

 

Only with a combination of the above mentioned as a package on reform could CSSA and social security in Hong Kong be granted its proper roles in the society, and to ensure that the original policy goals of CSSA and social security be maintained, improved and valued accordingly by the society so as to make it functioning properly to achieve what they are supposed to achieve.

 

The study also indicated clearly that welfare alone is inadequate to deal with the issue of working poor, but welfare provision is indeed the last resort for them to turn to. However, with widespread misconceptions and misunderstanding on the nature of CSSA as well as wrong perceptions, prejudices and discrimination against CSSA recipients, some working poor people were reluctant to make use of CSSA even until the very last moment. The original policy intention and the latent goodwill of the community are therefore undermined. Some things have to be done on these if an effective and functional social safety net for those who are in difficulties is still a communal spirit the society ofHong Kongwishes to uphold.

 

 

Recommendations for Changes

 

With economic restructuring, and with the long term lack of policy visions to prevent labour market complications under the new economic scenario, social security protection should be fundamental social safety net for against marginalizing labours for them to cushion against contingencies in social living, as well as to provide them with sufficient space for labour transition. This assumed mission of social security had not been functioning satisfactorily inHong Kong. Improvements concerning the following four aspects are therefore necessary. Firstly, efforts have to be made to prevent discrimination against social security recipients; secondly, the society has to reconsider the proper strategies to administer CSSA and related measures; thirdly, the government has to undertake a fundamental review on the inadequacy of the existing social security system in Hong Kong; and finally, some more proactive interventions into the labour market have to be considered.

 

1.     Prevent Discrimination

 

In order to prevent the spread of popularization of discrimination against social security recipients, the government should take initiatives to foster a more positive attitude to “Low Income CSSA” There are obvious barriers in applying CSSA / low-earning CSSA. Many of these low-income workers expressed explicitly that their economic status were even worse than those receiving CSSA. This arouses bitter feeling and consolidated the negative images on those who choose to take low earning CSSA and set up a viscous cycle in perception and utilization. It is therefore with contradictory trends that more people are getting low earning CSSA due to low income while some other with low income are reluctant to apply for CSSA because of their intention to evade from prejudices. Both of these are perceived as displacing the original good will and policy objective of CSSA as well as social security, which in the long term is going to discredit the original policy goal of CSSA. It is therefore recommended that a more positive attitude to low income CSSA has to be developed instead of accusing those who are being benefited or who should be targeted beneficiaries.

 

Therefore, to combat inappropriate discrimination on welfare recipients should be on top of the agenda. The government should take initiative to handle the issue of discrimination against CSSA recipients and even among CSSA recipients themselves. New immigrants and the unemployed are facing even greater discrimination and are being negatively stereotyped by the society, with the government’s action, government’s indifferences, the actions and speech of some government officials as well being significant instigators of this negative stereotyping. This phenomenon is also probably caused by lack of information provided to the public about the CSSA. It is therefore recommended that the government should reformulate its policy, and to reconsider its strategy. The government should be more cautious and reasonable in public expression on issues concerning CSSA. The government should also take steps to increase the transparency of the CSSA policy and to deliver more widespread public education on the proper attitude towards income disparity and the proper policy justification for the CSSA.

 

 

 

2.     Proper strategies to administer CSSA

 

In term of administrative strategies on CSSA and related measures, some more options are useful in expanding the scope and benefit level of recipients so as to actualize the original policy intention of the system. .

 

One of the possible measures is to provide “Allowances” as an option to support gainful employment. The government has experimented to provide transportation allowance to those living in remote areas, and this has been adopted as a more committed policy in the current financial year. Nevertheless, many interviewees reported that long travelling hour was also a major obstacle for them to seek jobs outside, especially for those need to look after their families and housework. With this family role and responsibility, less competitive job seekers are always forgone and the policy effect of transportation allowance is greatly jeopardized. In order to ease the employment strains of remote new town areas where job opportunities are lagging behind population growth, it is recommended that the government should play a leading role in providing more job opportunities there in form of speeding up public services and to transform contracted jobs into public servant vacancies.

 

The government should also play a leadership role to confirm the vitality of “Low Income CSSA”. As more and more people start to know low-earning CSSA, it is true that with the increasingly harsh of the labour market environment and pauperization of the low income sector, more people are with higher intention to use CSSA, saved from the perceived pressure they have to endure. It is quite apparent that some low-earning CSSA recipients were actually treating low-earning CSSA as a temporary means for escaping from the harsh demand from the labour market. Without proper intervention to the labour market, the pressure on CSSA will be continue to rise if all other factors remain unchanged. It is therefore recommended that the government should consider a more balanced approach on public service provision and labour market intervention on the working poor issue, and to make low income CSSA an inalienable right for all.

 

 

  1. 3.                                                              To Conduct A Comprehensive Review on Existing Social Security System

 

It is obvious that the existing social security system is becoming less and less capable to deal with all kinds of social risks. The system itself is over-reliant on a single mode of public assistance in form of CSSA to cater for all welfare demand. As CSSA is a pay-as-you-go in nature and has to be financed every year out of the government budget, the aging of population with majority of them without pension arrangement, the economic restructuring leading to more structural and sectoral unemployment, the mismatch of labour market with labour pool, the previous pro-business policy approach and the tyrannies of the unregulated labour market, together with the unfair policy of the government all serve to intensify the problem of working poor and to ever increasingly exerting pressure to those less fortunate social members. The government is therefore urged to reposition itself and to formulate proper policies on all these fronts if it really has an intention to develop a more harmonic society where the disparities and inequalities among social groups could be eased properly.

 

  1. 4.            More Proactive Interventions into the Labour Market

 

The is clear than wage too low or uncontrollably low is a major factor drawing some people away from the labour market, it is also a major factor to demoralize workers. Without proper intervention to the labour market, the pressure on CSSA will be continue to rise if all other factors remain unchanged. The government is therefore urged to reformulate its non-interventionist approach to the market and its conservative mentality towards social protection, especially under this rapidly changing economic arena ofHong Kong.

 

The government should also improve public consciousness on labour rights, to undergo comprehensive review on the relevance of the existing retraining programmes so as to evaluate their effectiveness to assist displaced workers to find a position in the labour while also guarantee them reasonably gainful employment. In particular to the working poor issue, the government should consider a more balanced approach on public service provision and labour market intervention on the working poor issue, and to make low income CSSA an inalienable right for all. It is also high time for the government to consider seriously adopting minimum wage as a regulative measure with the ultimate goal of treating workers fairly, and with an instrumental goal to reduce pressure on public finance.

 

 

Conclusion

 

The economic recovery in the last three consecutive years have bought with recorded high economic growth since 1997, while the total number of employed people has also reached the historical peak in Hong Kong. However, it is also apparent that the income disparities are ever expanding. According to the most recent figures released by the Hong Kong Government, households earning less than HK$4000 per month have increased by nearly half since 1997, reaching a total of more than 200,000 households. The Gini Coefficient has also reach an alarming point of 0.533. All these point to the fact that the issues of poverty, low income and working poor are now intermixing together as a complex web of social and economic phenomenon needing immediate social attention as well as actions. From a humanistic point of view, it is intolerable to allow a significant portion of our population staying in that desperate situation for extended period, which had marginalize them from the mainstay of the society, while also may jeopardize their life chances of themselves and their family. From a pragmatic perspective, the existence of a consolidated underclass is also by no mean a healthy development of a society as the possibility of social instability and class confrontation would be seeded to upset the long term prosperity of Hong Kong. The above mentioned recommendations are therefore put forward, with the wish that the situation of those less advantaged sector of our society could be eased on one hand, and to maintain a balanced development spur of Hong Kongon the other hand.

 

 

 


[1] Perrin, G (1969), ‘Reflections on fifty years of social security’, International Labor Review 99(2); 249-269

[2] Dixon, J. (1999), Social Security in Global Perspectives, WesportConn.: Praegerm, p.1

[3] Ibid.

[4] International Labour Organisation, (1984). Introduction to Social Security.Geneva: International Labour Organisation, p.13

[5] In May 2007, according to the Social Welfare Department, the total caseload of CSSA were 293 952, with 516 404 recipients.

[6] According to 2006 Population By-census-Summary Results, the number of working people earning less than $4000 a month increased from 242429 in 1996 to 324434 in 2006.

[7] Lai & Wong, (2006), Review on CSSA, Hong Kong:Alliance of the Review on CSSA.

[8] Centre for Social Policy Studies, Department of Applied Social Sciences, Hong Kong Polytechnic University and the Oxfam Hong Kong (2007) Perception and Utilization of the CSSA: a Study on the Views of the Public and the Lower Income People, Hong Kong: Centre for Social Policy Studies, Department of Applied Social Sciences, Hong Kong Polytechnic University

 

[9] Aaccording to the up-to-date figures from the Social Welfare Department, CSSA cases that involved new arrival recipients, which having resided in HK for less than 7 years, were only 10.5 to 14.1% of the overall recipients in the past eight years. Obviously, the majority of CSSA recipients were still local “Hongkongers”. The proportion that involving new arrivals was not as high as the general public preserved

29. 社区非正规就业的制度阻碍与出路 ——以吉林省的社区就业为例

社区非正规就业的制度阻碍与出路

——以吉林省的社区就业为例

社区就业是通过开发社区岗位来实现就业的一种方式,从形式上看,社区就业大都属于非正规就业,这种就业的优点是具有较强的灵活性,技术、年龄等方面要求不高,适合存在就业困难的失业下岗群体的实际需求。我国目前大力提倡社区非正规就业缘于就业压力不断攀升,失业群体的就业难度不断加大。相对于全国而言,以重工业为主要经济支柱的东北三省失业问题更加严重,发展社区非正规就业就更具重要性和紧迫性。

1996年以来,全国裁减国有企业职工达到100-200万的省区有12个,东三省尽在其中,人数最多的辽宁省达259.43万。由于长期以来经济结构单一,新兴产业不多,正规部门提供的岗位有限,东三省下岗职工再就业非常困难,再就业率逐年走低。从吉林省来看,1998年吉林省国有企业下岗职工再就业率为51.63%;1999年下降到35.5%,下降了16.1个百分点;到2000年,再次下降为15.7%,比上一年下降了19.8个百分点。这三年吉林省国有企业下岗职工再就业率均低于全国水平。到2001年,情况略有好转,再就业率上升为37.77%,仍远低于1998年的再就业率(见表6—1)。

2006年7月,据吉林省城镇零就业家庭情况摸底调查发现,零就业家庭为49195户,就业难度很大。这一群体涉及总人口132098人。其中有就业愿望人员73447人,持有再就业优惠证人员7713人,已进行失业登记人员24885人。他们中有就业愿望的人员素质偏低,年龄偏大,且大都没有专业技能,这就决定了这些人只能适应一些技术含量较低、以体力劳动为主的工作,再就业面临许多实际困难。[1]

表6—1         吉林省国有企业下岗职工基本状况

年份 吉林省国企累计下岗职工 上年结转(万) 本年新增(万) 到年末仍未就业(万) 进服务中心人数(万) 吉林省国有企业下岗职工再就业率 全国下岗职工再就业率
1998 41.59万 12.56 34.04 51.63 50
1999 58.49万 34.04 24.09 34.4 27.48 35.5 42
2000 54.04万 34.4 12.13 41.91 36.5 15.7 36
2001 45.28万 41.91 17.93 27.35 22.26 37.77 30

资料来源:参考1998-2001年《吉林统计年鉴》

居高不下的下岗失业人员与城镇新增劳动力、农村剩余劳动力一起使得东三省就业问题十分尖锐。目前东三省的失业率远高于全国平均水平。2003年,全国城镇登记失业率为4.3%,东三省平均为5.2%,辽宁省已达到6.5%。近两年,国家有关部委和东北三省落实了一系列推动东北振兴的政策措施,就业情况开始好转,但辽宁省的登记失业率在2005年仍达到了6.15%。从城镇登记失业率来看,东三省的失业率并没有达到7%的警戒线,但城镇登记失业率能否全面真实地反映失业情况一直受到质疑,因为有相当多的人并没有登记失业。有学者认为,全国人口普查所涉及到的失业数据基本可以反映失业状况的全貌。根据2000年全国人口普查资料,中国15岁以上人口的城镇失业率为8.27%,而东三省则远远超过了这一全国平均水平,失业率在全国排名为第一、第二和第五,其中辽宁省为17.68%,黑龙江省为15.43%,吉林省为13.88%。[2]从这一数字可以看出,东三省的失业率早已超出了警戒线。如果一个地区失业率超过警戒线,除非有良好的社会保障作后盾,否则极有可能爆发大规模的社会动乱或经济危机。但东三省在社会保障极不健全的情况下失业率如此之高却并没有爆发大规模的社会动乱,原因何在?

事实上,相当多的失业下岗人员都在从事着不稳定的,但可以保证他们基本生活的社区非正规就业,比如钟点工、保姆、小商贩等等。社区非正规就业以其特有的灵活性容纳了大批在年龄、性别、技能等方面不具有优势的失业下岗人员,使得他们的生活免于陷入贫困。东北三省虽然在1980年代就倡导非正规就业,但由于社区建设不完善以及制度体制等方面的制约,社区就业在总体上来看还处于“自发”阶段,其进一步发展遇到了政策瓶颈。2005年8月—9月,笔者以吉林省社区非正规就业为典型案例,采取个案访谈、文献收集等方法对吉林省社区非正规就业情况进行调查,以期待进一步了解东北社区非正规就业的现状及其存在的问题。

(一)非正规就业的概念及相关理论

非正规就业的概念

正规就业一般是指在正式单位就业,并签订劳动合同,其权利和义务有法律保障的就业形式。

非正规就业主要指无固定场所,无固定雇主和服务对象、无固定劳动关系、无稳定收入、无社会保障的小规模经营的就业形式。国内学者从不同角度对非正规就业进行了相当广泛的研究,但由于问题的复杂性和太多的因素交织在一起,到目前为止,政府和社会各界没有就非正规就业概念达成共识。[3]内涵模糊、外延重叠的现象十分普遍,而不同的定义必然会导致不同的政策出发点和不同的政策主张。

国际劳工组织认为,非正规就业就是指“在非正规部门里的就业”。它的特征是:容易进入或没有进入障碍;主要依赖于本地资源;家庭所有制或自我雇用;经营规模小;采用劳动密集型的适用性技术;劳动技能不需要在正规学校获得;较少管制和竞争比较充分。这个定义把非正规就业看作是在非正规部门里的就业,这个界定在我国并不完全适用,因为在我国大量的非正规就业者处于一种“散兵游勇”的状态,他们不属于任何部门,同时正规就业部门中也存在着非正规就业,所以从范围来讲,非正规就业应该是比非正规部门更大的一个概念。

从国内最先引入非正规就业的上海市情况看,它是把非正规就业界定为“下岗失业人员介入或组织起来,通过参与社区的便民利民服务、市容环境建设等公益性劳动,为企事业单位提供各种临时性、突击性的劳务及家庭手工业、工艺作坊等形式进行生产自救,又无法建立或暂无条件建立劳动关系的一种就业形式”。这个界定明确了非正规就业的工作重心,但却把其他形式的非正规就业排除在外,显然不能作为我们研究非正规就业的依据。

综合国内外相关研究成果,我们认为:社区非正规就业从其主要组成部分来看,它主要是指下岗职工、失业人员参与社区便民利民服务活动的个人和组织,暂不便于进行工商登记,也无法建立或暂无条件建立稳定劳动关系的一种生产自救性质的就业形式。从形式上来看,社区非正规就业应该包括两大类:自雇型非正规就业群体(小型个体、微型私营经济活动或流动的小商小贩);受雇型非正规就业群体(受雇于大中型企业的临时工、小时工、劳务工、季节工和受雇于小型和微型企业的劳动者)。与正规就业相比,非正规就业具备几个显著特征:与劳动单位没有签订完整的劳动合同,没有稳定的社会保障,没有固定收入。只要符合上述三点中的一点,就可以称为非正规就业。

解释非正规就业的理论基础

非正规就业的理论基础之一是二元经济论。刘易斯认为,发展中国家的国民经济部门可分为两部分:现代工业部门和传统农业部门。这两大部门的经济性质和劳动力的工资率差异悬殊。每一个理性的劳动者为了追求利益的最大化,不断地由农村向城市流动。农村传统农业部门将源源不断地向城市输送劳动力,直到城市现代工业部门吸净农村剩余劳动力为止。后来,刘易斯的两部门模型受到发展经济学家托达罗等人的质疑。托达罗认为,农村剩余劳动力进入城市后,并不直接进入城市现代工业部门,而是先进入城市传统部门,然后再转入城市现代部门。非正规就业就出现在城市的传统部门。这种理论阐明了非正规就业产生和发展的外部动力,从城乡关系和城市化的动态演进解释了非正规就业的发展。

非正规就业的理论基础之二是贫困理论。这种理论阐明了非正规就业产生和发展的内部动力。它强调由城市失业和贫困化而引起了社会阶层分化,那些没有能力进入现代经济部门的劳动力,只能进入非正规部门就业,这种迫不得已的选择促进了非正规就业的产生和繁荣。国际劳工组织为许多经济贫困、落后的国家和地区制定了全国性或地区性就业发展计划,使非正规就业理论逐步演变为一种指导这些国家就业决策的规范。

非正规就业的理论基础之三是制度边缘理论。秘鲁经济学家德·索托认为发展中国家非正规经济是在国家严格控制的经济制度下市场力量的真正爆发,非正规部门产生和发展的原因主要是严格的歧视性的行政和立法制度。这种制度所形成的经济环境会导致资源的“劣”化配置并在经济上迫使企业在法律框架以外从事经济活动,这也就是非正规部门长期存在的原因。另外,新制度经济学认为,制度存在的一个主要功能是降低成本。政府对企业在卫生、安全、社会保障和社会福利等方面增加了多方面的管制,无形中加重了企业的成本,企业转而采用规避管制、减少成本的非正规化办法从事经营活动,也推动了非正规经济发展。

(二)吉林省社区非正规就业发展的制度支持

在新制度经济学看来,个人的行为并不能达到完全理性,因为外界环境是复杂的、不确定的,在这样的一种环境下,个人对世界的认知能力是有限的,所获得的信息是有限的,而制度能通过一系列规则的制定来减少环境的不确定性,提高个人的认知能力,降低交易成本。从非正规就业的发展历程来看,正是有了制度的支持,社区非正规就业的发展速度才有了明显的提高。

按照国际标准来衡量,早在改革开放以前,吉林省城镇就存在非正规就业,只不过正规就业势头强劲,就业大都由国家统一安排,因此非正规就业的规模非常有限。乡镇企业及农民工进城打工最初推动了非正规就业的发展,但也没有引起太多关注。1993年以后,经济转型和产业结构调整使得正规就业部门的职工大量下岗、失业,下岗职工与城镇新增劳动力、农村剩余劳动力一起出现使得就业问题十分严峻。在这种情况下,政府把加强社区建设和扩大就业有机地结合起来,把社区就业工作摆到重要位置,以城市社区为依托,以市场需求为导向,按照产业化的发展方向,大力开发社区就业岗位,引导、帮助更多的下岗职工和失业人员在城市社区服务领域实现就业或再就业。实行了鼓励多种经济发展的政策,于是区别于传统正规就业模式的社区非正规就业形式也自发或经由政府鼓励而迅速发展起来。

据劳动部门统计,2004年吉林省城镇新增就业中,到国有企业的占16.0%,到集体企业的占2.1%,到个体、私营企业及其他各种经济型单位达到了81.9%。可以说,近几年吉林省城镇下岗失业人员有70%以上是以社区非正规形式实现再就业的。

就笔者的调查发现,目前在吉林省的失业下岗人员中,约有30%的人从事着“比较稳定”的工作,这些人大都是有一技之长或者自己有钱做一些小买卖的;约有60%的人“不稳定但经常”能够找到工作,这些工作大部分是小时工、力工或者其它的一些家政服务业;而真正“什么也没干”的下岗职工实际上非常少。非正规就业具有低门槛、低岗位成本、高效率、灵活方便等优势。

社区就业的方式灵活。李女士原来在长春市二面粉厂工作,36岁时下岗,下岗后找了几份工作,但时间上都不合适,因为爱人开出租车,孩子上学要人照顾,家里的老人也需要人护理,要找一份既能照顾家庭,又能兼顾单位的工作,首选自然是社区非正规就业,于是在社区市场根据季节的不同交换着经营品种,她冬天烤地瓜、春天卖瓜子、夏天卖水,秋天煮包米。

社区就业进入门槛低。李春娟是吉林市塑料厂的下岗职工,由于家境贫困,她找到了所在的街道。经过协调,就业部门为她办理了非正规就业手续,在2000年12月正式开办了“一帆”切面店,这一下使她的家庭收入大大增加,每年纯收入在6000元以上,不但解决了家庭生活和孩子上学的后顾之忧,还可以新安排两名下岗职工就业。“是非正规就业让我走到了今天,虽然我只是一个芝麻粒大的小老板,但我的带动效应却不小,这几年来到我这儿学习办店的下岗职工,还挺多呢!”李春娟说。

由以上两个案例可以看出,社区非正规就业对劳动者的技能、年龄、性别、学历没有太高要求,包容性较大,尤其是家庭保姆、家庭清洁、家庭搬迁等家政服务业,成为解决失业下岗人员的一个重要行业。社区非正规就业从时间到空间,从形式到内容,无处不体现其灵活性。这种从业方式的灵活性尤其适合那些上有老下有小,既要照顾家庭又不得不承担起改善家庭经济状况重任的中年妇女。

为了推进失业下岗人员社区就业,1998年以来,吉林省出台了一系列促进下岗职工和失业人员就业与再就业优惠政策,推动了社区就业的进一步开展,对于鼓励失业下岗人员到社区再就业起到重要作用。目前这类政策主要有:

税收优惠政策。各级税务机关要按照国家税务总局《关于下岗职工从事社区居民服务业享受有关税收优惠政策问题的通知》(国税发〔1999〕43号)和省地税局、省劳动保障厅《关于认真落实国家和省有关下岗职工再就业税收优惠政策的通知》(省地税联字〔1999〕7号)的规定,对下岗职工从事社区居民服务业项目的,在规定期限内给予免征营业税、个人所得税、城市维护建设税和教育费附加等优惠政策。

工商登记优惠政策。根据《关于认真贯彻落实党中央、国务院〈关于切实做好国有企业下岗职工基本生活保障和再就业工作的通知〉的通知》(工商个字〔1998〕第120号),对下岗职工从事社区居民服务业的,给予3年内免收工商行政管理行政性收费等项政策。

信贷优惠政策。根据《国务院办公厅转发国家经贸委关于鼓励和促进中小企业发展若干政策意见的通知》(国办发〔2000〕59号)和中国人民银行《关于进一步改善对中小企业金融服务的意见》(银发〔1998〕278号)的有关规定,切实加强对下岗职工和失业人员自谋职业和组织兴办社区服务小企业等社区就业实体的金融服务。要采取切实有效措施,运用企业互保、联保、贷款保险、建立担保基金等形式,解决好下岗职工所办企业的贷款担保问题。第三产业贷款贴息政策要重点扶持社区服务业项目。

申请小额担保贷款政策。下岗失业人员自谋职业、自主创业或合伙经营组织起来就业,资金不足的,经贷款担保机构承诺担保,可向各商业银行或其分支机构申请小额担保贷款。金额为2万元以内。对下岗失业人员合伙经营和组织起来就业,10人以上的贷款额度不超过2—3万元。[4]

免费培训的优惠政策。下岗失业人员持《再就业优惠证》、下岗证、失业证、特困证、低保证中的任意一个即可享受免费职业技能培训。

地方政府或组织为促进就业自行设计实施的政策。长春市朝阳区政府2004年出台了《鼓励全民创业、建设特色街路工作实施方案》中,制定了相关的优惠扶持政策:凡在朝阳区范围内,具有创业能力的多类失业人员,均可利用自身优势、自家资源、自主经营创建开办各类小型和微型企业,从事商贸、餐饮、修理、加工、中介服务等个体经营项目。其中,各类失业人员可向区劳动保障部门提出申请,给予项目和岗位认定,进行就业登记后,工商部门将先行发给筹办营业执照。自取得筹办营业执照之日起,六个月内免收相关费用。由妇联牵头实施的“巾帼社区就业小额借款项目”,扶持对象是40岁左右、有劳动能力、有从事社区服务愿望但缺少资金的下岗失业妇女,每户借款为3000—5000元。

个人续保政策。个人可以缴纳养老保险政策的出台使一部分非正规就业者解决了后顾之忧。2001年,长春市连续下发了几个文件,鼓励个人参加保险。比如在2001年年初下发的《关于妥善处理职工社会保险关系强化社会化服务等有关问题的通知》,这成为全省开办个人缴费窗口的第一个指导性文件。这个文件对接续养老保险关系的人员范围、缴费基数、缴费比例都作了规定。在2001年11月份再次发布《关于企业职工、个体工商户接续基本养老保险关系的通告》,规定个人缴费窗口向所有中断缴费人员开放。2003年,又对原有政策做了三次微调,一次大调。包括:取消了距离法定退休年龄不足5年续保人员缴费基数的限制;取消了已达法定退休年龄中断缴费人员续保的限制;统一了不同性质人员到个人缴费窗口补交欠费的缴费基数、缴费比例等。

劳动保障监察政策。2004年11月1日,国务院发布了《劳动保障监察条例》,总结了十多年来劳动保障监察工作的经验,规范了劳动保障监察程序,明确了劳动保障行政部门、用人单位和劳动者在劳动保障监察工作中的权利与义务,强化了劳动保障监察执法手段。这一政策的贯彻实施,对于进一步加大劳动保障监察执法力度,规范劳动保障监察执法行为,维护劳动者,特别是非正规就业从业者的合法权益会起到积极的作用。

上述就业优惠政策的落实使社区非正规就业中以自雇经营为主的个体和私营经济受益最深,而自雇经营的发展创造出了大量社区就业岗位,从而在一定程度上带动了社区就业的发展。但由于社区就业开展的时间不长,其有效管理办法尚在探索之中,再加上现行扶持政策本身存在局限性、落实中存在诸多矛盾,使得社区非正规就业深入发展面临一些障碍。

(三)制度的有限性对非正规就业的阻碍

制度所制定的一系列的规则应该具有这样的几个基本的特点:一是公平性,它能够保证绝大多数人的利益,二是效率性,规则的存在可以保证行为的高效运行,三是激励和约束性,规则可以弥补个人对行为判断时信息的不足,对合理的行为起到激励的作用,对不合理的行为起到规避作用。可是我们从目前对非正规就业的政策中可以看出,规则并没有发挥出应有的效用,制度的有限性主要体现在以下几点:

1.扶持社区非正规就业的政策不完善

(1)享受优惠政策的人群过窄

从优惠政策的享受对象可以看出,可以享受到优惠政策的只有四大类人:国有企业下岗职工;国有企业失业人员;国有企业关闭破产需要安置的人员;享受最低生活保障并且失业一年以上的其他城镇失业人员。[5]这四大类人主要是原国有企业失业下岗人员,大量和他们面临一样困境的集体企业员工被排除在外,他们在就业的过程中享受不到任何优惠政策。享受优惠政策的人群过窄,大量需要扶持的非正规从业者没有得到应有的扶持。

(2)小额担保贷款门槛过高

从长春市的情况看,从2004年初到6月末,发放小额贷款为300万。按每人贷款2万元的上限计算,实际贷款人数仅为150人,覆盖面过窄。

在调查中还遇到一些人,他们根本就不具备贷款的条件。

王女士,50岁,无业人员,由于以前实行岗位顶替制,子承父业,所以王女士的父亲、丈夫、儿子,一家三代人都在拖拉机厂工作,他们的交际圈也限于拖拉机厂,企业效益不好,所有的亲戚朋友的生活都会差不多,在这种情况下,想贷款做点儿生意,首先找一个“具有偿还能力的自然人做担保”就很困难。再者办小额贷款得下岗证失业证什么的都要全,王女士说自己也不是下岗也不是失业,反正不明不白地单位就给放长假了,什么证件也没有。最关键的是自己本来就穷,要是再赔进去可咋办?

小额担保贷款效果不理想的主要原因是贷款的门槛过高。目前吉林省下岗失业人员申请小额担保贷款必须:持省市劳动保障部门核发的再就业优惠证;工商行政管理部门核准登记并获得营业执照;投资项目明确,确有发展前途,且资金不足;有固定营业场所;有按期还款能力;具有偿还借款能力的自然人做担保;本人诚实守信,无劳教或犯罪记录。[6]从这几个条件来看,基本上是针对已有做生意的经验,且生意小有规模的人员而言的,不适用于大多数下岗失业人员。对吉林省的居民来说,求稳定怕冒险是他们共同的心理特点,没有一个心理和经验上的缓冲期,而直接去办营业执照——贷款——经营,风险太大。

(3)非正规就业者的培训效果并不是很明显

非正规就业的进一步发展离不开培训。近些年吉林省为培训下岗失业人员投入很多,组织开展了再就业免费培训班,开设了几十种专业,报名学习的人很多,也取得了一定的成效。但非正规就业者的培训效果并不是很明显。

代女士今年刚刚35岁,但她自己觉得很老了,言谈之中总是有种自卑。她说找工作人家都要年轻的小姑娘,还得长得漂亮,自己这么大岁数了,找工作难哪。以前也学过技术,花了一千多元,学做面食,但老师教的技术根本就不行,拿不出手,市场不认。虽然后来也给她发了证书,但挣不着钱。至于免费培训,她说基本上就是学护理病人,没太多项目。也有学电脑的,但电脑培训仅仅是半个月的课程,最长的也就一个月,学的都是些皮毛,想做一个最起码的打字员都不可能。

我在长春市一家大型劳动力市场调查时遇到一位私企老板,他想招几个技工,但来了几天了还是没有招到。他说真正的好技工太少了。现在技术工人的来源,一是工厂的学徒,二是以前各类职业学校的学生。学校教出来的学生在实际操作上有差距,而在工厂学徒的也不多,一方面现在的人很少愿意学这个,再者如果自己带一个学徒,那么学成之后他就会跳槽。我问政府免费培训出来的技术工人有没有人推荐给他,他说根本就不知道还有免费培训班这回事儿。

从上面的案例来看,非正规就业者的培训仍然存在一些问题。虽然为下岗失业人员的培训很多,但培训后的就业率正在逐年下降,出现这种情况的一个主要原因是没有把正规就业和非正规就业人群划分层次,培训没有针对性,培训专业设置与市场信息不对口,培训内容浅显,与应用脱钩,同时培训与职业介绍缺乏有机联系。由于没有专门针对非正规就业者的培训,非正规就业的进一步发展很困难。

2.社区非正规就业与城市管理存在严重冲突

(1)社区就业服务体系不完善

据一家用人单位反映,他们企业需要清洁工,月工资380元,在长春市永春路市场招聘,招聘了一个星期却无一人报名。因为许多人住的离这家企业都很远,除去坐车、吃饭,一个月的工资就会所剩无几。为什么会出现这种情况呢?主要信息不畅,如果这个信息在该企业所在的社区发布,情况自然会有所不同。由于市、区、街道三级职业介绍机构之间缺乏有效协调,没有形成信息联网,这些都会大大限制职业介绍机构功能的发挥,也直接影响到职业介绍的成功率。笔者在调查中了解到一些下岗职工的实际困难。

陈女士,31岁,有一个5岁的孩子,已正式下岗五年了。当年休产假时她所在的木板厂2000多人只留下了二百来人,她也就此休“长假”了。在这五年间她也打过工,每天起早贪晚,早晨走时孩子还在睡觉,晚上回来,孩子已经睡下了。孩子一上火,一生病,住几天院,打几针,她一个月辛辛苦苦挣到的三四百元钱就进去了,还不如不找工作好好在家带孩子呢。这样孩子5岁时她才出来找工作。她说前几天有家玩具厂招工,一个月500元钱,她去看了,挺喜欢那份工作,但离家太远了,骑自行车要1个多小时才能到,遇到刮风下雨或者冬天路滑那就更惨了。如果坐车的话,一个月光车票就得几十块,想一想挺不划算的,也就算了。

像案例8所介绍的陈女士这样的下岗职工很多,她们上有老下有小,生活压力很大,如果能够为她们提供就近的招聘信息,降低她们的就业成本,那么就业率将会有所提高。在调查中还了解到,就业局下设的劳动力资源市场的信息量远远大于其他劳动力市场,社区给下岗失业职工提供的信息是最少的,因为不少求职者都到社区登记过,也有不少社区主动为失业者登记,但“登记就像走形式,登过之后,就没信儿了”。就业信息短缺是制约就业发展的一个大障碍。虽然在网上能够查询就业信息,但网上的信息更新慢且陈旧,搜集就业信息也成为各职业介绍机构的一件极费心思的大事。究其原因,第一产业和第二产业释放出大量劳动力,而第三产业不发达,无法创造出更多的就业岗位是主要原因。同时,到企业去搜集信息的信息员力量有限,而且用人单位发布用工信息的渠道有限。

此外各个职业介绍机构的就业信息不能整合,社区职业介绍职能缺失,增加了求职者的成本。我们在调查中发现,到市内一些大型劳动力市场找工作的人很多,但到区劳动力市场找工作的人在逐渐减少,到社区找工作的就更少了。基层的社区职业介绍职能的缺失,不能为失业人员提供就近用工信息,其结果是不仅增加了求职者的成本,而且也使企业的用工成本增加了。所以许多人干脆越过社区,每天坐车到离家很远的劳动力市场去找工作,这就大大增加了其成本,对于一部分对时间和空间的灵活性和弹性要求较高的求职者来说,这种跨地区的求职也在无形中降低了其找工作的成功率。

(2)行政部门缺少有效配合,市场进入门槛高

由于一些部门历史形成的原因和下岗职工自身经济能力较低,社区在开发下岗失业人员就业岗位的过程中,受到来自方方面面的限制,有时一些手续办理时间较长,效率太低,使社区就业速度受阻。

长春市三马路在2004年6月份开始开放“不夜街”,一些非正规就业者,在夜晚的市场上,以各种方式从事着经营活动,且收入不菲,有些人光是每天晚上烤肉串,一个月的收入就可以达到3000元左右,许多非正规就业者都得到了实惠。但由于工商部门办照程序比较繁琐,一个执照办下来需要一、二周的时间;卫生防疫部门是自收自支单位,经费源于监测费,减免事业性收费难度很大。由于相关手续始终没有批下来,结果仅存在了12天就被取缔。

上面是长春是“不夜街”夭折的案例,这个在长春市具有巨大商业潜力的“夜市经济”始终没有被有效挖掘,这和市场准入门槛高这一障碍的限制是分不开的。市场准入门槛高是吉林省的普遍现象,审批手续繁杂,各个部门条块分割状况严重,审批一个项目困难重重,这些都极大影响了非正规就业从业者的经营活动以及进入市场经营的信心和勇气。因而,行政部门互相配合,降低市场进出入门槛是非正规就业发展的必要前提。

(3)法律法规不健全,非正规就业者就业权益得不到有效保障

一些雇主和用工单位以试用期为借口,无偿使用劳动力,试用期一过马上换人;随意扣留抵押金;任意延长工时;随意惩罚员工等等。如案例10的例子所显示的,被雇主和用工单位恶意欺诈是影响非正规就业者就业积极性的一个显著因素。

无法维权。王女士,40岁。从一家集体企业下岗后找到的第一份工作是一家饭店的服务员。每天早上四点上班,晚上八点下班,工作非常辛苦,讲好了月工资是600元。但第一个月过后只给她发了380元,220元钱被扣作抵押金,王女士想要一个欠条,老板拍着胸脯保证说这钱肯定少不了她的。但没过几天王女士就因为工作上的一点小失误,被老板责骂,王女士愤而辞职,抵押金一分钱也没要回来。由于当时没有签劳动合同,王女士不知道该怎么讨回这笔钱。

虽然目前有劳动监察大队专门管理企业欺诈行为,但侵权的事件频发,即使监察大队的工作人员全力以赴,也解决不了太多的问题。没有劳动合同,惧怕打击报复,使大多数权益受过侵害的从业者自认倒霉。但这种经历却让他们心有余悸,极大地影响了再找工作时的积极性,也强化了其对政府的依赖心理。我们调查时发现,在劳动力市场,许多求职者不是紧盯用工信息大屏幕,而是紧盯工作人员,不是主动联系工作单位,而是求工作人员给他们找一份工作,把职业介绍机构看成是一个靠山而不是交易的平台。特别是原国有大企业的员工,到私企干过一段时间之后更加怀念在国企的好处,制定相关法律政策维护非正规就业者的合法权益成为当务之急。

(4)缺少与非正规就业相匹配的灵活的社会保险

虽然近年来吉林省养老保险制度逐步完善,对个人也逐渐开办缴费业务,但至今还没有开设专门针对非正规就业群体的养老保险。

窦女士,43岁。她是从辽源来到长春找工作的。丈夫几年前出去做生意结果一去不返,后来听说和别人过日子去了,留下她和女儿相依为命。她一直没什么正式工作,四处打工,没有任何保险。女儿爱学习,在锦州读大学,每年连学费带生活费得六七千块钱。最低生活保障长春的标准是169元,到了她的手里,女儿和她的费用是40元,每人只有20元。领低保时,如果当天没去领,按她们那儿的规矩,就等于当月自动放弃,过后儿再去就不给了。我遇到她时她已经到长春第三天了,她说过了今天晚上就连住宿的钱也没有了。本来还挑一挑工作,比如侍候病人,她不愿做,雇主不顺她意也不做,但现在已顾不得这么些了,“明天只要有人来领,我就跟着走。”

张先生,39岁。他两年前被一家国营商店一次性买断后,学了一个月的面食,之后断断续续地在多家饭店打工。他收入好时交了一段时间养老保险,可收入不好时或者根本找不到工作时就交不起费用了,这时就希望能少交一点儿等到将来有钱了再补上,可现行的政策规定必须“连续交纳费用”,这就让他很犯难。

张先生给我们算了这样一笔账:吉林省的缴费基数为上年度职工平均工资,养老保险缴费比例为20%,医疗保险缴费比例为4.9%。2004年吉林省职工平均工资为12431元,那么养老保险金就是2486.2元,医疗保险金是609.1元。也就是说,如果一个非正规从业者要加入社会保险,每年要缴纳3095.3元的费用,这笔费用相当于一部分受雇人员的全年收入。如果按补充规定来计算,非正规从业人员的养老金可以按当地年度平均工资的60%缴纳,那么以长春为例,长春市2004年职工平均工资为15722元,养老保险金最低为1886.64元。长春市最低工资标准为每月360元,一些非正规从业者的工资水平处于最低工资上下,那么仅养老保险费就占工资的43.7%,在解决温饱和参加保险之间,他们只能选择前者。

上面的案例显示,现行养老保险制度是针对传统正规就业人员设计的,缴费基数、费率、待遇等对于非正规就业人员来说相对较高,不适用于就业与收入水平不稳定的非正规就业人群。还有一些大龄非正规就业者没等凑够钱却已经过了交纳养老保险的年龄。种种原因使得非正规就业者迫切要求建立一种适合自己的保险制度,以解除后顾之忧。

3.工作不稳定,劳动组织关系松散、简单,用工制度不规范

按工作的稳定性程度划分,非正规就业可分为:临时性就业、契机性就业和流动性就业。临时性就业与传统正规就业相比时间较短,但与其它两种就业相比时间相对较长,稳定性较强,如商业餐饮业、自雇经营,家政服务业中的保姆以及受雇于企业的一部分技术人员;契机性就业则是一些钟点工、小时工;流动性就业典型的就是流动的小商小贩,契机性就业和流动性就业最不稳定,但由于他们做的大多是无本或小本生意,只要能找到雇主或买方就行,所以他们的压力也最小,工作也可自己决定做或不做。相比之下,临时性就业虽然比较稳定,但每天的工作时间长,工作强度大,十分辛苦。不过他们从非正规就业转为正规就业的可能性也最大。非正规就业的最大特点是劳动力间存在较强替代性。由于不需要从业者有太高的技术,多数从事的是体力劳动,甚至是简单的重复性劳动,雇主或用人单位为了控制、降低人工成本,减少由于长期雇佣此类人员需要加薪造成的成本增加,大都采取频繁换人的办法,导致非正规从业者常常在不同的岗位之间频繁流动,劳动关系出现明显的短期化趋势。

工作关系不稳定。韩女士今年37岁,离异,无子女,无住房,她找工作的条件就是能包吃住。今年她一连换了好几个工作了。刚刚辞掉的那份工作是帮人做家务。她去时那家的门把手能有几十年没擦了,她费了一天的时间给擦出来,结果主人回来不高兴地说,你怎么用了那么多的洗衣粉?韩女士觉得挺委屈:这洗衣粉不都干活儿用了嘛,难道我还吃了不成?这份工作之前是侍候一个长期瘫痪的病人,很辛苦,帮病人擦身、翻身、接屎接尿,但挣的钱要多一些,一个月800元钱,等到这个病人去世了,她的这份工作也就结束了。

目前吉林省非正规就业部门的主体是个体或微型企业,劳动组织很简单,一般是自雇经营,或在家里人帮忙的基础上再雇一两个人,“两把刷子一块布,擦亮人生路”是相当一部分非正规就业的真实写照。雇主与劳动者双方仅在提供劳务期间存在简单的权利和义务关系,劳动关系松散多变,甚至出现一些从业者同时和多家单位保持多重松散的劳动关系的情况。[7]还有一些自雇经营者,根本没有劳动关系权利义务相对人,这使得非正规就业的劳动关系复杂。有资料显示,在非正规就业群体中90%以上的从业者没有和用工单位签订用工合同,用工制度不规范。由于劳动用工制度改革的不断深化,雇主或企业控制了用工自主权,同时劳动力市场上供大于求的状况相当严重,求职者处于相对弱势,根本不敢企求和企业建立起稳定、规范的劳动关系。另外也还有一部分非正规从业者认为签订劳动合同对自己是一种束缚,“哪儿好就上哪儿干”是他们的惯常想法。

(四)创新制度,推进社区非正规就业的发展

东三省老国有企业已吸纳不了太多劳动力,扶持发展中小企业才是出路,而中小企业的前身应该是非正规劳动组织。非正规劳动组织在南方一些发达省份,特别是在上海已初具规模,对当地非正规就业的发展起到了极好的带动作用。目前上海已形成2.7万家非正规就业劳动组织,吸纳了25万名失业人员。从非正规劳动组织转制为中小企业的已达1000多家。非正规劳动组织可以将大量单独从事非正规就业的下岗失业人员聚拢起来,政府通过扶持非正规劳动组织的发展继而促进非正规就业的发展,这既可以改变非正规就业自发、无序、混乱的局面,又可以使非正规就业劳动组织内的从业者熟悉市场、积累经验,降低风险。待组织条件成熟后,再将其转制为小企业或者个体工商户,从而催生了小企业群。为此,急需出台一些更灵活、更具体、更有针对性的政策法规,发展非正规劳动组织,保障非正规从业者的劳动权益,引导这部分劳动就业进入健康发展的良性轨迹中来。

借鉴外地经验,结合吉林省情,我们认为要进一步推动非正规就业发展急需出台一些更灵活、更具体、更有针对性的政策法规,切实保障失业下岗弱势劳动群体的劳动权益,帮助规范和理顺社区非正规就业的劳动关系,引导这部分劳动就业进入健康良性发展的轨迹中来。

扩大税费减免受益面。在切实落实已有的减免税政策的同时,要扩大受益面。不管是国有企业、集体企业还是农民工从事非正规就业,在起步时均可享受为期至少三年的优惠措施,包括免征营业税、所得税等所有地方性收税以及社会性缴费。而且,凡是三年内转制为个体工商户或者小企业的非正规就业劳动组织,既定的三年期扶持政策不变,以此帮助他们提高从事市场活动的经验和能力。

扶持发展非正规就业劳动组织,促进条件成熟的组织向小企业转化。非正规就业劳动组织是指以下岗失业人员为主开展非正规就业,帮助其获得一定收入和基本社会保障的社会劳动组织。这种组织在南方一些发达省份已初具规模,对当地非正规就业的发展起到了极好的带动作用。非正规劳动组织在有些地方又被称作“家庭公司”,比如上海的“家庭公司”主要分为两种:一种是下岗之后从“自己当老板”开始,由“家庭小作坊”起家,通过吸收新成员慢慢发展壮大;另一种是下岗失业人员合伙创办微小型企业,每一名成员作为合作股东,各自分工,相互照应。非正规劳动组织可以将大量单独从事非正规就业的下岗失业人员聚拢起来,政府通过扶持非正规劳动组织的发展继而促进非正规就业的发展,这既可以改变非正规就业自发、无序、混乱的局面,又可以使非正规就业劳动组织内的从业者熟悉市场、积累经验,降低风险。待组织条件成熟后,再将其转制为小企业,所以非正规就业劳动组织也可以说是小企业的“孵化器”。目前上海已形成2.7万家非正规就业劳动组织,吸纳了25万名失业人员,已经实现转制的有1000多家。[8]

放宽非正规就业劳动组织的经营许可范围,并建立必要的准入制度。要发展非正规就业劳动组织,首先要放宽其经营许可范围,给他们以更多的市场选择和竞争的机会,以及组织发展和创业的自由。同时也要建立并完善必要的准入制度,对其资金、组成人员、认定程序等做出明确的界定,使非正规就业健康有序地发展。结合吉林省非正规就业的实际情况,非正规就业劳动组织的经营服务范围应界定为:社区居民服务业;市政市容的保洁、保绿服务;家政、配送和各类代办服务;家电维修;家庭手工业和为机关、企事业单位提供的各种临时性、突击性劳务等。申请非正规就业劳动组织时要由筹备发起人向所在街道提出书面申请,符合申办条件的,报区就业管理服务机构审核后,由市就业管理服务机构认定,确保认定程序的规范。让每一个非正规就业劳动组织在起步时均可享受三年的扶持政策和优惠措施,帮助其提高从事市场活动的经验和能力,三年期满后,会有相当多的非正规劳动组织发展为小企业或者个体工商户,从而催生了小企业群。为此,需要制定各种扶持政策,对于已有的优惠政策,能够切实地落实。

落实小额贷款政策、降低贷款门槛,通过创业补贴、房租补贴等优惠政策,保证资金供给。资金短缺、融资困难是非正规就业组织面临的主要问题。虽然已经制定了小额贷款政策,但由于门槛较高,使得大多数非正规就业者望而止步。针对这种状况,可以考虑放宽条件,使得想贷款的人都能够贷上款。充分发挥过渡期的扶持、引导作用,使得非正规就业者申请到贷款,条件成熟之后再转制为个体工商户或是小企业。而不是像目前的这种状况:非正规就业者必须先成为个体工商户或是小企业,然后才能贷款。长春市朝阳区的经验可供参考:朝阳区政府和各个部门协调后先为非正规就业者发放“筹备营业执照”,取得该执照之后六个月内免收相关费用,享受各项优惠条件,发展得好,再去申请营业执照,为非正规就业者赢得过渡期,真正起到了过渡期的扶持作用。对于在小额贷款中普遍存在的担保难的问题,可以考虑实行多种抵押担保的方式,比如住房抵押,工龄抵押等,改变目前单一的担保方式;制定创业补贴、房租补贴等多种优惠政策,或是将失业救济金作为生产扶持资金一次性发给创业人员,为从事非正规就业者解决资金难题。

减免税费,扩大受益面。税费负担是非正规就业者普遍担心的问题,一些非正规就业者不愿到工商部门登记,尤其是流动的小商小贩,更是能躲就躲,这也使得他们和城建、市容管理等部门的矛盾愈演愈烈。为此,在切实落实已有的减免税政策的同时,要扩大受益面,制定适合非正规就业劳动组织的税费优惠政策。经政府认定并持有经营证书的非正规就业劳动组织,三年内都可免营业税、所得税等所有地方性收税以及社会性缴费。而且,凡是三年内转制为个体工商户或者小企业的非正规就业劳动组织,既定的三年期扶持政策不变。

建立专门针对非正规就业群体的分层次、分类别的多元社会保障制度。针对目前非正规就业群体成份复杂,收入差异大的实际状况,设计专门针对非正规就业的社会保险,使得在缴费基数、缴费率上区分层次,体现简便、易操作、形式多样,以及选择余地大、进入门槛低的特点,将大多数非正规就业群体吸纳进来。针对非正规就业者在从业过程中可能遇到的劳动者个人工伤、第三者人身伤害及财物损失的风险,应设立综合商业保险,当遇到上述伤害时,可申请保险理赔。保险费用可由用工补助专项经费和个人共同承担。

强化以非正规就业从业人员为目标群体的各类专门培训和信息收集,实现信息、培训扶持一体化。在培训方面,除了政府部门组织培训之外,还可发挥志愿者的作用,将已成功创业的企业家或小老板组织成志愿服务团,对创业初期的非正规从业人员进行经营项目、经营思路、技能、素质等方面的培训的指导。在信息收集方面,要整合各类职业介绍力量,使各个职业机构的信息联网,使各地信息互通有无,改变条块分割的状态。同时,要充分发挥社区的基层职介作用,使社区成为一个中枢,真正起到联系家庭、用工单位和求职者的作用。特别是社区之间的信息要互通有无,以此弥补各区域之间的经济差异以及岗位需求差异。

制定相应法律法规,预防与查处并重,保障非正规就业者的合法权益。对非正规就业者求职中受到的欺诈现象,应从预防和查处两方面着手,加大对企业劳动用工行为的监管力度,出台切实可行、便于操作的劳动用工管理规定,指导企业依法用工。并依据国家的劳动法律法规和劳动用工管理有关规定制定企业的劳动用工管理制度,从源头上减少侵权行为的发生。同时加大劳动保障监察执法的力度,赋予劳动保障监察更大的执法权,依法严格查处劳动用工中的违法欺诈行为。针对目前侵权事件多而执法人员少的现象,可以考虑将执法权下放到各个基层组织——区、街道或社区,由基层组织来直接处理引起争议的劳动纠纷,最大范围保护非正规从业者的权益,促进其就业积极性。

营造有利于非正规就业发展的良好环境。各职能部门要互相配合,降低门槛,简化手续,确保非正规就业能够健康有序地发展;要针对非正规就业的特殊性适度规范。特别是处理非正规就业者的求职、经营方式与市容管理之间的矛盾时,不能因其存在的缺陷而贬低、怀疑、简单地取缔打击。比如马路劳务市场是长春市非正规就业者比较普遍的求职方式,较成规模的马路劳务市场达30多家。这些自发形成的劳务市场有的在正规劳务市场外,有的在商业繁华地段。比如长春永春路劳务市场外,每天都有上百求业者“揽活儿”,他们或举牌子或者干脆在身上贴上标签,刮大白的、厨师、擦玻璃的到处都是,来一个雇主,一堆人会蜂拥而上。用这种方式找工作能和雇主面对面交流,方便快捷,成功率高。但同时带来了自身安全、占道、扰民等问题,所以也成为相关部门驱逐的对象。但驱逐只是治标不治本,今天驱散,明天照旧恢复。每一次驱散不但没有效果,而且使一些灵活就业者和一些老主雇失去联系,失去了就业的机会。所以扶持非正规就业的发展,就要充分分析它的特殊性和复杂性,积极引导、适度规范,形成全民创业的良好氛围。


[1]王瑾 孙鹤:2006,“吉林省将全面启动创建就业社区计划”,《新文化报》7月15日.

[2] [2]张车伟:2004,“城镇失业与扩大就业的对策思考”,《湖南社会科学》6期。

[3] 彭希哲 姚宇:2004,“厘清非正规就业概念,推动非正规就业发展”,《社会科学》7期。

[4]  吉发﹝1998﹞第12号文件。

[5] 中发﹝1998﹞第10号文件。

[6] 国税函发﹝1999﹞第43号文件。

[7] 江苏省统计信息网:2004,《关于新形式下非正规就业问题的研究与思考》。

[8] 周凯:2004,“上海:非正规就业模式造就2.7万名“小老板”,《中国青年报》12月24日。

28. Policy Coherence and Social Protection for All

Will Asia and the World Waste the Crisis?

Policy Coherence and Social Protection for All[1]


Rene E. Ofreneo, Ph.D.

Professor XII

University of the Philippines

 

02 October 2009

 

 

 

Crisis, G20 Responses and Protective Labor Institutions

 

An old Chinese saying states that a crisis is also an opportunity.  This is so only if the lessons on why a crisis has come about are used not only to avoid a repeat of the crisis but also, and more importantly, to rise at a higher level of human existence and development.

Unfortunately, this does not seem to be the case in the present global financial crisis (GFC). In their April meeting in London this year, the G20 leaders – virtually the new  executive committee for the global economy — talked of the importance of financial regulations and yet managed to agree only on two things: how to monitor the tax havens used by the unaccountable global speculators and how to increase the capitalization of an increasingly irrelevant IMF[2]. There were no decisive measures on how to reverse two decades of global financial deregulation and stop the bubble-creating speculative activities of a greedy few, both of which are at the roots of the GFC.

In their September summit this year at Pittsburgh, the G20 leaders pushed for additional financial reforms such as an agreement to limit bankers’ pay and bonuses, expand the voting rights of China and other developing economies in the IMF, and increase investments in food and agriculture as proposed by the World Bank[3]. These measures, laudable though they may be, still do not go deep enough to prevent another GFC in breaking out in some distant future.  For instance, the United States should have made a pledge to enact another Glass-Steagall Act[4] which put speculative investment banking under the strict supervision of financial regulators.

More significantly, the G20 leaders have either failed to grasp or deigned to ignore the central reality under  globalization – the huge imbalances in global trade, development and wealth distribution, all of which have contributed to the making of the GFC (see discussion in the next section).  This failure or avoidance is vividly illustrated in the resolution of the G20 goading the members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to conclude the Doha Development Round (DDR) based on an agenda of deeper liberalization across all economic sectors – industry, agriculture and services, including financial services.  They seem oblivious of the fact that the neo-liberal formula of liberalizing markets for liberalization’s sake is a formula for wealth creation for a few to the exclusion of the many who are too weak to play the globalization game.  And yet thePittsburgh’s “Statement of Leaders” talks of burying an “era of irresponsibility”, which is really deeply rooted in the mindless liberalization mania of the last three decades.

In contrast, seven decades ago, in response to a similar global crisis spawned by an unregulated free-wheeling capitalist order, the United States and Europe embraced not only Keynesian-prescribed government interventionism in the economy to spur aggregate demand  but also the institutionalist view on the positive role of trade unions, guaranteed hours of work, minimum wages and other protective labor institutions in stabilizing and sustaining the growth process. These labor institutions help fuel higher demand for goods and services as well-paid workers become good-spending consumers, a process which naturally sustains the growth momentum.  This is the reason why industrial relations as a discipline developed in the 1920s and 1930s.   It was also in this period that the International Labor Organization or  ILO was formed and got institutionalized, ironically with the help of big employers like John Rockefeller (For a detailed discussion of the evolution of labor institutions, see Kaufman, 2004).

After World War II, these protective labor institutions, together with a comprehensive  system of social security, were institutionalized inGermany,Scandinaviaand other European countries under a “social market economy” arrangement. This has given birth to “welfare capitalism”, which is really a fusion of Keynesian/institutional economics and protective labor institutions.  Politically, this welfare capitalism served as a barrier to the expansion of  the Soviet-style socialism during the Cold War era of the l950s and the l960s. Economically, this welfare capitalism helped transformWestern Europe,CanadaandJapaninto modern capitalist states with a strong social and labor base.

This paper, however, is not a call for a mechanical replication of the post-World War II European experience in welfare capitalism.

Rather, this paper is an appeal to governments and civil society movements in Asia-Pacific to be more audacious and far-seeing by using the GFC as an opportunity to institute bolder social and economic reforms similar to what their predecessors did in the 1930s and after the end of World War II.  Given the realities of a globalized and interconnected world, such social and economic reforms are, of course, complex, numerous and multi-dimensional.  Necessarily, they have to be undertaken at the national, regional and global levels.

This paper, however, focuses on only one major socio-economic reform – “social protection for all”, as raised by the ILO in its Decent Work Agenda (DWA).  One must be reminded that social protection is a fundamental human right that must be enjoyed by every human being in accordance with the 1948 UN Declaration on Human Rights – in crisis and non-crisis times. It is the basic and mandatory obligation of every government to ensure that every citizen is able to enjoy minimum standards of social protection.

This paper argues that extending social protection for all is not possible if there are no radical changes in the architecture of or rules in the global financial and economic order.  These changes require social and economic policy coherence at all levels.  In fact, the challenge of meeting such coherence and full social protection for all provides a good means of fostering policy coherence.

The race to the bottom: the roots of the GFC

The GFC presents the world an opportunity to find long-term global solutions to the cycle of unsustainable global imbalances, financial bubbles, economic crises and weak social protection for the majority who are affected by these imbalances, bubbles and crises.  These imbalances, bubbles and crises are directly traceable to the reality of a global race to the bottom.   In turn, this race to the bottom is facilitated and fuelled by the neo-liberal ideology that has become ascendant everywhere, starting in the l980s with the World Bank prescribing its structural adjustment program (SAP) for heavily indebted economies and the Reagan’s America and Thatcher’s United Kingdom embracing the ideology of “privatization”.

Some explanation on this global race to the bottom is in order.

Simply put, the race to the bottom means the efforts of big firms, the transnationals (TNCs) in particular, to ignore global labor, social and environmental standards in their blind pursuit of global profit-making activities.   Such a race to the bottom explains the terrible weakening of the labor movement almost everywhere as global capital flies in and out of deregulated national markets in search for the cheapest production platforms, which include union-free export processing zones (EPZs).  This has even pitted host countries against each other in their frenzied drive to attract global capital by sacrificing global and national labor, social and environmental standards.

In Asia, this race to the bottom is illustrated by the rise of Factory Asia (Baldwin, 2007), or the chain of production activities organized or outsourced by the TNCs in different sites in Asia, primarily in EPZs or enclave areas where unionism is held at bay.  Among the leading products of Factory Asia are electronics, auto parts, garments, textiles, furniture, toys, watches, household appliances and other labor-intensive products that are retailed by Wal-Mart and other big transnational retailers.

This race to the bottom took definite shape in the 1980s when the Reaganite/Thatcherite “privatization” program swept the OECD countries.  At about the same time, the World Bank and the IMF imposed on heavily-indebted countries their SAP, which pushed for privatization, economic deregulation and trade and investment liberalization as the uniform solutions to underdevelopment. Both the Reaganite/Thatcherite privatization program and the World Bank’s SAP were inspired by the ideas of the so-called “Chicago school” of economics  led by Milton Friedman, who believed in liberalized or “unfettered markets” as the panacea to almost every economic problem.

The labor economists in the World Bank and other think tanks seized the neo-liberal Friedmanesque thinking by declaring unionism, collective bargaining, social security and other protective labor institutions as “rigidities” in the labor market, or as unwelcome interference in the free interplay of supply and demand in the labor market (see, for instance, the neo-liberal arguments in Harrison and Revenga, 1998;  World Bank, 1995).   Thus, under the neo-liberal interpretation of how the labor market should behave, a strong interventionist labor movement is blamed as the cause of unemployment in a given society.  Accordingly, job-creating capital does not come in when wages do not go down due to institutions of unionism and collective bargaining.

In industrial relations terms, this neo-liberal treatment of the labor market has been translated by CEOs and human resource managers into “strategic HRM” or personnel policies  supportive of lean-and-mean business operations without regard to the welfare and social needs of the workers.   This strategic HRM is part of the radical change in the teaching of business management which swept the MBA schools in the 1980s and 1990s.  This change ignores the social dimension of business and expounds single-mindedly on the supposed primary mission of the managers, which is to increase the “shareholder value” of the business owners at all cost, including competition with their own suppliers, customers, regulators and, yes, employees.  This effectively freed the MBA students or the new generation of would-be managers from any sense of moral responsibility in the conduct of business (Goshal, 2005).

Likewise, the US Federal Bank chief, Alan Greenspan, used the same neo-liberal thinking by helping repeal in 1999 the Glass-Steagall Act, a Depression-era law  regulating operations of commercial banking and separating it from investment banking (Mah-Hui Lim, 2008). This financial deregulation and the general hands-off policy of Greenspan in the “excessive financialization” in Wall Street are at the roots of the so-called financial bubbles which burst into a costly and painful American  financial  meltdown and global economic recession.  Sadly, the mass media have simplified the explanation for this financial meltdown into a case of “greed”, that is “excessive greed” by a few financial speculators bringing the financial house down.  This, of course, is true only up to a point.

For the bigger picture is that this excessive speculation-financialization phenomenon is the natural outcome of the global and regional race to the bottom, which  is facilitated by the neo-liberal SAP program of market deregulation or the worship of unregulated “free markets” dubbed in the 1990s as the “Washington Consensus”.   This race to the bottom has caused a disequilibrium in the global market, or an imbalance in the global supply and global demand.   There has been a global “overproduction” of goods, especially those produced by the TNCs under their Factory Asia in Chinaand other countries.  At the same time, there is growing global “underconsumption” of the same goods because the workers and farmers producing these goods have declining wages and incomes under an unequal and unjust race to the bottom. This global overproduction-underconsumption pattern engendered by the race to the bottom is easily validated by the widening gap in many countries between rising labor productivity and labor compensation in the l980s up to the 2000s, as shown for example in the case of the United States itself.  A recent ILO global wage report also shows that between 1995 and 2007, global wages global wages grew by 0.75 per cent annually versus a GDP per capita growth of one (1) per cent annually.  Moreover, in this period, the share of profits in the global GDP had been going up, the gap between the top wage earners and those in the bottom had been  widening and collective bargaining coverage had been going down.

In the meantime, the TNCs able to accumulate super-profits from their global production and service chains also increasingly turned to financialization and financial speculation in the neo-liberal decades of the l980s up to the 2000s.  General Electric and the big auto makers such as Ford and Toyota expanded their corporate earnings by going financial, while hedge funds, private equity companies and investment banks used the global financial and market deregulation to create speculative bubbles in the stock markets, currency markets, credit markets, housing markets, commodity markets and futures markets.  EvenChina, after accumulating around US$3 trillion savings invested  a trillion of its dollar savings on theUSfinancial market, the world’s biggest, and bought into Blackstone, the world’s leading private equity company.

East Asia, of course, had  a bitter experience with these bubbles in 1997-98.   This is the reason why Asian unions, AMRC and academics opposed to neo-liberal globalization have been calling – since the Asian crisis  — for the monitoring  of these non-regulated speculative financial operations, especially those undertaken by the hedge funds and private equity companies. They have also raised a number of times the dislocating impact on employment and society of these speculative activities, which often lead to job-displacing MACs (mergers-acquisitions-consolidations), union-subverting corporate reengineering exercises, and the erosion of job, union and income security of workers.

 

Joblessness, unequal growth and flexibilization in Asia

One outcome of the global race to the bottom is a pattern of a jobless and unequal growth, which is amply illustrated in the Asia-Pacific region.

Asia’s labor market before the GFC

 

Before the global financial meltdown, Asia-Pacific was hailed as the model region of globalization, reported as the fastest-growing as a result of rapid economic liberalization and integration in the global economy.   And yet, the UNDP’s Human Development Report (2006) noted the great social and economic contradiction when it asked rhetorically: Asia has embraced free trade, but has free trade embracedAsia’s poor?

In terms of the labor market, the UNDP’s answer is largely negative.  Yes, around 250 million living on less than a dollar a day were lifted out of poverty through more and better jobs between 1990 and 2001.  However, majority of these jobs were generated inChina, the world’s work shop.  In the rest ofEast Asia, especiallySoutheast Asia, growth was jobless as indicated by the fact that 337 million jobs were created in the l980s but only 176 million jobs in the 1990s.  Also, the UNDP noted the deepening inequality inChinaand the rising number of unemployed youth in this country.

One explanation for the jobless growth phenomenon inAsiais the low employment elasticity in many Asian countries as documented by an ADB research team (Felipe and Hasan, 2005), meaning fewer jobs are being created despite higher level of investments and higher economic growth indices. This means the increasing application of technology and productivity upgrading schemes. This is not bad per se except that part of the productivity enhancement could be due to work intensification via multi-tasking arrangements which is happening across industries. Another explanation is the consequent dislocation or destruction of domestic industries and farms (and subsequently, of jobs and incomes) as a result of the transnational domination of the local economies, facilitated by the neo-liberal trading policies which have put local producers at a disadvantage in their own markets.  This “hollowing out” phenomenon is observable in middle-level countries such asIndonesia,Philippines,Thailandand many South Asian countries.   A third explanation is, of course, the devastating impact on East Asia of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, which is the regional forerunner of the present global financial meltdown, which has now become the Great Recession.

InSouth Asia,Indiais projected as another miracle economy under globalization.  And yet, the high GNP growth  registered byIndiain recent years still has to filter down to the masses.  Yes, the “sunshine” IT and IT-enabled sectors (IT services, BPOs and call centers) have created around four (4) million jobs.  However, this is a drop in the 400-million-strong labor market bucket ofIndia. In fact,Indiahas one of the highest rates of informal employment, estimated to be as much as 93 per cent of the total employed work force (Ofreneo, 2008).  Its neighbors –Pakistan,Sri Lanka,BangladeshandNepal– also have similarly high informal employment rates.  Even the garments industry, the region’s leading employer, is partly done through an intricate system of informal subcontracting, which makes union formation difficult.

Globalization has also failed to reduce the size of the informal economy, where jobs are generally precarious.  As documented by the ILO, informal employment inAsiawas around 65 per cent of total non-agricultural employment in the region (for a regional and country-by-country report on informal employment, see AMRC, 2008 Labor Law Report).

To make matters worse, the formal sector, puny as it is in most Asian countries, is being subjected to massive “informalization” or “flexibilization”.  Despite their differing levels of development, virtually all Asian countries are moving towards “external flexibility” (Ofreneo, 2008), meaning HR managers have been resorting to the increased hiring or utilization of “short-term workers” variedly called as “dispatched workers”, “non-standard workers”, “agency workers”, “casuals”, “irregulars” and so on. InJapan, the country of “lifetime employment”, the ratio of  the “non-standards” to the regulars rose from 1:3 in the 1990s to 1:2  by 2003.   InKorea, the “irregulars” began outnumbering the regulars after the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, which was used as a justification by policy makers to “deregulate” the labor market. InChina, the old “iron rice bowl” job security  disappeared with market reforms, which, in turn, paved the way for the rise of a large “floating population” of rural migrants and displaced workers from the crumbling state-owned enterprises.   The same phenomenon happened inVietnam, where the old concept of “bien che” or work for life has also disappeared.   In the other Asian NICs (Singapore,Taiwan,MalaysiaandHong Kong), flexibility comes in the form of increased utilization of foreign migrants assigned to do the 3-D jobs (dirty, dangerous and difficult).   In the rest ofAsia, flexible labor is the norm in the formal sector under various hiring arrangements.

To sum up, globalization has succeeded in creating good quality jobs for a few, especially in new growth sectors such as the IT and IT-enabled sectors.   However, the overall labor market picture is not exactly attractive.  Before the GFC, the labor market of Asia had the following characteristics: deepening inequality in China and other “winners” of globalization, jobless growth in many Asian countries, a large and growing informal economy in developing Asia, and massive informalization or flexibilization in the formal sector in virtually all countries, both developed and developing.  Such features of the labor market make any labor organizing a daunting task and the campaign for “decent work” sound hollow.

 

 

Asia’s jobs market under the GFC

 

With the GFC and the slow global economic recovery for the real sectors (industry and agriculture), the jobs market in Asiahas become dire.  A comprehensive region-wide compilation of data on the impact of the global crisis on the different Asian economies and their labor markets is still difficult to find.  An economic team from the ADB (James et al., 2008) pointed out that the exposure of Asian banks and financial institutions to the USsub-prime/credit crisis is limited, with Japanese banks incurring US$10.8 billion losses, or less than 3 per cent of estimated global losses, and China’s banks, US$2.8 billion losses.  Most of the Asian banks also have higher percentages of capitalization and have understandably been able to withstand the global financial meltdown and the herd-like pressure for a bank runThis was obviously a result of the bank re-capitalization program in many Asian countries following the l997-98 Asian crisis.

However, the more worrisome effect of the global crisis is on its adverse and domino-like impact on the “Real Economy” of Asia as a result of the contraction in global trade, flow of foreign direct investments (FDI) and migrant remittances as pointed out by the ADB team and the ILO Regional Office (2009).  For 2009, global trade is projected to contract by around 10 per cent and FDI flows to emerging economies by over 80 per cent.   First to be hit by this global contraction are the export dynamos ofAsia, namely:China,Japan,Taiwan,Korea,MalaysiaandSingapore.  In early 2009,Chinareported around 20 million factory workers displaced from their jobs, whileSingapore, a relatively stable but trade-dependent economy, suffered a double-digit recession in 2008.  The electronics and auto export sectors piloted byJapan,TaiwanandKoreaalso dropped precipitously in 2008, resulting in massive job cuts and factory shutdowns in their overseas assembly plants inChina,Indonesia,Philippines,ThailandandVietnam. The same pattern obtains in the case of the garments, textiles, furniture and other labor-intensive export industries based on the transnational production chain system dubbed by an ADB economist as “Factory Asia” (Baldwin, 2007).

In many Asian countries, the negative job impact of the contraction in global trade, investment flows and migrant remittances is being felt only in 2009 because of the time lag in the effect of these changes on domestic employment, consumption and other economic activities.   For example, the Philippines, which proudly proclaimed itself as immune from recession in 2008, is now on the World Bank’s 2009 list of recession-prone countries.  ThePhilippineshas 10 million overseas workers and immigrants remitting over US$15 billion a year to their families at home. These remittances sustain the country’s expanding service industries.  With the exception ofJapan, the Asian NICs andBrunei, all countries inEast AsiaandSouth Asiahave high dependence on migrant remittances and are vulnerable to global migrant remittance slowdown.

Overall, the features outlined earlier in the pre-crisis period are now becoming even more pronounced.   Increased joblessness and job dislocations in the formal sector and in the overseas labor market mean more informal and vulnerable employment, more informalization and flexibilization in the hiring arrangements in the formal sector, and increased poverty everywhere.  All this are leading to a deepening crisis in industrial relations and a tougher environment for union organizing and bargaining.  For many Asian workers, the problem is compounded by the absence of a reliable system of safety nets for the adversely affected outside the usual extended family system.

When the Great Recession was officially admitted by the OECD in the second half of 2008, the ILO estimated the global job losses would reach over 20 million.  This number was quickly dumped as the number of the displaced workers in theUnited StatesandEuroperapidly rose by the millions and the total for the officially dislocated inChinaalone reached 20 million.  Thus, in January 2009, the ILO raised the projected total job losses to reach over 50 million worldwide under a “scenario 3” (deep recession).   In June 2009, the ILO mentioned that more job losses are forthcoming and that the jobs crisis is likely to persist for some time (ILO, 2009; ILO/ILS, 2009). Also, another looming problem is the rising number of young labor entrants who can not find jobs.  Globally, there are around 45 million new labor entrants a year.Asia, the world’s most populous region, accounts for a large percentage of the young labor force and the displaced work force of the world.  Chinaalone graduates over six (6) million college students a year.

The biggest worries of many workers inAsiaare how to not to lose a job or how to find one.  InJapan, some commentators refer to the present job situation as the “Ice Age” (Asia News Network, 2009).  As it is, the icy bearish jobs market is also increasingly being felt in the service sector – finance, commerce, banking, telecoms, education, tourism, and entertainment and so on.  For some countries, this is triggered by the decline in migrant remittances.  For others, it is simply the consequence of falling consumer demand, due to falling incomes and rising fears about the economy.

Rise of the “vulnerables”

 

With the wage labor market in both the industrial and service sectors shrinking, the “vulnerable” labor market, consisting of the low-value-added self-employed sector and unpaid family work,  is correspondingly expanding.  Over one (1) billion workers or roughly 60 per cent of the work force in the Asia-Pacific region belong to the vulnerables, with South Asia having the highest share (75 per cent) followed by East and South East Asia (60 per cent).  Under a deep recession scenario, the ILO estimates that over 60 million will be added to the ranks of the vulnerables 2009 (ILO Regional Office, 2009).   With huge job losses in the formal sector already occurring in China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam and other countries, this scenario is not a far-fetched possibility.

 

 

Timid global solutions from the G20

In the light of the foregoing, the results of the G20 meeting in April and September 2009 and the ensuing anti-recession initiatives by the major economies are clearly limited and woefully  weak.  Thus far, the boldest measures undertaken by the major economies are huge fiscal stimulus packages now amounting globally to over US$3 trillion dollars and the institution of tighter financial regulations in a number of countries.  However, the stimulus spending inAmericahas come under severe criticism because the stimulus appears directed to “socializing” the losses of the big banks, insurance companies and corporations while passing on to the tax payers the cost of the huge bailouts.   The overall logic is that these giants are “too big to fail” and that allowing them to go under would precipitate a system collapse.  It appears that theUSgovernment, bent in preserving its privatization policy, has ended up providing “corporate safety nets” for its financial giants instead of “social safety nets” for millions of unemployed Americans (Stiglitz, 2009).

In contrast, a number of East Asian countries, principallyChina,Singapore,India,IndonesiaandJapan, have intensified stimulus spending by focusing on job generation through increased consumption at home via programs such as consumer discount coupons, buy-local campaigns, etc.  This, of course, is a deviation from the old export-or-perish thesis, which reduces job creation to export drive promotion.

Will there be then a complete overhaul of the Washington Consensus and a non-recurrence of a recession-bound financial meltdown?

The answer to both is a sad no.

As mentioned earlier, the reforms in the financial sector in the leading countries have not gone far enough.  These are timid reforms: higher capital reserve requirements for the banks, improved financial supervision and closer monitoring of futures and derivatives markets. The central issue of returning banking to its original mission of serving as a financial mediator between savers and producers, not as a facilitator of speculative financial transactions, has remained largely untouched.

More importantly, there are no reforms in the global production and trading systems that have been advanced.   In short, there have been no efforts to arrest the race to the bottom, which is at the roots of the present global crisis as outlined above.  In particular, there are no labor reforms being discussed as solutions to the crisis.  This is why even Nobel Prize economists such as Joseph Stiglitz, Paul Krugman and Amartya Sen wrote papers reminding the policy makers that part of the Keynesian reform package in the 1930s came in the form of labor reforms such as the legal recognition given to unionism and collective bargaining as well as the enactment of social security and other safety net measures.  All these protective labor institutions, including the subsequent unemployment and health insurance scheme,  have become the material base of the welfare state and  a powerful platform of productive growth for Western Europe from the end of World War II  up to the early 1970s (Kaufman, 2004).

Towards social and economic coherence:  putting people at the center

In the context of the present global crisis, similar 1930s-type labor reforms would have helped restore the much-needed equilibrium in the global economy, specifically in balancing global supply and global demand for goods. But then this would mean reversing the race to the bottom and institutionalizing bold changes in the global economic architecture and the way it is governed, be it at the financial sector, production system and trading system.

A guiding reform principle should be how to put people at the center of development.  This means officially abandoning the neo-liberal Friedmanesque framework of economic programming that literally worships on the abstract altar of free trade, on the so-called free interplay of global market forces unmindful of the impact of such interplay on people’s lives and jobs.  Putting people at the center means there should be policy coherence in terms of economic, social, labor and, yes, environmental policies.   Putting people at the center means there should be policy coherence at the national, regional and global levels.  For example, global labor, human and environmental standards should be enshrined in regional trade agreements like the ASEAN + 3 (ten ASEAN countries plusChina,JapanandKorea) or ASEAN +3 + 3 (includingAustralia,New ZealandandIndia).  These standards should have enabling national laws and programs in the individual countries.

Putting people at the center means the development of minimum ethical standards of behavior for the global corporations, or all those with a cross-border capacity to ply in their trade or set up plants or businesses in two or more countries.  Part of a minimum code of behavior is the prohibition on speculative non-productive investment.  Another is respect for the labor, human and environmental rights of the people as reflected in the UNDP’s “Global Compact Initiative”. The challenge to the UN system is how to make this GCI universal and enforceable.

Putting people at the center means the global and regional financial institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and ADB should likewise change their lending policies by adopting the above principles as lending guidelines.  Lending should be in support of people’s development and capacity building, not lending to squeeze developing countries further through onerous debt obligations and policy conditionalities. Likewise, there should be bolder and more pro-people reforms in the financial system at the national, regional and global levels.  The primary purpose of financial institutions must be to provide responsible and sustainable financial services for society, not to make profits for shareholders.  This means bringing back the original purpose of banking as a mediator of financial service in support of productive consumption, production and circulation in the economy. There should be greater transparency in the operations and supervision of financial institutions, which can be achieved at minimal cost if the financial employees and their unions are mobilized for this purpose.  One approach is the taxation of short-term selling as such activity is obviously speculative and subversive of economic stability; on the other hand, society can provide incentives to investments that are truly directed towards job-creating productive activities.

Putting people at the center means reforms in the global and regional trading system. The WTO, APEC, AFTA, SAFTA and other similar trading agreements or bodies should abandon the one-size-fits-all liberalization model in favor of a more pragmatic and flexible system of trade policy calibration based on a society’s level of development and capacity.   In short, the full operationalization of the principle of “special and differential treatment”, which is stated over a hundred times in the WTO’s multiple agreements, including its Preamble. The SDT principle should be complemented by programs supportive of the labor, human and environmental rights of the people.   In fact, the present global crisis is an opportunity for the WTO to launch a truly developmental multilateral trading arrangement based on the principles of equity, reciprocity, justice and solidarity.

Extending lifelines for all, promoting social protection for all

Finally, putting people at the center means extending lifelines to all, in particular social safety nets to the unemployed, displaced and the vulnerables and informals, all of whom are the leading victims of the present global crisis.  The primary contents of any economic stimulus package should not only be economic revival measures (which can be jobless) but also the formal recognition and extension of minimum social protection for all.

In this context, it should be made clear to all sectors of society, including domestic and foreign investors, that there should be a new system of doing business and work – away and distinctly different from the disastrous race to the bottom.  There should instead be a Race to the Top based on the virtuous circle of stronger labor-management cooperation and partnership leading to higher productivity and competitiveness, which, in turn provides greater spaces for higher growth, employment and development for society.

Asiashould heed the ILO call for decent work for all.   By definition, decent work is “productive work” obtained “in conditions of freedom, equity, security  and human dignity”.   In concrete terms, decent work happens when

n      basic labour rights are respected,

n      fair and life-sustaining wages are given,

n      humane conditions of work are provided, and

n      job holders are assured of social and economic stability today and tomorrow.

The problem, as outlined earlier, is that under globalisation, decent work is a vanishing reality in many Asian countries.   ILO’s decent work programme is a sisyphus-like undertaking, for the general trend is towards a race to the bottom, which makes jobs less decent and decent jobs more and scarcer.

Yes, the ILO has a program propagating decent work through its Decent Work Agenda (DWA).  Briefly, it means the promotion of core labor standards, social dialogue, employment creation and social protection for all.  Unfortunately, many countries tend to equate the DWA mainly to the promotion of core labor standards in the narrow formal sector where clear employer-employee relations obtain and where labor enforcement is easier to monitor.

Clearly, the challenge is how to create more decent jobs, on one hand, and how to make existing jobs in the large informal economy decent, on the other.  This is what the G20 leaders, WTO ministers and governments all over should be debating.

On the creation of more and better jobs, it is abundantly clear that there are no hard and fast rules.   However, it is also abundantly clear that the world must be prepared to accept that the one-size-fits-all liberalization formula is no development formula and should be abandoned.  The world should cast aside the neo-liberal ideology of unregulated markets in favor of a more flexible, balanced and calibrated program of liberalization and protection in the economy on a sector-by-sector basis as needed. This, in essence, is the meaning of the “special and differential treatment” (SDT), a proviso in the WTO repeated nearly a hundred times in the founding document.  SDT means not all countries are created equally and each has the right to pursue and plan development based on one’s level of development.  This means trading arrangements should be concluded based on the principle of mutually beneficial exchanges, not an abstract free-trade system or an inflexible zero-for-zero tariff system which benefits mainly the big and powerful.  This also means investment programming and campaign for FDI should be based on a country’s real development needs for technology, market, value addition, etc.

Towards an Asian and global social protection floor

 

As to social protection, the European and global experience shows that comprehensive social protection schemes serve as stabilizing as well as sustaining factors in the growth process, as discussed earlier.  In crisis times, they become natural counter-cyclical economic programs which help arrest the fall in the aggregate demand.

However, the question often asked is: can developing economies afford universal social protection?  CanAsiaafford it?

First, it should be pointed out that a system of universal social protection means a system which recognizes that no citizen should be allowed to fall in society because of deficiency in income, food, shelter, education and health, especially in times of adversity like accidents and job dislocations (ILO, 2008).   Social security is a universal human right.

Second, different societies have a plurality of social security systems, which include high-end voluntary insurance schemes for the more financially capable, mandatory contributory social insurance for the wage workers in the formal sector, community-based mutual assistance schemes and government-assisted social assistance schemes.  The challenge for many government is multi-pronged – how to monitor and regulate the private insurance industry (which is prone to engage in speculative investments), how to strengthen the mandatory social insurance system (in particular how to safeguard the funds of members and how to provide non-pension services such as unemployment insurance), how to help upgrade the work of community-based solidarity groups and how to sustain social assistance projects (which target the numerous poor based on limited resources or budget).

A recent ILO study (Social Security Department, 2008) shows that six percent of a country’s GDP is needed to meet the basic nets of security – essential health  care, basic child benefits, universal old-age and disability pensions and at least 100-day employment a year – for all citizens of a society.  InAsia, the ILO modeling study coveredBangladesh,India,Nepal,PakistanandVietnam.

The whole point is that no country is too poor not to be able to provide social security for all.  In fact, history shows thatEuropeembraced the concept of universal social security right after World War II, when most of them were in shambles.

Of course, a social security floor, monetary-wise, has to be determined nationally.   But the general principles have to be universal.

There should also be a continuous program of sharing good practices.  For example, in the case of universal health care, a key to the effective health service delivery and universality of coverage is a system of preventive health care programs and facilities involving people participation at the community or grassroots level.

To conclude, an Asian social security floor is indeed affordable, if Asian governments have the political will.   The comprehensive social security proposal of AROSS – universal social assistance for the poor, a universal flat rate pension at 20 per cent replacement value, and workmen’s compensation,  minimum wage and unemployment insurance for all – is timely and should enjoy the support of all in Asia.  This is the right step in reversing the Asian and global race to the bottom.

References

AROSS, 2009.  “Position Paper on Asian Social Security System”, paper prepared for the Asian Regional Roundtable on Social Security 2009, Hong Kong.

AsiaNews Network, 2009.  “Wanted: Jobs!”, in Asia News, Bangkok, January 23-29, pp. 8-11.

Baldwin, Richard, 2007. Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism,  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 7, Mandaluyong: ADB.

Felipe, Jesus and Hasan, Rana, 2005.  “Labor markets in Asia: Promoting full, productive, and decent employment”, in ADB Key Indicators 2005, Mandaluyong, ADB.

G20 Leaders, 2009.  “LondonSummit– Leaders’ Statement”, 02 April.

Goshal, Sumantra, 2005.  “Bad Management Theories Are Destroying Good Management Practices”, in Academy of Management Learning & Education, 4, 1,London:Academy ofManagement, pp. 75-91.

Harrison, Ann and Revenga, Ana, 1998.  “Labour Markets, Foreign Investment, and Trade Policy Reform”, in Nash, John and Takacs, Wendy, eds., Trade Policy Reform: Lessons and Implications, Washington: World Bank.

International Labour Office, 2007. Rolling Back Informality, Bangkok: Regional Office forAsia and the Pacific.

International Labour Office, 2009.  Report of the Director-General: Tackling the global jobs crisis, Geneva: ILO.

International Labour Office and International Institute for Labour Studies, 2009. The Financial and Economic Crisis:  A Decent Work Response,Geneva: ILO (IILS).

ILO Regional Office for Asiaand the Pacific, 2009.  Responding to the Economic Crisis – Coherent Policies for Growth, Employment and Decent Work in Asia and the Pacific,Bangkok: ILO Regional Office.

ILO Social Security Department, 2008.  “Can low-income countries afford basic social security”, Paper 3,Geneva: ILO.

ILO Social Security Department, 2008.  Asia-Pacific Regional High-Level Meeting on Socially-Inclusive Strategies to Extend Social Security Coverage,Geneva:  ILO.

James, William et al., 2008.  The US Financial Crisis, Global Financial Turmoil, and Developing Asia: Is the Era of High Growth at an End?,  ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 139, Mandaluyong: ADB.

Kaufman, Bruce, 2004.  The global evolution of industrial relations: events, ideas and the IIRA, Geneva: ILO.

Mah-Hui Lim, Michael, 2008.  Old Wine in a New Bottle: Subprime Mortgage Crisis – Causes and Consequences, Working Paper No. 532,New York:  The Levy Economic Institute ofBardCollege.

Ofreneo, Rene, 2008. “Rights for Asia’s Invisible Majority, Social Justice for All Working Women and Men”, in Rights for Two-Thirds of Asia: Asian Labour Law Review 2008,Hong Kong:AsiaMonitorResourceCenter.

Stiglitz, Joseph, 2008.  “Reversal of Fortune”, in Vanity Fair Magazine, November.  Accessible at http://www.vanityfair.com/magazine.

Stiglitz, Joseph, 2009.  “America’s Socialism for the rich”, in guardian.co.uk, June.

Union Network International – Asia-Pacific, 2000.  Advancing Labor’s Vision in the New Economy, Hiroshima: UNI-AP.

United Nations Development Programme, 2006.  Asia-Pacific Human Development Report 2006: Trade on Human Terms,Colombo: UNDP Regional Centre.

World Bank, 1995.  Workers in an Integrating World, World Development Report,New York:OxfordUniversity Press.


[1] Keynote paper for the “Asian Regional Roundtable on Social Security (AROSS)”,   Hong Kong, October 8-10, 2009.  Conference organizers:  Asia Monitor Resource Center (AMRC), Center for Social Policy Studies of Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong Social Security Society and the Social Welfare Practice and Research Center of the City University of Hong Kong.  The paper draws heavily from a background paper prepared by the author for the Regional Conference of the Union Network International/Asia-Pacific.

[2] G20, “The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform”, in http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf.

[3]  G20, “Statement of Leaders”,  in http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm.

[4] This law, enacted in the Depression years of the 1930s to rein in free-wheeling speculative investment banking, was repealed in l999, at the height of the era of financial “irrational exuberance” under US Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan (Mah-hui Lim, 2008).

27. Welfare Agenda in Japan: from the perspectives of historical development and the Asian Context

Welfare Agenda in Japan: from the perspectives of historical development and the Asian Context

Yoshinori HIROI

Professor (public policy)

Chiba University, Japan

hiroi@le.chiba-u.ac.jp

The aim of this article

The Democratic Party of Japan won the general election in August 2009 and this is regarded as a historic victory as well as a turning point forJapan, in a sense that it ended a one-party rule by the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) which lasted for more than fifty years in postwarJapan. Many of the policy promises presented in the election manifest of the Democratic Party are in the welfare or social policy area, as in the examples of increased and extended family allowance for children, reforms of healthcare system for the elderly, reorganization of pension system, etc. In part, this can be seen as a backlash against the many problems such as growing economic inequality caused by the so-called “Koizumi reform” with a strong neo-liberal orientation. In this context, victory of the Democratic Party can be interpreted as a beginning of a first government of social democracy inJapan. On the other hand, the Democratic Party of Japan still does not have a comprehensive vision or consistent philosophy in welfare policy or public policy in general, and its election promises look rather ad-hoc and fragmented including the financial issue for the expanded welfare benefits.

Now Japan is the most “aged” country in the world with its ratio of people over 65 years old is over 20% of total population in 2008 and still increasing, and is going thorough a fundamental transition both in terms of economy and society after the times of rapid economic growth until the 1980s and the downturns thereafter. The change of the political structure is located in this broader context, and welfare policy or how to redistribute wealth in the aging society is a critical challenge which is common in all the industrialized countries. Also the analysis ofJapan’s experience can provide new perspectives and implications for other Asian countries or developing countries, asJapanwas going through a different path of development as a “late-comer” from other industrialized countries.

With these concerns in mind, in this article I would like to (1) review the evolution of redistribution policy of postwarJapanboth from the viewpoint of industrial policy and welfare policy, (2) locate them in a broader context with a concept of “sustainable welfare society” and refer to the agenda including other Asian countries.

1. Failure in a Shift From Industrial Policy to Welfare Policy ? : Evolutions of Redistribution Policy in Postwar Japan

  For having a overall picture of the current status of welfare policy in Japan, please look at Figure 1. This is from the OECD database and it shows the volume of social protection expenditures as against GDP. Here we find that the government welfare expenditure inJapan is among the lowest in the major industrialized countries, almost equivalent with theUnited States, although the ratio of elderly people inJapan is highest in these countries as mentioned before.

Figure 1   Comparison of Social Protection Spending (% of GDP, 2005)

Source: OECD database

In a sense, this figure may be contrary to the general image ofJapan, asJapanhas been enjoying a relatively “equal” society in its image as well as in reality. Why are the government social protection expenditures are low inJapanand what is the background ?  What is the current situation regarding economic equality or inequality inJapanand what are the essential policy agenda?  And how do these relate to the change of political structure mentioned above?  In order to have a comprehensive understanding to these questions, here I would like to briefly review the postwar Japanese public policy from the perspective of income redistribution, and examine the dynamic relationship of industrial policy and social and environmental policies.

Stage 1: Policy Initiatives for “Equality of Opportunities” in the Postwar Era 

I tentatively divide the developments of postwar Japanese public policy regarding redistribution into four stages.

Stage 1 is the period just after the end of the WWⅡ. This was the period of occupation by theUnited Statesand this stage is characterized by the strong policy initiatives for “equality of opportunities.” Specifically, two policy developments were significant in this context, which are:

1) Radical land redistribution through the agricultural land reform

2) Mandatory education system of junior high schools

1)      was realized by the strong initiative in the occupation policy in order to dissolve the feudal land ownership. In 1946, the Special Law for the Creation of Landed Farmers was enacted and many agricultural lands were bought by the government and sold to the peasants. As a result, the ratio of landed farmers of all the farmers increased from 31 % in 1945 to 62% in 1950. 2) was also realized by the similar  initiatives in the occupation policy.

Both of these reforms, particularly the former, were radical in nature and had the very strong effect of redistribution. Also these two were common in providing people with equal opportunities at the early stage of life-course, and in retrospect, served as a basis for the economic development later as they provided the equal springboards for  the economic activities of individuals.

Figure 2  Initial Land Distribution and Economic Growth

Source:  World Bank (2005)

In this connection, Figure 2 shows an interesting relationship between the equality of the initial land distribution and the economic growth. There is a positive correlation between equal land distribution and higher GDP growth. We should note that we can find relatively more equal land distribution in East Asian countries with typical examples of Korea, China, Taiwan and Japan in comparison with other developing areas in the world. [1]

Stage 2: “Redistribution at the Production Level” in High Economic Growth Period (1950s-1960s)

The term “redistribution at the production level” may sound odd but this is the most characteristic aspect of redistribution policy in postwarJapan.

In the standard understanding of the welfare states, production is done in the system of market economy and income redistribution is done “afterwards” by the system of social protection and related mechanisms (progressive taxation etc). But in the period of high economic growth in postwarJapan, sets of policies at the production level rather than social protection or social policies play the major roles in income redistribution, and the roles of social protection as income redistribution were relatively small.

Specifically, typical examples of such redistribution policies were as follows and these can be categorized as “industrial policies in the broad sense.”

1) Subsidies to farmers (distribution from urban to rural areas)

2) Tax redistribution system from central to local governments

3) Industrial policies (subsidies to small-sized companies, declining industries etc.)

1)              was very important because this period coincided with a huge population transfer from rural areas to urban areas and the income gap between farmers and the urban residents was a major political agenda.[2] 2) was a strong redistribution mechanism of tax revenues from the national government to local governments, particularly of rural and poor areas. 3) was a redistribution policy among the various industrial sectors mainly done by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which some scholars pointed out as a key element of “economic success story” of postwar Japan. [3]

All of these policies had the character of government interventions in the production level and unlike the standard distinction in economics between “resource allocation” and “income redistribution,” both of these were mixed with each other through the industrial policies by the government. This was possible because of the continuous expansion of economy and the rapid process of industrialization of this period.

Figure 3  Government Expenditure in Japan by Policy Area  (billion yen)

Social protection(by tax) Tax Redistribution from Central to Local Governments Public Works
1958 122 224 190
1960 193 328 304
1965 546 716 726
1970 1152 1772 1441
1975 4136 3308 3487
1980 8170 6952 6896
1985 9902 9690 6891
1990 11480 15931 6956
1995 14543 12302 12795
2000 17636 14915 11910
2005 20824 15923 8015

Source: Ministry ofFinance,Japan

Figure 3 is the chronological change of government expenditure in Japan.[4] This shows that until the 1970s the expenditures of tax redistribution from central to local governments and public works were bigger than that of social protection, and these mechanisms played major roles in realizing equal distribution of income.

Japanachieved universal coverage of social insurance in 1961 both in health care and pension, but we should note that this was possible based upon the strong redistributive mechanism by other policies than social protection.

Stage 3: Dependence on Public Works and the Beginning of Redistribution by Social Protection for the Elderly (1970s-1990s)

Japanentered the period of low economic growth since the 1970s. In terms of redistribution policy, this period is characterized by the following two characters:

1) Dependence on public works as a redistributive mechanism

2) Beginning of redistribution by social protection for the elderly

As for 1), “public works as a redistributive mechanism” may sound strange, but this means that at this period government spending on public works came to take the role of income redistribution.

Figure 4  Pubic Works and Per Capita Income of Local Prefectures in Japan

             〔1955-1960〕                      〔1991-2000〕

Vertical Axis: Volume of Public Works per capita (Thousand Yen)

Horizontal Axis: Income per capita of each prefecture (Thousand Yen)

Source: Daiwa Research Institute, Economic Planning Agency of the Japanese Government, Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office

Figure 4 shows the relationship of the volume of public works per capita and the income level per capita in various prefectures inJapan. In the period of 1955-1960 there is no clear correlation between the two, but in the 1990s, there is a clear relationship showing that in the region where income per capita is lower, more public works by the government are done. This means that during this period public works came to take the role of income redistribution to low-income regions, apart from the necessity of public works themselves. In other words, “redistribution at the production level” that we discussed in the previous stage was still maintained here, and this type of “production-oriented” sets of policies, which had been effective in the period of high economic growth, gradually became the obstacles discouraging the development of social policies inJapan, particularly for the working age. Also dependence on public works as a redistributive mechanism had the effects of curtailing labor transfer and causing environment destruction, while contributing to lower unemployment rate at the surface level.

On the other hand, this period is also characterized by the beginning of redistribution by social protection for the elderly. As the elderly people are retired from the labor force, the mechanism of “redistribution at the production level” cannot be used. Therefore, redistribution by the social protection system becomes inevitable and during this period, with the backdrop of high speed of aging (ratio of people over 65 increased from 7.1 % in 1970 to 17.3 % in 2000), lots of policy developments regarding pension, health care and long-term care took place.[5]

Stage 4: Pro-Market Reforms and Their Outcomes (2001)

The last stage in the evolutions of redistribution policy in postwarJapancoincides with the so-called “Koizumi Reforms” since 2001, which is characterized by the strong pro-market or neo-liberal policy initiatives. Through the reforms, the system of “redistribution at the production level” or various government interventions in the market which had been the characteristics of redistribution policy in postwarJapanwas almost abandoned or minimized. In addition, expenditures of social protection were kept minimal. Although these reforms had the positive meanings of dissolving the vested interests and inefficiency in government interventions, one of the most salient negative effects was the increased income inequality inJapan.

Figure 5 Relative Poverty among the Working-age Population and Social Spending in 2000

Source: OECD (2005)

For instance, Gini Coefficient in household income after the redistribution increased from 0.3606 in 1996 to 0.3812 in 2002 (data from the Income Redistribution Survey by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare). Also Figure 5 shows that the relative poverty rate among the working-age population inJapan is among the highest in OECD countries, which is accompanied by the low social spending.

We reviewed the evolutions of Japanese postwar public policy from the perspective of redistribution, and the following evaluations may be possible.

First, in retrospect, one of the most effective and perhaps most successful sets of policy in terms of redistribution were the very strong policy initiatives for “equality of opportunities” in the postwar era, which provided a basis for economic development later on. Secondly, “redistribution at the production level” worked relatively successfully in the earlier period of high economic growth, while becoming the burdens since 70s and curtailing the development of social protection per se. The recent pro-market reforms to dissolve the negative aspects of government interventions led to the increasing income inequality.

These policy developments and their results can be summarized as a “failure in a shift from industrial policy to welfare policy.” That is, government interventions at the production level, which were successful in the period of high economic growth both in terms of efficiency and equality, became the obstacles in the latter half of economic growth period, and the pro-market reforms with the underdevelopment of social policies worsened the situations in terms of income equality. It is to be noted that this pattern is likely to happen in many latecomer or “catch-up”countries in industrialization or developmental states.

In addition, we should note that similar policy developments are detected in the area of environmental policy inJapan. During the middle of high economic growth period, the problems of environment were recognized as policy issues in late 60s and early70s, and some policy responses were initiated such as implementation of various laws and regulations regarding environmental protections, creation of Environment Agency (1971) etc.

But many of the policy initiatives regarding environmental protections were taken by government ministries in charge of each industrial sector (such as Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Public Works, etc) and were placed as residual policy areas. Recently, there are signs of new developments with the background of growing public concerns about environmental issues, but many agenda remain to be tackled. We see here the similar pattern as in the case of social policy, in a sense that policy initiatives which were oriented for economic growth or industry curtailed the development of environment policy.

So we summarize the foregoing discussions regarding welfare, environment and economy as in Figure 6.

Figure 6  Framework for the Policy Integrations of Welfare, Environment and Economy in the Dynamic Process of Economic Development

process of economic development

Development-oriented Quality of Life -oriented
Dimensions regardingHuman/Labour Industrial Policy Welfare (or Social) Policy
Dimensions regardingPlace/Space Land Policy(Agricultural Policy, Urban Policy) Environmental Policy

 

2Towards Sustainable Welfare Society : Agenda for Japan and Asia

   In the foregoing section we reviewed the evolutions of public policy in postwarJapan paying attention to the dynamic relationships of welfare, economy and environment. The fundamental reorganization of policies from development or production- oriented ones to the ones geared towards quality of life are needed and this coincides with the agenda that the Democratic Party which won the general election last summer is now facing.

Here, having a concept of “Sustainable Welfare Society” in mind, let us consider what kind of social model is to be designed and how it has relevance forJapanand other Asian countries.

 

Meaning and Implications of “Sustainable Welfare Society”

“Sustainable Welfare Society” is defined here as a “society where quality of life of individuals and distributional justice are realized in a sustainable manner for a long period of time under the finite natural resources and environment.” This concept has the following two basic policy implications.

First, this concept suggests the significance of integrating welfare or social policy and environmental policy by combining the term of “sustainability” and “welfare.” Many of the Asian countries are now going through the rapid process of economic development and accelerating consumptions of natural resources with the typical examples ofChinaandIndia, and so the problems of environmental sustainability are critical when we discuss the social policy issues. We need to incorporate the elements of environmental sustainability into the discourses of welfare policy in the contexts of rapid economic development in Asian countries.

Second, the concept of sustainable welfare society refers to “welfare society” as distinct from “welfare state.” There have been discussions about the differences between “welfare state” and “welfare society” and the transformation or evolution from the traditional welfare state to welfare society has been discussed in various contexts and this also has to do with the topics of civil society. In this sense there are common situations both in Europe and Asia, but at the same time there are differences which are not to be neglected because Asian countries have not experienced the welfare states in the European sense, in other words, institutionalized mechanism of redistribution by the government as in the cases of many European countries. We have to be careful about the term of “welfare state” and “welfare society” in the comparison ofEuropeandAsiaand in this context, too, the concept of “sustainable welfare society” can provide a common basic framework when we explore the future visions of society inEuropeandAsia.

Policy Context: Welfare and Environment

   Here let us consider the policy context regarding the meanings of sustainable welfare society.

Figure 7 shows the two major axes of policy choice. The horizontal axis concerns the distribution of wealth, in other words, the choice between “big government” and “small government.” The vertical axis, on the other hand, concerns the total volume of wealth, in other words, the choice between “growth-oriented” and “environment (or sustainability) -oriented” policy sets.

Figure 7   Two Axes of Policy Choice: Growth and Distribution of Wealth

Growth-oriented

Social Democracy          Conservatism

Keynesian Policy           Neo-liberalism

Big                                                         Small

Government                                                 Government

Sustainable Welfare Society ?

Environment (or Sustainability)-oriented

Horizontal Axis:  concerning distribution of wealth

Vertical Axis:     concerning total volume of wealth

Historically, there have been the confrontations regarding the horizontal axis and this made the backgrounds of two-party systems in politics in postwar advanced countries. That is to say, the left side in Figure 7 insists on the strong government interventions in market economy, such as social protection and public works, and by doing so tries to realize full employment and equality among citizens. In contrast, the right side insists that minimum government interventions are desirable for market economy and, in different contexts, insist that too much of government interventions erode the basis of family and community ties.

But the important thing to be noticed here is that although the two sides differ sharply in their views about the roles of the government, they are common in a sense that both of them are aiming at economic growth or continuous expansion of economy.

Since the 1970s and 80s, however, the vertical axis emerged and came to draw people’s attention. This is the confrontation between “growth-oriented” and “environment (or sustainability) oriented” as mentioned above, and needless to say, the major background was the emergence of environmental problems and related discourses. [6]  As a result, the arena of policy choice gradually shifted from the upper side to the lower side of Figure 7, and then the distance (or the differences) of the traditional confrontations between “big government” and “small government” became narrower. In other words, even the “big government” side has to think about the efficiency of government activities in the times of low economic growth and the assumptions of continuous economic growth should be reconsidered in the context of environmental sustainability. On the other hand, the “small government” side can no longer cling to the simple pro-market policies because the times of mature economy also mean the times of aged society, thus requiring at least certain levels of social protection for the elderly population.

Here comes the background where the concept of “sustainable welfare society” arises. That is, we have to think about a new social model which is neither a traditional welfare state nor laissez-faire economy, and also which is sustainable for a long period of time under the finite natural resources and environments.

We also have to note here that the contexts differ widely between European countries and Asian countries. The historical change I mentioned just now mainly concerns the cases in the advanced countries includingEuropeandNorth America. In these cases there have been the times of two-party system based upon the horizontal axis mentioned above, and then the vertical axis of environmental issues gradually arose. On the other hand, the Asian countries are now facing the two axes “at the same time.” In other words, Asian countries are confronting both issues of distributional justice and environmental sustainability simultaneously in the rapid process of economic development.

Agenda for Realizing Sustainable Welfare Societies in Asia

As for the environmental sustainability, the situations in Asia, at a first glance, look vary serious as, for instance, some gigantic countries such as China and India are now accelerating their economic developments and resource consumptions.

 

If we look at the trend of population from a longer perspective, however, the situation is not so pessimistic. For instance, total population ofJapanalready began to decrease in 2005 and, population inChina, too, is expected to reach its peak around 2033 (with its population of about 1.5 billion). Population inEast Asiaas a whole will reach its peak also in the 2030s (about 2.1 billion according to the UN population forecast). The backgrounds for such population stabilizations are decreasing fertility rates inAsiaand the aging population.

So we have the good chances of realizing environmentally sustainable societies combined with aged societies in Asiaas shown in Figure 8. On the other hand, although the population is likely to stabilize towards the middle of 21century in Asia, consumption of food, energy and other natural resources per capita are now accelerating there, and so the visions and policy initiatives for realizing sustainable welfare societies in Asia from local to national to regional level are one of the most urgent agenda.

Figure 8 Environmentally Sustainable Societies and Aged Society

EnvironmentallySustainable Society Aged Society
Characteristics “Steady-state Society”
Environmental Sustainability↑finite natural resources Stable Population↑aging and low fertility rate
Major Concept Circulation
between human beings andnature  inter-generational
Time Scale super long-term long-term

Let us turn our eyes from environmental sustainability to welfare or distribution of wealth. Figure 9 shows the relationship of economic development (GNI per capita) and income inequality (Gini coefficient) in Asian countries, and we may roughly detect a pattern of Kuznets hypothesis of inverted U-shaped curve although this is to be examined in detail more precisely.

Figure 9  Economic Development and Income Inequality in Asian Countries

Source: adapted from the date from World Development Report 2006

As for the domestic aspects of income inequality, measures should be taken in the contexts of public policy in each country. We should note here that in the cases of  rapidly industrializing countries including many Asian countries, not only welfare policy but also the industrial policy are crucial in achieving income redistribution and, as discussed in the previous section, the integrations of industrial policy and welfare policy and the appropriate transformation of policy orientations from developmental to QOL are essential. It is significant to conceptualize such policy models through comparative research in Asian and European countries.

In addition to the welfare issues at a national level, welfare at a supra-national level in Asiawill become significant. This may include 1) international cooperation in the areas of social protection, 2) “Asian Welfare Network” and 3) welfare state at a supra-national level. One example of 1) is a project by JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) regarding the implementation of old-age pension in the rural areas in China which started in 2006, [7] and various forms of international cooperation in the areas of social protection should become more active. 2) is the communications and networking of researchers, NGOs etc. in the areas of welfare or social policies including research. 3) concerns the the discussions of East-Asian Community and other forms of cooperation among Asian countries including the redistributive mechanism at the supra-national level inAsia.

Welfare agenda are becoming increasing critical in a new context both inJapanandAsia. Rapid speed of aging accelerates this trend.Japanshould reorient its policy paradigm under the new political leadership and seek for a new social model such as sustainable welfare society discussed here.

References

Institute for International Cooperation(2004), Development of Japan’s Social Security System, Japan International Cooperation Agency.

Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle.

OECD (2005), Extending Opportunities: How Active Social Policy Can Benefit Us All.

World Bank  (2005), World Development Report 2006 (Equity and Development),OxfordUniversity Press.


[1] But the relatively equal land distribution inJapan has been eroded in recent years as discussed later.

[2] Note that whenJapan tried to achieve universal coverage of social insurance in 1950s, ratio of people engaged in agriculture was around 40% of the total population, which is much higher than Western countries.

[3] For example, Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle.

[4] The column of social protection shows the social protection expenditure by tax and the expenditure of social insurance is not included.

[5] Among the total social protection expenditures inJapan, the spending for the elderly constitutes as high as 69.8% in 2006 and there are criticisms that social protection for working-age population is too insufficient.

[6] We should note that, aside from the environmental problems, the maturation of economic growth or material consumption was a factor behind the situations.

26. 中国劳动者工伤保险权法律保障的完善

中国劳动者工伤保险权法律保障的完善

林嘉*  杨飞**

摘要:

工伤保险权是劳动者依法享有的一项重要的社会保险权利,其核心是获得工伤保险待遇的权利。中国现行的工伤保险法律制度尚不够完善,劳动者的工伤保险权难以得到充分的保障。目前中国正在进行《社会保险法》的制定和《工伤保险条例》的修订工作。为了充分保障中国劳动者工伤保险权,应当扩大工伤保险权的主体范围,所有劳动关系中的劳动者都应享有工伤保险权;应当扩大劳动者的工伤范围,保留上下班途中受到机动车事故伤害认定为工伤的规定,同时缩小了不得认定工伤的范围;应当扩大工伤保险基金支付费用的范围;应当提高劳动者工伤保险待遇标准,尤其是一次性工亡补助金标准;应当通过加大对不参保用人单位的处罚力度和建立工伤保险基金先行垫付医疗费制度保障未参保劳动者的工伤保险权;应当简化工伤认定、劳动能力鉴定和争议处理程序,使劳动者及时获得工伤保险待遇。

关键词:劳动者  工伤保险权  工伤认定范围  工伤保险待遇

一、导言

工伤保险权是劳动者依法享有的一项重要的社会保险权利,[1]其核心是获得工伤保险待遇的权利。目前,中国在快速工业化的发展过程中,包括职业病在内的工伤事故呈现出高发的状态。如2008年全年生产安全事故死亡91172人,全年共发生道路交通事故26.5万起,造成7.3万人死亡,30.5万人受伤。[2]这些道路交通事故有相当部分发生在工作时间且因工作原因或发生在上下班途中。2008年中国认定工伤95万人,比上年增加19万人;全年评定伤残等级人数为38万人,比上年增加2万人。全年享受工伤保险待遇人数为118万人,比上年增加22万人。[3]由于现行工伤保险法律制度的不够完善,还有不少受伤劳动者难从工伤保险基金获得救济,其工伤保险权难以得到充分的保障。

中国工伤保险法律制度中存在的不足已经得到了相关立法部门的重视,当前国务院正在修改《工伤保险条例》,已经提上立法议程的《社会保险法》也对该部分进行完善。本文拟从中国劳动者工伤保险权的法律保障角度出发,分析目前中国工伤保险法律制度存在的问题,结合《社会保险法(草案)》和《国务院关于修改〈工伤保险条例〉的决定(征求意见稿)》来介绍目前中国工伤保险法律制度的最新发展动向,并从各方面提出保障中国劳动者工伤保险权的具体建议。

二、中国工伤保险法律制度发展的背景

中国自1978年改革开放以来,从社会主义计划经济体制逐步发展到社会主义市场经济体制,经济获得了高速增长,同时快速从农业社会、农村社会向工业社会、城市社会转型。2008年中国全年国内生产总值300670亿元,比上年增长9.0%。其中第一产业增加值34000亿元,增长5.5%;第二产业增加值146183亿元,增长9.3%;第三产业增加值120487亿元,增长9.5%。2008年末中国总人口为132802万人,其中城镇人口占45.7 %,乡村人口占54.3%。总人口中60岁及以上人口占12.0%,其中65岁及以上人口占8.3%。[4]2008年末全国就业人员77480万人,比上年末增加490万人。其中,第一产业就业人员占39.6%,第二产业占27.2%,第三产业占33.2%。2008年末城镇就业人员30210万人,比上年末净增加860万人。2008年末全国农民工总量为22542万人,其中外出农民工数量为14041万人。[5]这些数据表明中国的工业化、城市化、人口老龄化速度很快,城镇人口很快将超过乡村人口,并已经快速进入老龄化社会,这对中国社会保险制度的影响十分深远。

社会保险制度建设作为构建和谐社会的重要组成部分也得到了中国共产党和中央国家机关的高度重视。目前中国正处在社会结构的整体性变迁即社会转型的过程之中,存在不少影响社会和谐的矛盾和问题。2006年中国共产党第十六届中央委员会第六次全体会议通过的《中共中央关于构建社会主义和谐社会若干重大问题的决定》指出:“社会公平正义是社会和谐的基本条件,制度是社会公平正义的根本保证。必须加紧建设对保障社会公平正义具有重大作用的制度,保障人民在政治、经济、文化、社会等方面的权利和利益。”这里的“加紧建设对保障社会公平正义具有重大作用的制度”就包括“完善社会保障制度,保障群众基本生活。”2007年中国共产党第十七次全国代表大会上的报告明确提出“积极构建社会主义和谐社会”,“加快推进以改善民生为重点的社会建设”,而社会建设的重要内容之一就是“加快建立覆盖城乡居民的社会保障体系,保障人民基本生活”,其中包括“完善失业、工伤、生育保险制度”。执政党提出的“科学发展观”、“和谐社会”、“社会建设”等意识形态话语为包括工伤保险在内的社会保险法律制度的发展和完善提供了理念基础。正是在这一社会背景下,中国进行了《社会保险法》的制定和《工伤保险条例》的修订工作。

 

 

三、中国工伤保险法律制度的发展概况

中国的工伤保险法律制度建立于1950年代初。依据《中国人民政治协商会议共同纲领》第32条“逐步实行劳动保险制度”的规定,1951年政务院颁布了《中华人民共和国劳动保险条例》,其中包括工伤保险,此后又陆续颁布了一系列法规和规章,建立了与计划经济相适应的工伤保险制度。随着社会发展,这一制度逐渐暴露出一些问题,主要包括:工伤保险的覆盖范围较窄,只在全民所有制企业中强制执行;没有建立工伤保险基金和统筹,职工的工伤待遇全部由本企业支付,造成企业负担畸轻畸重;一些待遇规定不尽合理,不利于保护工伤者的利益;工伤认定和评残的标准和程序不健全;注重发生事故后的补偿,而忽视工伤预防和伤病康复。针对上述问题,中国从1980年代末开始对工伤保险制度进行试点改革,主要内容包括:扩大工伤保险的实施范围;调整工伤保险的待遇标准;建立工伤保险基金,实行工伤保险费统筹,实行差别费率和浮动费率。

1994年,全国人民代表大会常务委员会通过了《中华人民共和国劳动法》,其第三条规定:“劳动者享有……享受社会保险和福利的权利……”。第73条规定:“劳动者在下列情况下,依法享受社会保险待遇:……(三)因工伤残或者患职业病;……”。这就以法律的形式明确规定了劳动者的工伤保险权。

在试点改革的基础上,劳动部于1996年颁布了部门规章《企业职工工伤保险试行办法》,第一次将工伤保险作为单独的保险制度统一进行规定,对沿用了40多年的企业自我保障的工伤福利制度进行了改革,保障了职工的工伤保险权。该办法不仅规定了工伤保险的原则、工伤范围及其认定,而且对劳动鉴定和工伤评残、工伤保险待遇、工伤保险基金、工伤预防和职业康复、管理和监督检查、企业和职工责任、争议处理等事项均设专章进行规定。

2003年,国务院颁布了行政法规《工伤保险条例》,标志着中国工伤保险立法进入一个新的阶段。该条例共六十四条,分为八章:总则、工伤保险基金、工伤认定、劳动能力鉴定、工伤保险待遇、监督管理、法律责任、附则,对工伤保险的内容作出比较具体的规定。随后,劳动和社会保障部等又颁布了《工伤认定办法》、《因工死亡职工供养亲属范围规定》、《非法用工单位伤亡人员一次性赔偿办法》、《关于农民工参加工伤保险有关问题的通知》等部门规章和规范性文件,进一步完善了工伤保险制度。此外,各地也相继颁布了一些关于工伤保险的地方性法规、地方政府规章和规范性文件,例如2007年《河南省工伤保险条例》、2004年《北京市实施〈工伤保险条例〉办法》等等。

《工伤保险条例》施行以来,对保障工伤职工的合法权益发挥了重要作用。截至2009年6月,全国参加工伤保险职工已达1.4亿人。但该条例也存在一些问题:第一,各地对工伤认定范围问题,特别是上下班途中受到机动车事故伤害,以及因违反治安管理和道路交通安全管理受到伤害是否认定为工伤问题争议较大,需对工伤认定范围进一步加以界定;第二,工伤认定、劳动能力鉴定和争议处理程序复杂,落实待遇时间过长,严重影响工伤职工的合法权益;第三,对不参保用人单位的处罚力度不够;第四,未参保工伤职工的伤亡待遇难以落实;第五,工伤保险的适用范围、基金支出项目、缴费方式、待遇标准等也需修改完善。为解决上述问题,国务院法制办公室形成了《国务院关于修改〈工伤保险条例〉的决定(征求意见稿)》,于2009年7月24日全文公布征求社会各界意见。[6]

同时,中国也在抓紧制定社会保险法。2008年12月27日,全国人民代表大会常务委员会全文公布了《中华人民共和国社会保险法(草案)》征求社会各界意见。该法草案第四章为“工伤保险”,包括第29条到38条,对工伤保险进行了原则性规定。

四、中国劳动者工伤保险权的主体范围的扩大

工伤保险权的主体就是被保险人,是指直接对工伤保险标的具有保险利益,并享有工伤保险待遇请求权的主体,一般是指用人单位为其投保的劳动者。从各国工伤保险的发展史来看,工伤保险权的主体范围根据本国的经济和社会发展情况通过立法确定,并逐步扩大的。

目前中国工伤保险权的主体范围仍不能覆盖劳动法上所有的劳动者。《工伤保险条例》第2条规定:“中华人民共和国境内的各类企业、有雇工的个体工商户(以下称用人单位)应当依照本条例规定参加工伤保险,为本单位全部职工或者雇工(以下称职工)缴纳工伤保险费。中华人民共和国境内的各类企业的职工和个体工商户的雇工,均有依照本条例的规定享受工伤保险待遇的权利。有雇工的个体工商户参加工伤保险的具体步骤和实施办法,由省、自治区、直辖市人民政府规定。”第61条进一步规定:“本条例所称职工,是指与用人单位存在劳动关系(包括事实劳动关系)的各种用工形式、各种用工期限的劳动者。”据此,仅仅企业的职工和个体工商户的雇工享有工伤保险权,而事业单位、社会团体、民办非企业单位等组织的职工没有工伤保险权,这是十分不公平的,与劳动法和劳动合同法调整和保护的劳动者的范围相比也显得比较狭窄。[7]

我们认为,所有劳动关系中的劳动者都应享有工伤保险权。《国务院关于修改〈工伤保险条例〉的决定(征求意见稿)》将事业单位、社会团体、民办非企业单位等组织纳入了工伤保险适用范围,即将《工伤保险条例》第2条第1款、第2款修改为:“中华人民共和国境内的各类企业、事业单位、社会团体、民办非企业单位等组织和有雇工的个体工商户(以下称用人单位)应当依照本条例规定参加工伤保险,为本单位全部职工或者雇工(以下称职工)缴纳工伤保险费。”“中华人民共和国境内的各类企业、事业单位、社会团体、民办非企业单位等组织的职工和有雇工的个体工商户的雇工,均有依照本条例的规定享受工伤保险待遇的权利。”这一修改值得肯定。

除了劳动者本人是工伤保险权的主体外,劳动者的近亲属也可以在法定情形下享受工伤保险待遇,成为受益人。受益人的受益权是劳动者工伤保险权的延伸和发展。《工伤保险条例》第37条规定:“职工因工死亡,其直系亲属按照下列规定从工伤保险基金领取丧葬补助金、供养亲属抚恤金和一次性工亡补助金……”根据劳动和社会保障部2003年《因工死亡职工供养亲属范围规定》第2条的规定,工伤保险中的受益人范围包括职工的配偶、子女、父母、祖父母、外祖父母、孙子女、外孙子女、兄弟姐妹。这一范围实际上是“近亲属”,而大于“直系亲属”的范围(直系亲属不包括兄弟姐妹)。《国务院关于修改〈工伤保险条例〉的决定(征求意见稿)》将条例中的“直系亲属”修改为“近亲属”,扩大了申请工伤认定的主体范围,值得肯定。

五、中国劳动者获得工伤保险待遇权利法律保障的完善

(一)劳动者获得工伤保险待遇的权利概述

劳动者享有依法获得工伤保险待遇的权利,这是工伤保险权的核心,也是整个工伤保险法律制度的核心。该权利在性质上属于公法上的权利,产生的依据是法律的直接规定。《工伤保险条例》第2条明确规定:“中华人民共和国境内的各类企业的职工和个体工商户的雇工,均有依照本条例的规定享受工伤保险待遇的权利。”从权利实现来看,如果给付主体(即社会保险经办机构)拒绝提供给付或者双方当事人对给付的内容和范围存在争议的,应当通过行政诉讼来解决。

获得工伤保险待遇的权利一旦受到侵害,劳动者就享有获得损害赔偿的权利。《工伤保险条例》明确规定了劳动者对工伤保险待遇给付主体享有的损害赔偿请求权,其第56条规定:“经办机构有下列行为之一的,由劳动保障行政部门责令改正,对直接负责的主管人员和其他责任人员依法给予纪律处分;情节严重,构成犯罪的,依法追究刑事责任;造成当事人经济损失的,由经办机构依法承担赔偿责任:(一)未按规定保存用人单位缴费和职工享受工伤保险待遇情况记录的;(二)不按规定核定工伤保险待遇的;(三)收受当事人财物的。”

我们认为,上述规定更多是作为给付主体的监督机制存在的,而不是从劳动者获得社会保险待遇的权利出发的。因此,被保险人只能就法律规定的违法行为造成的损害请求赔偿,对其他造成社会保险权无法实现的行为则无法请求损害赔偿。因此,还应当扩大劳动者获得损害赔偿权利的范围。

(二)劳动者工伤认定范围的扩大

被认定为工伤是劳动者有权获得工伤保险待遇的前提,因此,工伤认定范围在一定程度上决定了劳动者工伤保险权的范围。《工伤保险条例》对工伤认定范围采取列举式立法模式,通过肯定性列举和否定性列举相结合的方式,明确了工伤认定的范围,详见下表。

《工伤保险条例》的规定

认定为工伤 第十四条:职工有下列情形之一的,应当认定为工伤:

(一)在工作时间和工作场所内,因工作原因受到事故伤害的;

(二)工作时间前后在工作场所内,从事与工作有关的预备性或者收尾性工作受到事故伤害的;

(三)在工作时间和工作场所内,因履行工作职责受到暴力等意外伤害的;

(四)患职业病的;

(五)因工外出期间,由于工作原因受到伤害或者发生事故下落不明的;

(六)在上下班途中,受到机动车事故伤害的;

(七)法律、行政法规规定应当认定为工伤的其他情形。

视同工伤 第十五条:职工有下列情形之一的,视同工伤:

(一)在工作时间和工作岗位,突发疾病死亡或者在48小时之内经抢救无效死亡的;

(二)在抢险救灾等维护国家利益、公共利益活动中受到伤害的;

(三)职工原在军队服役,因战、因公负伤致残,已取得革命伤残军人证,到用人单位后旧伤复发的。

不得认定为工伤或者视同工伤 第十六条:职工有下列情形之一的,不得认定为工伤或者视同工伤:

(一)因犯罪或者违反治安管理伤亡的;

(二)醉酒导致伤亡的;

(三)自残或者自杀的。

由于对工伤认定范围问题争议较大,《国务院关于修改〈工伤保险条例〉的决定(征求意见稿)》从两方面调整了工伤认定范围:

1.                删去了《工伤保险条例》第14条第(六)项上下班途中受到机动车事故伤害认定为工伤的规定。

这一修改缩小了对劳动者工伤保险权的保障范围,引起了社会的强烈反响。

删去的主要理由是:第一,2006年《机动车交通事故责任强制保险条例》实施后,上下班途中受机动车事故伤害的职工可以从机动车交通事故责任强制保险得到补偿,同时还可以通过民事赔偿的途径解决。第二,将机动车事故伤害纳入工伤保险范围而未将非机动车事故纳入范围的现行规定,导致了政策上的不平衡,有失公平。第三,工伤保险的目的主要是为因工作原因、在工作时间和工作场所受到伤害情形提供保障,上下班途中虽然可以视为工作时间和工作场所的延伸,但并不等于就是工作时间和工作场所,因此,删除该项并不会影响对工伤保险核心情形的保障。第四,实践中,由于住房商品化和人员流动性的提高,对如何确定上下班途中争议繁多、操作难度大。第五,从国外情况看,许多国家未将上下班途中机动车事故伤害纳入工伤认定范围;有的国家虽然将其纳入,但对“上下班途中”、“机动车”等概念作了严格限定,如仅限于单位提供的班车。不纳入的做法不仅更为简便、可行,而且妥善处理了与道路交通安全法的关系。[8]

我们认为,上述理由并不充分:第一,随着汽车的增多,上下班途中发生交通事故的可能性大大增加,如果劳动者被未交机动车交通事故责任强制保险的“黑车”撞到,或是肇事车撞人后逃逸,劳动者仍然无法获得有效的保护。况且机动车交通事故责任强制保险是在责任限额内予以赔偿,如果劳动者的实际损失超出责任限额,肇事者和车主又无力赔偿,劳动者再不能受到工伤保险的保护,对劳动者是极为不利的。第二,原来没有将非机动车事故纳入工伤范围导致了政策上的不平衡,应当在修改时将非机动车事故也纳入工伤范围,而不是将机动车事故排除出工伤范围。我国台湾地区《劳工保险被保险人因执行职务而致伤病审查准则》第4条规定:“被保险人上、下班,于适当时间,从日常居、住处所往返就业场所之应经途中发生事故而致之伤害,视为职业伤害。”这里的“应经途中发生事故”就不限于机动车事故。第三,上下班途中不等于工作时间和工作场所,但是与工作密切相关,劳动者上下班出行的目的均是为了工作,因此应当受到工伤保险的延伸保护。第四,与保障劳动者的生命健康权利相比,操作难度大不应成为理由。第五,其他国家和地区的情况也有相反的规定,如我国台湾地区《劳工保险被保险人因执行职务而致伤病审查准则》第4条的规定,足见将机动车事故伤害纳入工伤认定范围未必就不可行。此外,有记者采访了解后发现,此类通勤事故在工伤事故中所占比例并不太高。[9]可见保留也并不会增加工伤保险的负担。

因此,我们认为不应当删去上下班途中受到机动车事故伤害认定为工伤的规定,相反,应当借鉴台湾地区《劳工保险被保险人因执行职务而致伤病审查准则》第4条的规定,将“机动车事故”改为“事故”,扩大对劳动者工伤保险权的保护范围。

2.                删除了因违反治安管理行为和违反道路交通安全管理行为导致事故伤害不得认定为工伤的情形,缩小了不得认定工伤的范围。

这一修改实际上扩大了对劳动者工伤保险权的保障范围,值得肯定。工伤保险作为社会保险,目的是保障工伤职工的基本生活,应当尽可能缩小不得认定工伤的范围。违反治安管理行为和违反道路交通安全管理行为与犯罪相比,社会危害性较小,不宜将因这两种行为导致的事故伤害排除在工伤认定范围之外。

(三)工伤保险基金支付费用范围的扩大

为了更有效地保护劳动者获得工伤保险待遇的权利,《国务院关于修改〈工伤保险条例〉的决定(征求意见稿)》将由用人单位支付的一次性工伤医疗补助金、住院伙食补助费和工伤职工到统筹地区以外就医的交通食宿费改为由工伤保险基金支付。

我们认为,这一修改值得肯定,但还不够,一次性伤残就业补助金也应当改为由工伤保险基金支付。《工伤保险条例》关于用人单位支付部分工伤保险待遇费用的规定加重了用人单位的义务,在实践中部分用人单位因此不愿意支付这些费用,在理论上也不符合工伤保险作为保险制度的基本性质与其社会法的属性。从保险的性质与保险制度设置的目的而言,一旦发生承保范围内的险情,所有发生的费用都应当由承保人负担,社会保险在这一方面也应当具备保险制度的基本性质。同时,工伤保险法具有社会法的属性,是救治、补偿和救助三位一体的社会保障制度,以社会存在为本位,在人群依赖性程度提高时关注弱者利益,以社会整体优势保障职业伤害的受害者及其供养亲属的基本生活,以基金作为保障受害人及其供养亲属的基本生活的物质基础。[10]因此,工伤保险基金应当成为职工获得全部救治、补偿和救助的来源。只要用人单位参加工伤保险,劳动者因工伤所引起的所有支出和补偿都应当由工伤保险基金支付。

(四)一次性工亡补助金标准的提高

为解决部分地区一次性工亡补助金过低的问题,《国务院关于修改〈工伤保险条例〉的决定(征求意见稿)》提高了工亡待遇标准。征求意见稿设计了两种方案供选择:第一,统筹地区职工月平均工资低于全省月平均工资的,以全省月平均工资计发一次性工亡补助金;第二,将一次性工亡补助金标准由统筹地区上年度职工月平均工资的48个月至60个月提高到60个月至80个月。

我们认为,第二种方案对劳动者的补助更多,但一次性工亡补助金的标准还可以再提高。中国最高人民法院2003年《关于审理人身损害赔偿案件适用法律若干问题的解释》第29条规定:“死亡赔偿金按照受诉法院所在地上一年度城镇居民人均可支配收入或者农村居民人均纯收入标准,按二十年计算。但六十周岁以上的,年龄每增加一岁减少一年;七十五周岁以上的,按五年计算。”由此,民法上死亡赔偿金的标准是240个月乘以月均收入,远远高于一次性工亡补助金60至80个月乘以月平均工资的标准,这容易导致有些工亡职工的近亲属不选择工伤保险而选择民事赔偿。因此,应当加大一次性工亡补助金标准的提高幅度,使一次性工亡补助金和死亡赔偿金标准的差距在合理的范围之内。

(五)用人单位未参保时劳动者获得工伤保险待遇权利的保障

目前,用人单位未参保时劳动者的工伤保险权很难获得及时和有效的保障。《工伤保险条例》第60条规定:“用人单位依照本条例规定应当参加工伤保险而未参加的,由劳动保障行政部门责令改正;未参加工伤保险期间用人单位职工发生工伤的,由该用人单位按照本条例规定的工伤保险待遇项目和标准支付费用。”这一规定在实践中很难落实,由于《工伤保险条例》和《社会保险费征缴暂行条例》对未参保用人单位的处罚力度不够,用人单位不参加工伤保险、拖欠甚至拒不支付工伤职工待遇的现象很多,工伤职工难以获得及时的救治和补偿。

为解决用人单位不参保问题,《国务院关于修改〈工伤保险条例〉的决定(征求意见稿)》通过罚款、收取滞纳金、申请人民法院强制执行等措施加大了对不参保用人单位的处罚力度,促使用人单位积极参加工伤保险。这一修改值得肯定,但用人单位仍未参保时,劳动者如何及时获得工伤保险待遇的问题仍未解决。

我们认为,《国务院关于修改〈工伤保险条例〉的决定(征求意见稿)》至少应当规定工伤保险基金先行垫付医疗费的制度(简称工伤医疗费垫付制度),从而在用人单位未参保时更加及时和有效地保障劳动者的工伤保险权。有了该制度,即使用人单位没有参加工伤保险,职工在发生工伤后可以向工伤保险基金申请医疗费,使自己得到及时治疗,有效地保障了工伤职工的生命健康权。《中华人民共和国社会保险法(草案)》征求意见稿第37条规定了这一制度:“职工所在用人单位未依法缴纳工伤保险费的,不影响个人享受工伤保险待遇。发生工伤事故的,由用人单位支付医疗费用;用人单位拒不支付的,从工伤保险基金中先行支付。从工伤保险基金中先行支付的医疗费用应当由用人单位偿还。用人单位不偿还的,社会保险经办机构可以依照本法第六十条第二款、第三款规定的程序追偿。”我们认为,《工伤保险条例》在修改时应当作出相同的规定,最好再进一步,规定工伤保险基金先行垫付所有工伤保险待遇给付的制度,由社会保险经办机构对用人单位追偿并罚款。理由同前文所述,根据工伤保险作为保险制度的基本性质与其社会法的属性,工伤保险基金应当成为职工获得全部救治、补偿和救助的来源。况且,用人单位不参保与国家机关行政不作为密切相关,国家机关享有行政权力能有效地进行追偿,合理的制度不能让弱势地位的劳动者在用人单位违法和国家机关行政不作为时自己承担不利的后果,否则就有违公平正义。

六、中国劳动者工伤保险权程序保障的完善

目前,中国工伤认定、劳动能力鉴定和争议处理程序复杂,时间过长,严重影响劳动者工伤保险权的及时实现。根据北京市农民工法律援助工作站对按照法律程序办结的150多件工伤维权案件的统计,平均每个案件耗时约15个月。北京义联劳动法援助与研究中心主任黄乐平表示,他们办理的案件中最长的一件历经7年,在职工没有劳动合同和工伤保险的情况下,最少需要1年以上。[11]为保障劳动者获得工伤保险待遇的权利及时实现,《国务院关于修改〈工伤保险条例〉的决定(征求意见稿)》简化了工伤认定、鉴定以及争议处理程序,具体包括:

1.增加了及时报告制度。

用人单位在发生工伤事故后应当在24小时内报告。《工伤保险条例》第17条规定工伤认定申请的时效为1年。在实践中,由于种种原因,一些用人单位和劳动者往往在事故发生很长时间后才申请认定,证据材料已发生很大变化,造成人力资源和社会保障行政部门取证困难,无法作出认定决定。为此,《国务院关于修改〈工伤保险条例〉的决定(征求意见稿)》修改第4条第3款为:“职工发生伤害事故后,用人单位应当采取措施使受到事故伤害的职工得到及时救治,对死亡职工进行善后处理,并应当在24小时内以书面形式向统筹地区人力资源和社会保障行政部门报告;受到事故伤害的职工或者其近亲属、工会组织也可以以书面形式向统筹地区人力资源和社会保障行政部门报告。”但是,并没有规定违反该报告义务的法律责任。

我们认为,应当明确规定用人单位在发生工伤事故后24小时内不报告的法律责任,包括行政责任和造成劳动者损害时的赔偿责任。此外,还应当增加规定行政部门及时赴事故现场调查取证的义务:“人力资源和社会保障行政部门接到报告后,对于出现死亡的、重伤的或者5人以上轻伤的,应当及时赶赴事故现场调查取证,用人单位应当予以配合。”在工伤事故发生后立即进行调查取证,查清劳动关系是否存在和事故发生得原因等比较容易,大大有利于劳动者获得工伤保险待遇的权利及时实现。

2.取消了行政复议前置程序。

《工伤保险条例》第53条规定,在工伤争议处理程序中,提起行政诉讼前必须先进行行政复议。[12]为了便于工伤职工尽快享受待遇,《国务院关于修改〈工伤保险条例〉的决定(征求意见稿)》取消了行政复议前置程序,规定在发生工伤争议时,有关单位和个人可以依法申请行政复议,也可以直接依法向人民法院提起行政诉讼。这是真正能够起到简化程序作用的规定。

3.简化了存在劳动关系争议的工伤认定程序。

实践中,一些劳动者没有与用人单位签订劳动合同,发生工伤时用人单位往往否认存在劳动关系。这些存在劳动关系争议的工伤认定案件在申请工伤认定前,需要先就劳动关系进行仲裁,往往导致劳动者获得工伤保险待遇的时间十分漫长。为了解决这一问题,《国务院关于修改〈工伤保险条例〉的决定(征求意见稿)》规定,对人力资源和社会保障行政部门作出的不予受理决定不服的,可以不经过劳动争议仲裁和行政复议程序,直接向人民法院提起行政诉讼。

我们认为,该规定很难达到简化程序的目的,应进一步予以完善。有学者指出:“如果是因劳动者无法证明其与用人单位之间存在劳动关系,导致相关部门不予受理工伤认定申请。根据行政诉讼法的规定,受案法院也无权在行政诉讼中直接认定劳动者与用人单位之间是否存在劳动关系。最终,劳动者仍然必须先到劳动仲裁部门进行仲裁,证明双方之间是否存在劳动关系。如果有一方对仲裁结果不服,还需要到法院诉讼。”因此建议增加规定,由人力资源和社会保障行政部门对劳动者与用人单位是否存在劳动关系在工伤认定中一并认定,对认定不服的可以提起行政诉讼,从而减少劳动仲裁部门在劳动关系认定方面所耗费的时间,在一定程度上简化工伤认定程序。[13]这一建议值得赞同。

4.明确了再次鉴定和复查鉴定的时限。

为弥补法律漏洞,《国务院关于修改〈工伤保险条例〉的决定(征求意见稿)》规定,劳动能力再次鉴定和复查鉴定的时限按照初次鉴定的时限执行。

国务院法制办表示,通过上述简化程序规定,最多可缩减程序30%左右。[14]但这尚需实践来检验,而且是“最多”缩减程序30%左右,因此我们认为并没有从根本上改变程序的繁琐和漫长,仍需要进一步的完善。

 

九、结语

中国目前正处在一个急剧变革的社会转型的时代,劳动者为经济发展做出了重要贡献,但是,劳动安全卫生条件的恶劣使得工伤和职业病频发,劳动者的生命健康权受到极大的损害。工伤保险法律制度的完善,对于因工作遭受事故伤害或者患职业病的职工获得医疗救治和经济补偿具有重要的作用。因此,中国应当扩大工伤保险权主体范围、完善劳动者获得工伤保险待遇权利和其程序保障,切实保障劳动者的工伤保险权,从而实现社会公平正义。


* 林嘉:中国人民大学法学院教授,副院长,中国人民大学劳动法和社会保障法研究所所长,法学博士。

** 杨飞:中国政法大学民商经济法学院讲师,中国人民大学劳动法和社会保障法研究所研究人员,法学博士。

[1] 在中国,社会保险权包括养老保险权、医疗保险权、失业保险权、工伤保险权、生育保险权。

[2] 数据来源:中华人民共和国国家统计局:《中华人民共和国2008年国民经济和社会发展统计公报》,载http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/ndtjgb/qgndtjgb/t20090226_402540710.htm,2009年9月10日访问。需注意的是,本文中所有公报各项统计数据均未包括香港特别行政区、澳门特别行政区和台湾省。

[3] 数据来源:人力资源社会保障部、国家统计局:《2008年度人力资源和社会保障事业发展统计公报》,载http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/qttjgb/qgqttjgb/t20090519_402559984.htm,2009年9月10日访问。

[4] 数据来源:中华人民共和国国家统计局:《中华人民共和国2008年国民经济和社会发展统计公报》,载http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/ndtjgb/qgndtjgb/t20090226_402540710.htm,2009年9月10日访问。

[5] 数据来源:人力资源社会保障部、国家统计局:《2008年度人力资源和社会保障事业发展统计公报》,载http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/qttjgb/qgqttjgb/t20090519_402559984.htm,2009年9月10日访问。

[6] 参见国务院法制办关于《国务院关于修改〈工伤保险条例〉的决定(征求意见稿)》公开征求意见的通知,载国务院法制办公室网站http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/cazjgg/200907/20090700136637.shtml,2009年9月11日访问。

[7]1995年1月1日实施的《中华人民共和国劳动法》在第2条规定:“在中华人民共和国境内的企业、个体经济组织(以下统称用人单位)和与之形成劳动关系的劳动者,适用本法。国家机关、事业组织、社会团体和与之建立劳动合同关系的劳动者,依照本法执行。”2008年1月1日实施的《中华人民共和国劳动合同法》在第2条规定:“中华人民共和国境内的企业、个体经济组织、民办非企业单位等组织(以下称用人单位)与劳动者建立劳动关系,订立、履行、变更、解除或者终止劳动合同,适用本法。国家机关、事业单位、社会团体和与其建立劳动关系的劳动者,订立、履行、变更、解除或者终止劳动合同,依照本法执行。”

[8] 参见国务院法制办关于《国务院关于修改〈工伤保险条例〉的决定(征求意见稿)》公开征求意见的通知,载国务院法制办公室网站http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/cazjgg/200907/20090700136637.shtml,2009年9月11日访问。

[9] 参见王亦君、欧阳骆沙:《〈工伤保险条例〉修改公开征求意见结束  工伤保险五大问题悬而未决》,载《中国青年报》2009年8月17日第12版。

[10] 参见郑尚元:《工伤保险法律制度研究》,北京大学出版社2004年版,第34页。

[11] 参见王亦君、欧阳骆沙:《〈工伤保险条例〉修改公开征求意见结束  工伤保险五大问题悬而未决》,载《中国青年报》2009年8月17日第12版。

[12] 《工伤保险条例》第53条规定:“有下列情形之一的,有关单位和个人可以依法申请行政复议;对复议决定不服的,可以依法提起行政诉讼:(一)申请工伤认定的职工或者其直系亲属、该职工所在单位对工伤认定结论不服的;(二)用人单位对经办机构确定的单位缴费费率不服的;(三)签订服务协议的医疗机构、辅助器具配置机构认为经办机构未履行有关协议或者规定的;(四)工伤职工或者其直系亲属对经办机构核定的工伤保险待遇有异议的。”

[13] 参见刘姝宏:《工伤维权耗时1年以上成“常态”  专家:工伤维权程序需简化》,载法制网http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/0801/2009-08/07/content_1134760.htm,2009年9月11日访问。

[14] 参见国务院法制办关于《国务院关于修改〈工伤保险条例〉的决定(征求意见稿)》公开征求意见的通知,载国务院法制办公室网站http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/cazjgg/200907/20090700136637.shtml,2009年9月11日访问。

25. A Unified Universal Flat Rate Pension for Asian Community

A Unified Universal Flat Rate Pension for Asian Community

 

Henry T K MOK

Research Officer

Hong Kong Social Security Society

 

August 2009

Asian countries have been badly hit by the global financial crisis since October, 2008. But this situation is not unique. This kind of the global or regional financial crisis have been repeated from time to time since 1980s, and now become more frequent every 4 to 5 years. European Union are smart enough to develop a unified social and financial policy to fight against these crises. One of these is to harmonize the different country social security systems so that workers can move freely and work in different countries to bring up the economic growth of theUnion. Euro dollars is another financial policy to strengthen their unity against crisis. Hence, Asian countries have much to learn from the European Union. And definitely, a unified social security system would benefit the Asian economy. This paper aims to develop a model of unified flat rate pension for Asian countries.

Before we discuss the pension model, it must be emphasized that the fundamental layer of social security provision for every Asian country is the means-tested social assistance program. Social Assistance must be in place before we start to set up a pension system. This is because social assistance shall prevent people from living in absolute poverty so that none will suffer from hunger. With in-built system to promote work incentive, the social assistance program will facilitate people to work hard and later earn enough to stand up on their own.

But old people cannot work because of ageing, and therefore almost all of them will have no income. Apart from a minority who can survive with personal savings, the majority have to rely on social security provision, or they become dependent of their children. But the asset test of the social assistance program will prevent large group of the elderly from take up of the scheme. Hence the better arrangement is to provide a universal flat rate pension.

First of all, a flat rate pension is fair to all old people. Every old person gets the same amount of money for livelihood. It means equal treatment. Secondly, it will prevent any old people from living in absolute or relative poverty, as long as the pension benefit is up to the basic standard of living. It will mean a reduction of poverty rate by 10% to 20%. Thirdly, it will promote solidarity because all targets get the same benefit. In particular, it promotes gender equality. Fourthly, it is simple to administer. Every target is given the same amount of money. It is easy to deliver. At the same time, farmers can also benefit from the system in the same manner as the urban dwellers. The question is to pay how much pension per month per elderly.

Drawing lessons from the OECD countries, the average replacement rate for the first tier pension, including the basic and the minimum pension, is 31% of the average wage (See Table 1). Considering the level of Asian economy, it will not be possible to provide pension close to 30%. Judging from the fact that social assistance provision is around 15% in the majority Asian countries, 18% to 20% seems to be the optimal pension benefit. The replacement rate can be upgraded when there is economic advancement in the future.

Table 1. Replacement Rates of the First Tier Pension in OECD Countries

Country

Rates

Country

Rates

Country

Rates

Australia

23%

Greek

40%

New Zealand

38%

Austria

37%

Iceland

25%

Norway

33%

Belgium

38%

Ireland

31%

Portugal

44%

Canada

30%

Italy

22%

Spain

33%

Denmark

34%

Japan

19%

Sweden

34%

Finland

21%

South Korea

30%

Switzerland

26%

France

31%

Luxemburg

46%

United Kingdom

33%

Germany

24%

Netherland

34%

United States

20%

Average

31%

Source: Edward Whitehouse (2007) Pension Panorama: Retirement System in 53 Countries. OECD and the World Bank.

The United Nations (2007) did a simple exercise to assess the cost of universal pensions for those aged 60 or over in developing countries and in economies in transition. The exercise assumed a basic pension equivalent to US$1 per day in purchasing power parity. This is to prevent the elderly from living below the international extreme poverty line. The exercise also assumed that the universal pension could remain constant in real terms during the entire period 2005 to 2050. It was also assumed thatGDPgrowth would be sustained at the average rate achieved during 1990 to 2005, with growth rate capped at the most at 5% level. Countries with negative growth performance during the period 1990 to 2005 were not considered in the exercise. The results show that the cost of providing a universal pension is not very high. Out of 100 countries, 66 countries show that the cost is less than 1 percent ofGDPin 2005. Among these 66 countries, 34 are found that the cost is less than 0.5% ofGDP. All the Asian countries are found less than 1% ofGDPexceptVietnam,Sri Lanka,BangladeshandNepal. When projected to 2050, onlyNepalis found over the cost of 1%GDP. The whole exercise lends strong support to our proposal for a unified universal flat rate pension system inAsia.

The next question is how to contribute the cost of pension. The international practice is by contribution, and the use of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system, in which the current generation of employees pay contribution into a central fund and the pensioners draw out their pension from them. It guarantees the application of a prescribed formula to determine a certain wage replacement level. Hence, it is also called defined benefit system. It has the advantage of redistribution of resources and institutionalizes the practice for the young people to support the old ones. The individual account system or the fully funded system is not the usual practice. Among all the OECD countries, onlyAustraliaandMexicouse the defined contribution system. They prescribe a periodic contribution and future benefits depend on the level of contribution made and the returns on the investment of those contribution. They redistribute upward to the interest of the rich and are not congruent with the principle of social justice. There is no evidence in which the fully funded scheme would automatically increase savings and go into the productive investment, as the mandatory savings may be offset by a reduction in voluntary private savings. Hence, PAYG system is much preferred.

In our case, we can ask the employers and employees to each contribute 10% or adopt the tripartite contribution of each 6% by adding government contribution. Obviously, the lower level of contribution is easily accepted and welcome by the citizens. And most of all, the farmers are likely not earning enough to contribute. Even the use of  the international minimum wage standard, that is the 40% of the average wage, as the starting point for requiring the citizens to contribute, will almost prevent not only the farmers but also those working in the informal sectors from making contribution. Therefore, the government contribution will be the logical arrangement to support the elderly from the informal sector and those in the rural areas, since the government is likely to subsidize the poor elderly by the social assistance any way, if the pension system does not exist.

The employers are expected to support the system as currently they are contributing in average 9% to the country retirement schemes. (See Table 2)That means, as long as we keep the current level of employers’ contribution to 9%, the employers will not object to our proposal of universal flat rate pension. The employees in the formal sector will not denounce the contribution as the principle of personal adequacy is upheld and they are bound to benefit from the flat rate pension scheme. A simple calculation will tell that 15 years of retirement getting monthly pension of 18% will gain much more than 30 years or 35 years of monthly contribution of 6%. They may be jealous of those working in the informal sector and the farms equally benefit as they do but without contributing to the pension. At the same time, it is certain that they will approve the principle of social justice and lend the helping hand to their fellow citizens and the working poor. The first tier pensions of the OECD countries are good examples. Hence, the change of the fully funded provident fund schemes to the universal flat rate pension system is practicable.

From Table 2, one can easily tell that government contribution of 6% will help the pension schemes ofFijiand thePapua New Guineaworkable. The only difficulties are found in thePhilippinesandPakistan. But if we estimate the formal sector of these two countries by assessing the requirement of the percentage of the urban population to contribute for the universal flat rate pension, they are found feasible (See Table 3). In fact, the estimation shows that our proposal is workable, as the formal sector requirements are usually below 20% of the urban population. This means that this requirement is easily met in the majority countries ofAsia. Problems may be found inThailandandSri Lanka, as these two formal sector requirements are over 28%. But these difficulties are likely to be overcome as the average rate of urbanization in the past three decades inAsiaare almost doubled. Hence, it is expected that with the increasing rate of urbanization and economic growth inAsiain the next few decades, the universal flat rate pension of 18% is feasible even when the demographic ageing becomes two workers to support one elderly person in the decade of 2050s.

Table 3. Estimation of Formal Sector Requirement for Pension inAsia

Country

65+ in 2015

(% of total population)

Urban population in 2015

(% of total population)

Formal sector requirement (% of urban population)

Japan

26.2%

68.2%

38.4%

Singapore

13.5%

100%

13.5%

South Korea

13.3%

83.1%

16%

Malaysia

5.8%

75.4%

7.7%

Thailand

10.2%

36.2%

28.2%

China

9.6%

49.2%

19.5%

Philippines

4.7%

69.6%

6.8%

Sri Lanka

9.3%

15.7%

59.2%

Vietnam

5.8%

31.6%

18.4%

Indonesia

6.6%

58.5%

11.3%

India

5.8%

33%

17.6%

Laos

3.4%

39.8%

8.5%

Cambodia

4%

37.6%

10.6%

Pakistan

4.3%

37.2%

11.6%

Bangladesh

4.3%

35.2%

12.2%

Nepal

4.2%

39%

10.8%

Papua New Guinea

2.7%

40.6%

6.7%

Fiji

6%

56.1%

10.7%

Source: Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fight Climate Change. United Nations, 2008.

The only problem is how to set the retirement age. The average life expectancy age inCambodiaandPapua New Guineaare 58 and 57 respectively. They should set the age of claiming pension at age 55. The rest of the Asian Countries can set at age 60. If their governments worry about the sustainability and affordability of pension scheme, they may consider increasing the retirement age to 65. In this regard, they may take an incremental increase by three to six months every year so that the average life expectancy is at least 5 years ahead of the retirement age (See Table 2).

Table 2. Existing Retirement System inAsia(2005)

Country / Region

Retirement Scheme

Contribution

Life Expectancy

65+

(%)

GDP per

capita (US$)

Employee

Employer

Total

Bangladesh

Means-Tested

0

0

0

63.1

3.6

1870

China

Pension and Ind. Account

8

20

28

72.5

7.6

5896

Fiji

Provident Fund

8

8

16

68.3

3.9

6066

Hong Kong

Provident Fund

5

5

10

81.9

12

30822

India

Provident Fund

12

17.6

29.6

63.7

5.3

3139

Indonesia

Provident Fund

2

4

6

69.7

5.5

3609

Japan

Flat-rate and Earnings – Related Pension

7.3

7.3

14.6

82.3

19.7

29251

South Korea

Earnings-related Pension

4.5

4.5

9

77.9

9.4

20499

Laos

Earnings-related Pension

4.5

5

9.5

63.2

3.7

1954

Malaysia

Flat-rated Pension and Provident Fund

11.5

12.5

24

73.7

4.6

10276

Nepal

Provident Fund

10

10

20

62.6

3.7

1490

Pakistan

Earnings-related Pension

1

6

7

64.6

3.8

2225

Papua New Guinea

Provident Fund

5

7

12

56.9

2.4

2543

Philippines

Flat-rated Pension

3.3

6.1

9.4

71.0

3.9

4614

Singapore

Provident Fund

20

13

33

79.0

8.5

28077

Sri Lanka

Provident Fund

8

12

20

71.6

7.3

4390

Taiwan

Earnings-related Pension

1.1

3.8

4.9

9.8

27500

Thailand

Earnings-related Pension

3.4

3.4

6.8

69.6

7.1

8090

Vietnam

Earnings-related Pension

5

10

15

73.7

5.4

2745

Source:USgovernment. (2006) Social Security Programs throughout the World:Asiaand the Pacific, 2006. Social Security Administration Publications.

In short, if we keep the rate of contribution of the formal sector employees, including the civil servants, to 6% of the average wage, and promise for all the elderly to get a monthly flat rate pension of 18% at the age of 65 or higher till death, it is practicable to develop this unified system of universal pension for Asia. It will also mean a step closer to our Asian community and better Asian economy in the future.

24. The Social Security System: Coverage, Compliance, and Accountability Issues

The Social Security System: Coverage, Compliance, and Accountability Issues[1]

 

Homenet Southeast Asia, the Philippines

From Policy Brief on Social Security , MAY 2009

 

The implementation of the Philippine Social Security Law for private sector and self-employed workers typifies that of most other laws in the country – the good inten-tion is not matched by similar implementation. Workers in the informal economy continue to be under-represented in the membership roster of the Social Security System (SSS), and for such workers who are members, there is the critical issue of non-remittance of monthly contributions. The SSS, being a government-controlled financial institution, also has not been immune to problems related to politics, and to demands for more democratic control and representation.

Introduction

In 1957, with the founding of the SSS, the government implemented “The Philippine Social Security Act of 1954” and adopted the social insurance approach to social secu-rity.

The mandate of the SSS is to pro-vide “meaningful protection to pri-vate sector workers and their fami-lies against the real life contingen-cies of old age, disability, death, sickness, maternity and employment injury” by providing replacement income and funeral cash benefits. The SSS also provides loan privi-leges to all active SSS members.

With the enactment of “The Social Security Act of 1997,” SSS cover-age was expanded to include self-employed workers, agricultural workers, household helpers, parents employed by children, and minors em-ployed by parents. Also included are workers who can opt for voluntary cov-erage; i.e., separated members, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs), as well as non-working spouses of SSS members.[2]

The new Social Security Act has a penal clause which specifies punishment of fines and imprisonment for failure to comply with its provisions, and failure to register employees or himself/ herself, in the case of the covered self-employed.

The SSS has the necessary mecha-nisms in place. The crucial issues are how effectively it has reached out to and served its constituent base in the infor-mal economy, and addressed failure by members to meet their social security obligations.

The Social Security Commission

The SSS is directed and controlled by the So-cial Security Commission composed of the Secretary of Labor, the SSS President, and seven appointive members representing the workers’ group, the employers’ group, and the general public. The President of the Philip-pines designates the Chairman of the Commis-sion from among its members and appoints the SSS President and CEO. Since SSS funds come mainly from workers’ contributions, workers’ groups are demanding more democ-ratic representation and control over SSS deci-sion-making and the choice of its Board, which they say should have gender balance and seats not only for formal but also for in-formal workers.

Credibility and transparency need to be brought to the fore, given the recent appoint-ment of a controversial political figure very close to the President to the SSS leadership, and the past scandals involving questionable investments and expenditures.[3] The immedi-ate past President of the SSS, Corazon de la Paz, admitted that during her term, she had to resist proposals to use SSS funds for pro-poor government projects which are not defined in the Charter.[4]

Actual Coverage

Type of Member Number
Employee 21,527
    Regular 21,413
    Househelper 114
Self-employed 5,159
    Regular 1,270
    Expanded 3,373
    Farmers & Fishermen 517
Voluntary 694

 

Source:  Nora Mercado,  Head of the SSS Membership Program Management Department.[5]

The total SSS membership of 27.38 million as of March 2008 is close to ten million more than the membership in 1996, prior to the enactment of the new Social Security Law.[6]

Employed Persons by Class of Worker (In Percent)

Employed Persons (in thousands) 33,536
Total 100  
Wage and Salary Workers       52.8      17,707
       Private Households         4.7        1,576
       Private Establishment       39.5      13,247
       Government/ Government Corporation         8.0        2,682
       With pay (family-owned business)         0.5           168
Own Account       34.7      11,637
       Self-employed       30.1      10,094
       Employer         4.6        1,543
Unpaid Family Workers       12.5        4,192

 

Source: National Statistics Office, April 2008 Labor Force Survey

 

 

An analysis of the figures in tables 1 and 2 show the predominance (79 per cent) of workers in formal private employment in SSS membership. They com-prise 48.7 percent of the total employed population outside of government. The self-employed sector, to which the informal workers belong, constitutes only 19 percent of SSS membership despite the total share of own account workers to the total employed population outside of government being 37.7 per- cent.

Women as a group are also disadvantaged in terms of SSS coverage considering that majority of em-ployed women are in the informal economy. They also comprise the overwhelming majority (two-thirds to three-fourths) of newly hired Overseas Fili-pino Workers (OFWs) and domestic workers. There are less women (11,871,770) than men (17,670,345) in the membership roster.[7]

Similarly, there are some disturbing membership figures: Only 680,000 of the millions of OFWs are SSS members; 114,000 out of the 1.58 million do-mestic workers[8]; and only 6,000 out of millions of Fili-pino housewives (almost half of all Filipino women) who could be classified as a “non-working spouse.[9]

No less than the Head of the Membership Program Management Department of the SSS reported that only eight million of the more than 27 million SSS members are actually continuing their payments. Paying mem-bers comprise just one-third of the total membership and one-fifth of the self-employed membership.[10] This indicates a serious evasion and compliance problem.

Non-continuation of payments has implications on benefits that may accrue, particularly retirement bene-fits which require at least 10 years of continuous pay-ment, and even maternity benefits which assume that at least three monthly contributions during the 12-month period prior to the semester of delivery have been paid. Again, women who are less covered, who live longer, and who face sex-specific contingencies such as mater-nity, are more disadvantaged.

Immediate past president of the SSS Corazon de la Pazalso brings in the issue of whether informal workers, in particular, are willing to be covered in the first place. If they are, there are additional concerns of whether the irregularity of their income flows will allow them to meet the qualifying conditions for membership and sus-tain their monthly contributions.[11]

Acknowledging the dismal membership figures in the informal economy, the SSS in 2009 will embark on an intensive information and recruitment campaign for informal workers. The value of benefits for SSS members and the impor-tance of saving will be further emphasized.[12]

SSS Servicing

In response to pressure from informal workers and other groups, and to enhance its own viability, the SSS in recent years has expanded its payment channels in order to provide more access to informal workers, overseas workers, and other underserved groups. Monthly contributions may now be remitted, together with loan payments, through various modes; i.e., over-the-counter with the SSS, accredited banks, and non-bank collection agents; via mall payment centers; online; through an overseas bills payment system, electronic data interchange, and the Automatic Debit Ar-rangement (ADA).

Despite its efforts to expand its payment channels, the SSS still has a long way to go in terms of reaching out to infor-mal workers and other vulnerable groups. The ADApro-gram, a payments facilitation scheme conceptualized to serve this segment has not been that successful on the ground. SSS leaders report that just over a thousand ADAmembers remain active.[13]

 

 

Focus on the ADA

The Automatic Debit Arrangement (ADA) pro-gram is a payments facilitation scheme conceptual-ized by the BRW-DOLE (Bureau of Rural Work-ers – Department of Labor and Employment), SSS, NAPC (National Anti-Poverty Commission), and organizations of informal workers, and imple-mented in cooperation with accredited banks.

Under theADAprogram, informal workers can make their monthly SSS contributions through accredited banks via automatic debit from their savings accounts or over-the-counter transactions. The program allows workers in the informal econ-omy to open a savings account with a minimum deposit of only P100, instead of the regular P2,000-5,000 minimum deposit banks normally require. The maintaining balance is also set at P100.

The ADA is beneficial to the workers because: 1) it affords them the flexibility of depositing more money in periods when they are liquid, which gives them the peace of mind that this will cover future monthly payments; 2) it is a convenient way of making payments to the SSS; and 3) having savings accounts can encourage them to save for other purposes.

In its initial implementation, the BRW-DOLE and SSS facilitated participation in the program. Repre-sentatives from these agencies conducted orientation seminars in communities and brought application forms. The DOLE and SSS ensured rapid processing of the applications.

A focus group discussion conducted with nineADAparticipants from the Balingasa chapter of PATAMABA (National Net-work of Informal Workers) con-ducted on 3Au-gust 2008 showed some of the prob-lems which can affect implemen-tation of a well-intentioned program. One main problem was the dif-ficulty in making the monthly (P 104) payments due to lack of/absence of income. Thus, theADAscheme was marked by irregularity in monthly contributions and a high default rate. The combination of insuffi-cient account balances and irregular monthly pay-ments made it appear that theADAprogram was inef-fective, as it was expected that these payments were to be debited from the accounts. While the members realize the value of having savings accounts, they ad-mitted that it was not easy for them to save. Those who were able to make deposits found that they even-tually had to withdraw them.

There were difficulties encountered in transacting with the bank that originally serviced PATAMABA-Balingasa ADA members: payments were accepted only on Fridays, deposit slips for SSS payments were sometimes not available, the teller in charge of proc-essing payments was sometimes not present, and other depositors in line were given priority. It ap-peared that theADAparticipants were being discrimi-nated against.

The participants recognize the value of theADApro-gram in raising the awareness of both the workers and the SSS about the need for social protection by infor-mal workers. While some see merit in reviving theADAprogram, they are also concerned that they will still be unable to make their regular monthly contribu-tions. What they would like the DOLE and SSS to do is to conduct more orientation seminars on social pro-tection for informal workers and to continue to facili-tate the processing of more applications even without using theADAmechanism.

Some Ways Forward

The SSS must exert maximum effort to ensure that informal workers are effectively covered and efficiently served with respect to their social secu-rity needs. Their vulnerability and marginaliza-tion make these imperative. The following are recommendations gathered from various consulta-tions, dialogues, workshops and meetings of infor-mal workers’ groups with SSS officials and other stakeholders:

1. NGO-PO consultations [14] highlighted the need for the SSS to be more inclusive, to reach out to underserved sectors of the working poor such as tricycle drivers, farmers, fisherfolk, vendors, domestic workers, seasonal workers, and housewives/ spouses, and to devise more programs that ensure equality of access to benefits among people of different socio-economic classes.

2. Unemployment insurance and emergency loans must be provided to displaced and other informal workers especially during times of crises.

3. Sponsorships and subsidies from the national and local governments should be extended to those who cannot afford to pay the full SSS premiums particularly for those who enroll as self-employed and therefore pay both the em-ployer and the employee’s share.[15]

Local government units where various organi-zations are registered for accreditation as well as permits to operate can also provide subsi-dies to fully or partially cover SSS payments of their constituents

4. In order to facilitate universal membership, cooperatives, women’s and people’s organi-zations should be accredited as collecting agents of premiums.

5. Other collection mechanisms (through cell-phones, couriers, etc.) should also be devel-oped.

6.  Funds should be set aside to meet the im-mediate needs of SSS pensioners.

7. There must be an intensification of enforce-ment and monitoring efforts by the SSSwith respect to membership and compliance of members. Accredited banks and other pay-ment channels should comply with SSSrules and guidelines, particularly with regard to ac-ceptance of minimum payments.[16]

8. Monitoring of compliance by employers, especially in the provinces, needs to be im-proved and if possible be conducted by an in-dependent body.

9. Informal workers, in addition to formal la-bor, should be represented in the SSS Com-mission. Since SSS contributions come from workers, workers’ representatives should de-cide how best to use them based on the princi-ples of democratic control, transparency, and accountability.[17]


[1] Written by Nathalie A. Verceles and Rosalinda Pineda Ofreneo, based on inputs from HomenetPhilippines and MAGCAISA (Magna Carta for the Informal Sector Alliance) members, as well as proceedings of various workshops, meetings, and dialogues with SSS officials.

[2] Not yet covered are barangay health workers, barangay nutrition scholars, barangay tanod, and other workers in the government service who are considered part of the informal economy and who do community work in exchange for a small honorarium or allowance. Government employees who enjoy a monthly compensa-tion regardless of employment status are supposed to be covered by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), which provides social insurance to meet contingencies such as death, disability, separation from service, unemployment due to involuntary retrenchment, and retirement. GSIS should develop programs for informal workers in the government service to ensure their coverage., as proposed by the Magna Carta for Workers in the Informal Economy (MACWIE).

[3] Melisa R. Serrano and Mary Leian C. Marasigan, “The Bases of Insecurity of the Social Security System – Issues, Con-cerns, and Reform Proposal in the SSS.”Quezon City: University of the Philippines School of Labor and Industrial Re-lations (U.P. SOLAIR ) andFES (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung) 2002.

[4] Jimmy Calapati, “Safeguard funds, outgoing SSS head calls on members.” Malaya News,July 11, 2008. available at http://www.malaya.com.ph/jul11/news4.htm, accessedNovember 18, 2008.

[5] Symposium on “The State ofSocial Insecurity of Workers, the Informal Sector, Urban and Rural Poor: Structure, Benefits, Funding and Universal Coverage of the SSS and GSIS,”5 August 2008, University of thePhilippinesCollege of Social Work and Community Development (U.P. CSWCD) Diliman,Quezon City.

[6] Social Security System 2007 Annual Report

[7]  From the presentation of SSS Commissioner Jose Matula during the Multi-Stakeholder Forum on Social Protection for Women in Informal Economy, 14-15 August 2008, Bayview Park Hotel, sponsored by the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women(NCRFW) and CIDA.

[8] National Statistics Office, Labor Force Survey, April 2008.

[9] This even assumes that there are no male “non-working spouses” who are members.

[10] Nora Mercado, during the Symposium on “The State ofSocial Insecurity of Workers, the Informal Sector, Urban and Rural Poor: Structure, Benefits, Funding and Universal Coverage of the SSS and GSIS,”5 August 2008, U.P. CSWCD.

[11] Corazon. de la Paz, “The Challenge of Covering the Informal Sector: The Philippine SSS Experience.” Available at

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTHAILAND/Resources/333200- 1089943634036/475256-1151398840534/s 3_2_Philippines_Corazon.ppt accessedNovember 17, 2008

[12] Interview with Ms. Delia Lagaste, SSS Senior Communications Analyst, conducted by Nathalie A. Verceles .onNovember 4, 2008.

[13] MAGCAISA dialogue with SSS officials led by Vice President for Public Affairs Marissu Bugante, SSS Gallery,12 August 2008.

[14]  These refer to the NGO-PO Consultations on the Alternative Report on the implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights conducted by PHILRIGHTS for the NCR-Luzon ( 4 September 2008), Visayas (28 August ), and Davao (10 September), the final version of which was submitted to and uploaded by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-tural Rights (UNESCR) to its website.

[15]  In House Bill 1955 for a Magna Carta for Workers in the Informal Economy, it is proposed that the share of the employer for the self-employed members will be paid by government.

[16]  Reports from the ground reveal that banks accept only a minimum of P364 a month, when the required amount should only be P104. Sources include the focus group discussion with indigenous women members of PATAMABA conducted in Apugan, Loakan, Benguet by Lourdes Gula,10 August 2008.

[17] From the results of the workshop on national policies and programs, NCRFW Multi-Stakeholder Forum on Social Protection for Women in Informal Economy, 14-15 August 2008, Bayview Park Hotel. (Currently, formal labor is already represented in the SSS Board. There is also one woman member.) Previous recommendations go as far as workers and their organizations participating directly in choosing their representatives to the SSS Board, instead of the latter being appointed by the President of the Republic.